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Abstract
 Great progress for the rights of tongzhi (sexually and gender-nonconforming 
people) has occurred in Taiwan in the past two decades, culminating in the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in 2019. However, it is still not uncommon for parents to take their 
tongzhi son or daughter to see a spirit medium or psychiatrist in an attempt to ‘cure’ them 
of their same-sex attraction. In Confucian ideology, which is central to the culture of 
Taiwan, a filial son or daughter is one who marries heterosexually and produces progeny 
to continue the family line. Tongzhi who do not do so are therefore violating this 
traditional view of filial piety. In the face of these challenges, tongzhi members of the 
Daoist Brilliant Light Temple have created fictive kin relations that provide them with 
emotional and social support. They have become adopted sons and daughters of the 
Rabbit God (who is the deification of a man who desired another man), and through their 
devotion and obedience they are being filial to their spiritual father. The members also 
use the religious concepts of reincarnation and karmic destiny to explain the familial 
connections they feel with each other. This thesis also examines how Master Lu of 
Brilliant Light Temple and Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei have supported tongzhi 
individuals and tongzhi rights. In addition to exploring the intersection of East Asian 
religions and tongzhi experiences—a topic rarely addressed in the literature—this thesis 
also makes a new connection between tongzhi and Buddhist and Daoist clergy. Because 
they do not marry and bear progeny, celibate religious figures have historically fallen 
outside of Confucian norms in China’s history, and contentious attitudes towards clergy 
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continue to the present in Taiwan. Tongzhi’s creation of fictive kin networks for support, 
and their reinterpretation of filial piety, mirrors longer traditions among celibate monks, 
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1.1 My Project 
It was a case of heartbreak that first brought Evan, a 30-year-old butcher in 
Taipei, to a small Daoist temple in a neighboring city. However, this temple would 
provide a system of support during times of conflict with his family. In my interview with 
Evan he told me that when he was 19 years old and in his second year of university, his 
parents, grandparents, and other members of his extended family took him to see a 
psychiatrist in Taipei to try and ‘cure’ him of his desire for other men.1 The psychiatrist 
tried to explain to Evan’s family that he was not sick, and that being attracted to people of 
the same gender is not an illness. Evan’s family had already taken him to various temples 
to see mediums who tried to rid him of his desires. They put so much pressure on the 
psychiatrist that the doctor eventually prescribed Evan a concentration improving 
medication just to appease his parents so that they would let Evan leave the hospital. 
Evan continued to experience conflict with his family because they wouldn’t accept his 
sexuality—and it reached a point where he became suicidal. 
Evan’s experience is not unique. Family is a major source of conflict for those 
who do not conform to heteronormative sexual and gender identities in Taiwan. It is the 
conception of the family in traditional Chinese thought—and the fundamental concept of 
filial piety—that leads to this conflict and struggle for parents and other relatives to 
																																								 																				
1 Initial interview on October 11, 2020; follow-up interview on October 31, 2020. 
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accept a family member who has same-sex desires. The family, and not the individual, is 
the irreducible unit; family is the base of society in East Asian countries like Taiwan that 
have a culture shaped by Confucian ideology (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007). Within 
the family, filial piety is a central value. Being filial means obeying and looking after 
one’s parents and grandparents, and it also includes the imperative to marry and continue 
the family line. As I will describe in Chapter 3, this was an expectation Evan’s parents 
had: they wanted him to marry (a woman) and have children. In the traditional sense, 
Evan is not filial. However, as I will argue in this thesis, he and others have reinterpreted 
the fundamental concept of filial piety. 
One must be careful not to assume all queer communities around the world share 
the same history, struggles, and conceptions of identity. This is why throughout my thesis 
I will use the term that is most popular contemporary word used in Taiwan by same-sex 
attracted people, those who are transgender (kuaxingbie), and others who are sexually and 
gender nonconforming. That word is tongzhi, which means ‘comrade’ (I will discuss the 
history and politics of this term in more detail in Chapter 2). However, much of my thesis 
will focus on male tongzhi. This is a result of 1) reviewing the scholarship on the history 
of same-sex love in the Chinese-speaking world, much of which focuses on male same-
sex love because of the records that exist; and 2) the people I interviewed. 
In my thesis I will focus on what makes Taiwan’s tongzhi identity and history 
unique and different from the Euro-North American LGBTQ community. I do this by 
examining how same-sex love was described and discussed throughout China’s history, 
how previously fluid conceptions of sexuality gave way to more fixed identities at the 
turn of the 20th century, and finally I examine the terminology used in Chinese-speaking 
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societies today. I will also explore the ways in which the weight of family values and 
obligations has created a culturally distinct set of challenges for tongzhi in Taiwan. In the 
course of navigating familial responsibilities, tongzhi (and non-tongzhi) have formed 
fictive kin relations that provide them with support. In doing so they are also 
reinterpreting notions of filial piety. In their creation of fictive kinship and their 
reinterpretation of filial piety, they are not unlike celibate religious clergy in Taiwan who 
have also forsaken their familial obligations. My research also addresses a gap in the 
literature, as little scholarship has been done on the intersection of tongzhi and East Asian 
religions such as Buddhism and Daoism.2 
1.2 Arrangement of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 examines the history of same-sex love in China and Taiwan, from 
ancient times up to the present day in Taiwan. The earliest records attest to the fluidity of 
sexuality in Chinese society, and this fluidity can be seen again in contemporary times 
with the use of the term tongzhi. I begin by reviewing historical scholarship on same-sex 
love in China, demonstrating that in many periods of Chinese history same-sex love was 
widely practiced and accepted (Hinsch 1990; Vitiello 1992; Wu 2004). I draw on this 
scholarship to argue that in same-sex acts, it was the difference in social standing and 
power that was more important than each participant’s gender. The idea that the man who 
took the active, inserter role and the subordinate insertee shared the same social category 
(what could be described as homosexual today) did not exist in traditional Chinese 
																																								 																				
2 The one example I found was Huinan Yang’s (2005) study of the ‘Child-Brahman 
Abode’ (tong fanjing she), which he describes as the first tongzhi Buddhist group in 
Taiwan. Yang deployed an online survey, and found that one of the main issues that this 
group was concerned with was whether or not same-sex love violates Buddhist precepts, 
and if all beings have an equal standing of attaining enlightenment.	
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thought (Chou 2000). In the dynastic period in China, men manifested sexuality 
differently, depending on their stage in life, with adolescents taking the passive sexual 
role and adult men taking the active role (Hinsch 1990). I draw on Foucault’s second 
volume of The History of Sexuality when discussing this fluidity, as well as when I 
examine how in China love for the same sex and for the other sex were not seen as two 
exclusive choices or radically different types of behavior. In large part, because of the 
Confucian emphasis on family responsibility, men were still expected to marry women 
and sex within marriage served the procreative purpose of producing heirs. While what 
we would call ‘bisexuality’ today prevailed over exclusive same-sex love in much of 
China’s history, I argue that using words such as ‘homosexual’ or ‘bisexual’ is 
problematic, as the concept of sexual orientation did not exist and the men who engaged 
in same-sex love did not identify with a particular sexual identity or essence. 
Throughout Chapter 2 I also examine the terminology used to describe and label 
same-sex love throughout China’s history, as well as in contemporary Chinese-speaking 
societies such as Taiwan. I move from the time of Imperial China (during which there 
was no medical or scientific term equivalent to ‘homosexuality’) to the turn of the 20th 
century, at which time Chinese intellectuals and elites turned away from Confucian and 
neo-Confucian cosmological understandings of gender and sexuality, and turned instead 
to the natural sciences, importing, translating, and reinterpreting Western sexology to 
explain all matters of sexuality, including same-sex love. I demonstrate how the ideas 
around same-sex desire linked sexuality to procreation, and ‘heterosexualized’ the 
Confucian marital-reproductive institution while pathologizing same-sex love as a 
byproduct (Chou 2000; Dikötter 1995) 
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I then turn to the contemporary era, briefly examining the trajectory that tongzhi 
rights have taken in Taiwan from the 1990s to the present day. I also examine the 
terminology used by same-sex attracted communities in Chinese-speaking societies 
(China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) today. I conclude Chapter 2 by arguing that the term 
tongzhi is more appropriate for these communities than the Western terms gay, lesbian, 
queer, and ‘LGBTQ’. I explain that this is because of the different history of same-sex 
love in the Chinese-speaking world, and because tongzhi is more fluid in that it can refer 
to any form of sexuality that has been marginalized by hegemonic heterosexuality.  
Chapter 3 analyzes how religious practitioners and worshippers navigate the 
pressures of family responsibility and use religious frameworks to reinterpret kinship and 
the traditional Confucian concept of filial piety. This chapter describes how the family is 
the most basic and significant social institution in Chinese societies, and that within 
familial relationships the concept of filial piety is of central value. Filial piety means to 
respect and be obedient to one’s parents, elders, and ancestors; this includes having 
children and continuing the family line. Drawing on scholarship as well as my own 
ethnographic work, I argue that this expectation of marrying heterosexually and having 
progeny makes it challenging for parents in Taiwan to fully accept and support tongzhi. 
The largest challenge for most tongzhi is not discrimination from the state, job 
discrimination, or religious oppression—but the family, especially the parents (Chou 
2000).  
Scholars whose research has focused on tongzhi have demonstrated that the 
family-kin relation can be used to integrate a tongzhi family member’s partner into the 
family, and alternately that the same Chinese kinship system can also be used to create a 
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sense of an imagined community for tongzhi (Anderson 1983; Chou 2000; Wong and 
Zhang 2001). In relation to these discussions, I argue that both tongzhi and non-tongzhi 
members of a Daoist temple (‘Brilliant Light Temple’) in Taiwan have used religious 
beliefs and ritual to create fictive kin relations that provide them with emotional and 
social support. I draw on ethnographic fieldwork to demonstrate how some members 
have become adopted children of a deity (the Rabbit God) who cares about their well-
being and specifically intervenes in their romantic lives. I will also demonstrate how 
members use other religious beliefs—namely reincarnation—to explain the familial 
connection they feel with each other at the temple.  
Scholars in the field of China and Taiwan studies have argued that filial piety can 
be reinterpreted. I draw on this scholarship to argue that these members are attempting to 
be filial through their devout dedication to the god that has adopted them as children. In 
doing so they are also mirroring the practices of celibate religious figures who, since they 
too do not have progeny, have long been outside of Confucian norms in the history of 
China and Taiwan. I will explain how celibate clergy have reinterpreted the notion of 
filial piety through their religious activities. 
Chapter 4 is a pragmatic-poetic analysis of statements made by Taiwanese 
Buddhist scholar-nun Shih Chao Hwei at a public hearing in support of same-sex 
marriage.3 I translate and analyze four excerpts from Shih’s speech, choosing parts of her 
speech that were quoted by media outlets and discussed online by people in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Since Shih is responding to arguments made by quasi-Christian 
																																								 																				
3	For Chinese names and terms I use the pinyin system of romanization for Mandarin 
Chinese. However, I have kept some people and places’ names in the romanization 
system they use (for example Shih Chao Hwei and Chou Wah-Shan, whose names are in 
the Wade-Gilles system, and Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian Church in Taipei).	
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organizations and NGOs that publicly rallied against same-sex marriage, I examine the 
recent scholarship examining these groups. I demonstrate that many of these 
organizations drew on the traditional Chinese cultural notions of family and filial piety to 
try and sway public opinion in Taiwan against the legalization of same-sex marriage. I 
demonstrate that Shih critiques her opponents’ ideas of what constitutes a family, and she 
does so by questioning the procreative purpose of marriage. I also demonstrate how Shih 
challenges and dismisses her opponents’ logic, through the use of argumentative 
strategies such as rhetorical questions as well as repetition and rapid pacing. I continue 
some of the points I made in Chapter 3, arguing that Shih’s support for tongzhi and her 
fight against those who oppose same-sex marriage draws from her own personal 
experience as a woman who is not having children and is therefore unfilial according to 
traditional Chinese beliefs.  
1.3 Reflexivity 
In many ways I am an outsider to the community that I have engaged with and 
researched in this thesis. I am not from Taiwan, and—unlike some of the people I spoke 
with—I am heterosexual. Therefore, my life experiences have differed from many of the 
people I interviewed. I also have to acknowledge that I have a lot of privilege—being a 
white, cis-gender man who is a Canadian citizen, university educated, and currently 
studying at an American university. However, despite the many differences, there are 
some points of shared experience. Like those I spoke to for my research, I grew up in a 
religious household and practiced religion well into my early adult years. Furthermore, I 
also grappled with my religious beliefs and sexuality as a young adult. It was these 
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experiences—as well as my experience as an immigrant—that have shaped my interests 
and led me to this project. 
I was born in South Africa, and ever since I can remember, every Sunday my 
family and I would go to church. My and my siblings’ lives were infused with Christian 
values passed down from church, our parents, and school. When I was 13 years old, my 
family left South Africa and moved to Hamilton, Canada. This had a huge impact on my 
life. I experienced culture shock—I recognized that my family and I came from a 
different cultural background, and I saw these differences between us and my new 
Canadian classmates, teachers, and others. My family continued going to church, finding 
a Baptist church that was less formal than the Methodist one we had grown up attending, 
and one which I would describe as being fairly moderate in its outlook. After moving 
from Ontario to the Vancouver region in 2004, my family found another church 
(belonging to the Alliance denomination). Youth group was a welcome avenue for 
making friends, since, having moved halfway through Grade 10, I struggled to forge deep 
connections in my new high school. When I started university I began to seriously 
question my faith. Frustrated with church politics—and recognizing through my literature 
studies that the Bible can’t be separated from its sociohistorical setting—I decided in the 
summer before my third year of university that I was no longer Christian. However, I still 
had a lot of questions about religion in general. I set out to study the religions of the 
world and read their scriptures, and ending up double majoring, adding Religious Studies 
to my English Literature degree. 
It was around this time that I began my first real relationship and—after years of 
being told by the church to ‘wait until marriage’—I had to figure out my own sexuality 
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and how I was comfortable acting in a relationship. I found all of this quite 
overwhelming—I was no longer Christian, but felt the weight of all the doctrine I had 
grown up learning, and still felt the pull of the Church. Christianity had provided me with 
many of the values I had, and I had to decide which I still wanted to keep, and which I 
wanted to reinterpret. I still had a lot of Christian friends from youth group and young 
adult groups in the church, and occasionally went to church when I came home from 
campus to visit my parents. Though I was no longer Christian, I still felt guilt and shame 
about being sexually active, knowing that my Christian friends, the church, and my 
parents to some extent would not fully approve of the actions I was taking with my 
girlfriend at the time. I realized that religion and sexuality were powerful forces in my 
life, and this was reflected in my studies: many of my papers—whether in my literature 
classes or religious studies—focused on religion, or sexuality, or their intersection. I will 
never fully understand what many of the people I spoke to in Taiwan have experienced, 
being LGBTQ (or tongzhi). But navigating my own sexuality—even if it was just 
heterosexuality—was still a challenge for me, because of my religious beliefs.  
In 2014, when I was studying journalism and applying for a fellowship to produce 
my own radio series, I drew on these previous experiences to come up with a project. 
After speaking with one of my younger sister’s friends, who is lesbian and comes from a 
conservative Hindu family, I decided to focus on telling the stories of LGBTQ people 
who are people of color (and/or immigrants) in Metro Vancouver (see G. Fisher, Pride 
and Prejudice, 2014). I found producing this series to be very intellectually stimulating 
and fascinating. Some years later, when I decided I wanted to go into graduate studies, I 
knew I wanted to focus on religion in Taiwan, and so I began thinking of issues related to 
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religion that would be stimulating and productive to explore. I followed with interest 
when, in May 2017, the Constitutional Court first said that same-sex marriage is a 
constitutional right, giving Taiwan’s government two years to change the marriage law. It 
was further interesting to see Christian groups speak out against this change—since this 
is not a major religion in the country. I questioned what leaders and followers of 
Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religion—which are practiced by far more people in 
Taiwan—had to say on the issue. This is what led to my thesis project. 
 From a young age I have been thinking about identity and belonging, because of 
my experiences emigrating from South Africa to Canada. I wrestled with issues of 
religion and sexuality in my personal life as a young adult, and though I will never fully 
understand what it means to be LGBTQ or tongzhi, I have tried to use my experiences 
and struggles to try and relate to the people I contacted and interviewed for this project. 
Over the time that I’ve been in graduate school I’ve learned that one of my own sisters 
identifies as queer, which has given me an even more personal motivation to relate to the 
experiences of others who are not cis-gender and heterosexual like me.  
1.4 Methodology, or, Virtual Ethnography in the Time of Covid 
While stating one’s positionality is important for anthropologists, so is 
recognizing that the ethnographer is not a neutral observer. The whole process of 
ethnographic work—formulating and asking interview questions, interpreting and writing 
up data—is affected by one’s position and background. In my previous career as a 
journalist, I tried to be aware of asymmetrical power dynamics, and how my background 
could potentially bias the way I approached stories and sources. Like anthropologists, 
journalists are also very concerned about the subconscious biases they are bringing into 
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their work—however, instead of stating our positionality in our work we tend to strive for 
‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’. While studying journalism my colleagues, instructors and I 
discussed this approach at length, and we recognized that it is inherently flawed and 
largely impossible to achieve (can we ever be truly objective?). Yet, perhaps for a lack of 
another method, it is my understanding that most reporters take this approach. We try to 
be aware of any biases we have, be fair and measured in our approach to all the sources 
we speak to, ‘see the story from all sides’, and be careful about inserting our voice into 
our story (unless one is a columnist, and typically columnists are no longer allowed to 
write straight news for that reason). As a university educated Caucasian, cis-gender 
heterosexual man, I have a certain amount of privilege, and my experiences and 
perspectives differed from many of the people I interviewed. I tried to be aware of this in 
my journalism work.  
My training in anthropology through the graduate program at the University of 
South Carolina has taught me to continue and strive for further reflexivity in my work as 
an anthropologist. Before embarking on my research, I also completed the Collaborative 
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI), which covers important aspects of working with 
human subjects—such as informed consent and how to properly safeguard and protect 
data gathered during fieldwork. The American Anthropological Association also provides 
a useful ethical guideline for ethnographers to follow. As stated in the Association’s 
Principles of Professional Responsibility, anthropology is a wholly social enterprise, one 
that always involves others—such as research participants, colleagues, students, funders 
and so forth. Therefore, “anthropologists must be sensitive to the power differentials, 
constraints, interests and expectations characteristic of all relationships” (AAA 2012). As 
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per these principles, I need to be transparent regarding the purpose, methods, and 
outcomes of my work. The principles point out that, like informed consent, transparency 
is an ongoing process that involves the making of principled decisions prior to beginning 
the research as well as encouraging participation, engagement, and open debate 
throughout its course (AAA 2012). These guidelines also state that I have an ethical 
obligation to consider the potential impact of my research and its dissemination. 
I followed these guidelines while doing research over the summer, fall, and winter 
months of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic meant that it was not possible to conduct 
ethnographic fieldwork in Taiwan in the summer between my first and second year of the 
Masters program. The University of South Carolina and the U.S. government 
recommended that people avoid non-essential travel outside (and even within) the 
country, and on March 18, 2020, the government of Taiwan decided to close its borders 
to all foreign visitors (Everington 2020). Therefore, I had to conduct all of my interviews 
virtually, using video-calling technology. This was not without its challenges. I reached 
out to people I wanted to interview by emailing them or sending messages through 
various social media channels. I began by contacting the core individuals and groups 
discussed in my prospectus. However, even though I had already established contact with 
some, I struggled to reconnect and arrange interviews over the summer. I began searching 
more broadly for people, religious groups, and tongzhi organizations that could fit my 
research focus. However, I continued to be met with silence—or, after a promising reply, 
contact would fall away. I sent follow-up messages, and even stayed up to the later hours 
to phone one of the organizations I really wanted to speak to. I am not entirely sure why 
my attempts were unsuccessful, though I have several conjectures based on my own 
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knowledge of Taiwan as well as speaking to experts in Taiwan studies. First, though 
same-sex marriage was legalized in Taiwan in 2019, my research topic looking into 
issues of sexuality is still a sensitive one. And, as described above, I am an outsider. 
Also, I was not able to be present in Taiwan to make face-to-face connections. This 
relates to the concept of guanxi in Chinese-speaking societies: Guanxi (shared 
reciprocity) is the term used to refer to building a network of mutually beneficial 
relationships which can be used for personal or business means. Perhaps some of those I 
reached out to did not see the potential for guanxi to develop since I was not actually in 
Taiwan, and after talking virtually it would be uncertain if and when we’d ever meet in 
person. Finally, if one factors in the pandemic, speaking to a graduate student on the 
other side of the world during such a strange time may not have been a big priority for 
some, understandably.  
By the end of the summer I finally started to have some success in setting up 
interviews. I asked participants what form of video calling was most convenient for them 
to use, and it so happened that I used Skype for all of my interviews. These interviews 
were semi-structured; I had prepared some questions to ask (in Mandarin), but also let the 
conversation flow and asked follow-up questions accordingly. At the beginning of each 
interview I explained my project, and followed the process of informed consent as well as 
other guidelines established by the University of South Carolina’s Institutional Review 
Board. I asked each participant what name they would be most comfortable with me 
using in this thesis. It is common for some in Taiwan to have an English name, and some 
of my participants asked that I use their English name and not their Chinese one in my 
research. I also asked if I could record the interview, since I am not completely fluent in 
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Mandarin, and recording it would allow me to listen again and also translate and 
transcribe thoroughly. Each interview lasted around 2 hours. I recognize that I have a 
limited number of interviews. Rather than being truly quantifiable, they support the 
existing scholarship that describes the challenges of family for tongzhi. However, it does 
also provide insight into how tongzhi in religious communities have dealt with the weight 
of familial obligations. 
Lloyd, a member of the Daoist Brilliant Light Temple (see Chapter 3), helped me 
a lot in setting up interviews with other members of the temple following my first 
interview with the temple’s head priest. After that initial interview, Lloyd added me to 
WhatsApp and we used that to discuss other potential interviewees. While for my 
interview with Christian tongzhi woman Xiao’en (see Chapters 2 and 4) I asked all of the 
questions in Mandarin and she answered in Mandarin, my interviews with members of 
Brilliant Light Temple were a bit different. Lloyd was present for all of them, and helped 
facilitate and translate. He told me he took up this role because of his English abilities 
(which he said was superior to that of other members of the temple; he has also had 
considerable experience traveling and studying abroad). I still asked the majority of my 
questions in Mandarin, but if something wasn’t clear Lloyd would ask me in English for 
more information, and then ask the question to the interviewee in Mandarin. The 
interviewee would respond in Mandarin, and then Lloyd would give me a summary of 
what was said. Given my Mandarin ability, this was very helpful—as it allowed me to 
know in real-time what was being said, and ask follow-up questions accordingly. 
However, in translating and transcribing from my recordings I also noticed that Lloyd 
would sometimes expand on some of the answers given by the interviewees. Evan, one of 
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the tongzhi members of the temple, who was quite soft-spoken, often looked at Lloyd 
while answering my questions—and the two of them would sometimes discuss things 
(and have a few laughs) before Lloyd would summarize things to me. At times Evan felt 
more comfortable answering directly to Lloyd. I later learned that Lloyd had sat down 
and asked him questions about his life before our interview together, which is how Lloyd 
was able to expand on some of the answers Evan gave. In the interview I had with Olivia, 
a straight woman who is also a member of the temple, she also sometimes turned to 
Lloyd when formulating her answers. They also teased each other at numerous times 
during the interview. Lloyd told me later that they are quite close: they both do a lot of 
work for the temple, and have the shared interest in investing.  
For my interview with Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, I asked a Taiwanese 
graduate student (Sunny Tsai) to help interpret, since Shih asked that the interview be 
conducted in Mandarin, and because the interview only occurred late in my project 
(February 12, 2021). I formulated the questions in Mandarin, which Sunny looked over 
and checked for errors, and then during the interview with Shih I asked the questions in 
Chinese and Sunny translated the nun’s responses into English. 
Finding a suitable time for interviews was sometimes a challenge because of the 
time difference between South Carolina and Taiwan (Taiwan was 12 hours ahead in the 
fall, and 13 hours ahead during winter). I sometimes also had sound and technology 
challenges. During some of my interviews with members of the Daoist Brilliant Light 
Temple (see Chapter 3), participants were set up in a room where other members and 
priests were passing through. This made it quite noisy at times, and, over Skype, it could 
be challenging to hear everything. There were sometimes other technological issues that 
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also affected my hearing of what was being said. In these cases I had to ask for 
information to be repeated, and to wait for issues to be resolved. I was, however, 
prepared for the fact that multiple people would possibly be involved in the interview. 
Literature on metacommunicative norms in Taiwan that I had consulted had shown this to 
be the case. For example, in their study comparing American and Taiwanese mothers’ 
beliefs about childrearing and self-esteem, Miller et al. (2002) found that the most 
successful interviewing approach with Taiwanese mothers was framing the interview as 
more of a conversation. They began with some initial topics to put the participants at 
ease, accommodating multiple speakers and the domestic work they were all doing 
(cooking; harvesting green onions in the courtyard), and also allowing participants to 
control the topics of conversation (227).  
1.5 The Political Economy of Taiwan 
In this section I will explore the political economy of Taiwan, explaining how 
family is a crucial social institution within this economy, and how it is often the family 
that is more antagonistic towards those who are tongzhi than the state. This is not to say 
that the state has never been antagonistic; the tongzhi community in Taiwan faced 
repeated harassment from police in the 1990s, which I will address at the end of this 
section. First, however, I will give a brief historical overview of Taiwan and explain the 
history that has led there to being the Republic of China (ROC; commonly called 
Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC; commonly called China). In doing so 
I will explain what has led to Taiwan being a vibrant democracy today; a democracy that 
in May of 2019 made Taiwan the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage.  
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Taiwan is a relatively young democracy: the first free elections following 38-
years of martial law were held in 1996 (Morris 2004). However, given its shared history 
with the mainland, Taiwan is also home to many traditional Chinese beliefs and practices. 
In terms of Chinese religious traditions (Buddhism, Daoism, and folk/popular religion), 
Taiwan is in many way a place of religious innovation and the source of information on 
these religions, given that they were allowed more free reign in Taiwan than they were on 
the mainland. The different trajectories of Taiwan and China have also resulted in very 
different experiences for tongzhi on either side of the Strait, which I will touch upon as 
well.  
1.5.1 Taiwan and China: The Imperial Period in China and Immigration to Taiwan 
China, or officially the People’s Republic of China, has been a one-party state 
since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 (Wright 2001). However, dynasties ruled 
China for most of its history, from the Shang dynasty beginning in 1600 BCE (the first 
dynasty for which there is archaeological evidence) to the last Qing Dynasty, which 
ended in 1912 (Pletcher 2010, 15). Confucianism—a system of philosophical and ethical 
teachings—originated in the social and political upheaval that took place during the Zhou 
dynasty (1046-256 BCE), which followed the Shang (15). Confucianism developed from 
the teachings of Confucius and his followers (of which Mencius was the most 
prominent), and became China’s official state ideology in the second century BCE 
(Wright 2001, 21). I will discuss Confucianism further below. In these early periods of 
Chinese history, records attest to a long historical tradition of same-sex love dating back 
to the Zhou dynasty. In many periods of China’s history, same-sex love was widely 
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accepted and influenced political institutions and social conventions (Hinsch 1990; Van 
Gulik 1961; Vitiello 2011). I will explore this history in Chapter 2. 
During these early dynasties, the neighboring island of Taiwan barely figured in 
the Chinese imagination. Taiwan, which is 13,837 square miles in size (about a quarter of 
the size of Florida), is separated from the southeastern coast of China by the rough and 
shallow Taiwan Straits, which are about 81 to 137 miles wide (Morris 2004, 7). Fang Hao 
(1994) writes that Chinese Nationalists have long used vague references to the Land of 
the Eastern Barbarians or the Ryukyu Islands in the History of the Later Han Dynasty 
(25-220 CE) or the History of the Three Kingdoms (mid-200s CE) in an effort to prove 
Taiwan has always been part of the Chinese “motherland” (quoted in Morris 2004). 
However, even in 1600, Taiwan was still on the outer edge of Chinese consciousness 
(Wills 1999 85). In the 1600s there was no permanent Chinese settlement on Taiwan, but 
there were a number of Chinese and Japanese traders, pirates and fishermen that traveled 
to the island (85). At that time, the island was only vaguely referred to in the records of 
the officials who administered and patrolled the South China coast (85). When the Dutch 
colonized Taiwan in 1622-24 they estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,500 Chinese on 
the coast of Taiwan (87). Most of Taiwan’s inhabitants at that time were indigenous 
peoples, descended from Austronesian peoples whose first settlements on the island date 
back at least 15,000 years (Morris 2004, 7; Stainton 1999, 28-9). Their descendants make 
up the approximately 560,000 indigenous people (2.37 percent of the total population) on 
Taiwan today, with 16 distinct Indigenous Peoples that are officially recognized by the 
government (Adawai 2020, 324).  
19 
In the next century, the Chinese population on Taiwan grew and the island would 
come under more attention from the mainland. Ming loyalist and pirate Zheng 
Chenggong (also known as Koxinga) sailed with his fleet to Taiwan in 1661, ousting the 
Dutch to make the island the base of his movement to overthrow the Qing dynasty 
(Morris 2004, 8-9). Zheng therefore established the first Chinese administration of 
Taiwan, “ironically, a regime formed in rebellion against China’s ruling Qing,” historian 
Andrew Morris notes (9). Zheng’s son and grandson ruled for 21 years, during which 
time there were waves of steady immigration to Taiwan, primarily from the southern 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces in China (Morris 2004, 9; Jones 2003, 12). In 1683, as 
Taiwan was in the throes of a famine, an imperial force from the mainland defeated the 
Zhengs (who were Ming loyalists opposed to the Qing) and integrated the island into the 
Qing empire as a prefecture of Fujian province (Morris 2004, 10). Taiwan was upgraded 
to a full province in 1885 (12). 
 1.5.2 Japanese Influence on Taiwan 
The Qing dynasty’s rule of Taiwan came to close when, by the end of 1895, 
Japan’s military annexed the island—the first colony in Japan’s imperialistic expansion 
(12-13). This would have a lasting effect, differentiating Taiwan from China, which 
would undergo revolution and the start of a communist government at the beginning of 
the 20th century. The official doctrines of Japanese colonialism were assimilation and 
equal treatment under one imperial view, however officials also resorted to force to put 
down various rebellions against the occupying power (14). The Japanese colonial 
administration portrayed itself as a strong, stern, but benevolent force working for the 
betterment of the people in Taiwan, and they continued a number of modernization 
20 
projects that had begun under the Qing dynasty (Morris 2004, 14). These included 
building railroads and modern roads, expanding postal and telegraph networks, founding 
modern hospitals, establishing police institutions, introducing modern banking and 
currency measures, standardizing weights and measures, and also entering Taiwan in the 
Greenwich time system (14). While the Japanese government initially took a laissez-faire 
approach towards the religions being practiced in Taiwan, they later began to more 
vigorously regulate religious institutions and practices, and finally do away with native 
religions altogether (Jones 2004, 19). This was part of the larger ‘Japanization 
movement’ in which colonial officials pushed for more widespread use of the Japanese 
language, as well as the enforcement of Japanese-style dress (Morris 2004, 17). The 
Japanese ruled Taiwan up until their defeat at the end of the Second World War, at which 
time the Allied forces handed the island to the Republic of China (ROC) government that 
was ruling mainland China at the time. 
Today, there is still a surprising amount of nostalgia for the Japanese colonial era. 
During my first trip to Taiwan in 2011 to teach English for the summer, I had a couple of 
conversations with middle-aged Taiwanese in which they spoke about the Japanese 
occupation, and they pointed out that the Japanese had built much of their roads and other 
infrastructure such as dams. One of these conversations, with a parent of one of my 
students, took place while standing on a dam built by the Japanese in the rural outskirts of 
Tainan. Some of this nostalgia for the Japanese era is because the colonial government 
was perceived to be less antagonistic to the local Taiwanese population than the mainland 
Chinese government was during the first period after their arrival (more on this below) 
(Moskowitz 2011, 3). The influence of Japanese popular culture on Taiwan today can 
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also be seen in behaviors and in various media. The sound of Japanese enka largely 
influenced the melancholy nature of Mandopop (Mandarin-language pop music), and the 
sorrowful tone of Japanese literature has also had a significant impact on Taiwan’s 
literary scene (4). These themes have also spread to Taiwan’s movie and television 
industry (4). There is also a prevailing love of all things ‘cute’ (ke’ai) in Taiwan, which 
may be a direct import of Japanese concept of kawaii (4). The influence of Japan—from 
the time that they occupied Taiwan to the influence of popular culture today—has had a 
profound role in shaping Taiwan’s current identity. 
In addition to the ongoing influence of Japanese popular culture, a Taiwanese 
person today is also just as likely to engage with culture from neighboring South Korea 
(K-Pop and K-dramas), mainland China (Mandopop, movies, and TV), as well as 
Western music and U.S. television and movies. During my first trip to Taiwan in 2011, 
my elementary-age students had no problem recognizing and singing along to the hit 
song ‘Baby’ by (my fellow Canadian) Justin Bieber. In that trip and in later trips (2016 
and 2019), I connected with Taiwanese young adults when talking about American TV 
shows and music we mutually enjoy (as well as some Japanese anime that I am also 
familiar with).  
1.5.3 From Martial Law to Democracy 
When the Second World War ended, China was consumed again by civil war—as 
it had been in the years following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912 and the 
establishment of the Republic of China (ROC), led by the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang 
or KMT). Chiang Kai-shek, the general who has been leading the ROC since 1925, 
waged a violent war against the Chinese Communist Party (CPP). When those in Taiwan 
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heard that the Second World War was over and the Japanese were leaving, they were 
elated (Phillips 1999, 281). However, the ROC government decided to govern the new 
Taiwan Province under joint party-government-military administration. Governor-
General Chen Yi was given the ability to use a broad mixture of civilian and military 
powers that was starkly reminiscent of the early Japanese governors (282). The 
Nationalists stripped Taiwan of materials to use to win the civil war on the mainland 
against the Chinese Communist Party, and unemployment and inflation set in on the 
island (Morris 2004, 20). The Taiwanese began to criticize the KMT, comparing them 
unfavorably to the Japanese colonial regime, but had to do so quietly because if not they 
were regarded as “disloyal subversives” who were planning Communist rebellion against 
the ROC (21). However, the Chinese Communist Party eventually defeated the 
Nationalists on the mainland. In 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the new 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the remnants of Chiang’s government and 
discouraged military set sail in defeat for Taiwan; their former province was now home to 
the entire ROC regime. The KMT violently suppressed dissidents (often elites who were 
regarded as a threat to the regime) in Taiwan, and enacted a period of martial law that 
lasted 38 years. For the next two decades after their arrival in Taiwan, Generalissimo 
Chiang and the KMT were dedicated to the goal of retaking the Chinese mainland 
(Morris 2004, 24). During this time the United States continued to regard Chiang’s ROC 
regime as the rightful government of China, with Americans referring to the ROC on 
Taiwan as “Free China” (23). U.S. $4 billion from American taxpayers was poured into 
Chiang’s regime from 1951-1965 (24). 
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KMT rule in Taiwan after 1950 marked the beginning of a long transformation at 
this time into a “soft authoritarian regime” (24). Chiang and the KMT were determined 
that the economic collapse that spelled their doom in China would not be repeated in 
Taiwan (24). Fair and effective land reforms were instituted, rural lower middle classes 
set up small-scale factories, and heavy export production was encouraged and subsidized 
by the U.S. government (24-5). These strategies, combined with high household savings 
rates and a highly successful education system, produced an economic boom so dramatic 
that it became described worldwide as the “Taiwan miracle” (25). By the time Chiang 
Kai-shek died in 1975, most of the rest of the world no longer viewed the ROC as the 
rightful government of China. In the 1970s Mao and the People’s Republic of China had 
begun to successfully convince an increasing number of nations to recognize the PRC as 
the true government of China. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger strategically shifted 
towards serious dialogue with Communist China in an effort to isolate the Soviet Union 
(Morris 2004, 26). In 1972, a year after the United Nations General Assembly voted to 
award China’s UN seat to the PRC, Nixon ended the special relationship that the U.S. had 
with the ROC in hopes of garnering PRC support to end the war in Vietnam (26). In early 
1979 the United States officially began recognizing Mao’s China (Wright 2001, 162). 
Following Chiang’s death, his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who had lived in Taiwan 
longer than he had in China, took control of the ROC and set out to make a number of 
changes. He ended martial law and chose as his successor Lee Teng-hui, a Japanese- and 
American-educated agricultural economist (Morris 2004, 27). Lee’s 12-year reign saw 
Taiwan transformed into a free democracy (27). The first direct presidential elections—
billed as the first in 5,000 years of Chinese history—were held in 1996 and won by Lee 
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(28). I will discuss more of these democratic changes below. In 2000 the DPP won for the 
first time (under Chen Shui-bian, who led for two terms), and then in the elections in 
2008 and 2012 the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency. Taiwan elected its 
first female president in 2016 (Tsai Ing-wen), marking a return to the DPP, with Tsai 
winning a second term in January 2020. 
In the PRC, in the 1990s the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its rhetoric of 
the goal of reunifying the Chinese nation by extending its control to Taiwan (Morris 
2004, 29). The PRC’s main strategy has been to isolate Taiwan diplomatically on the 
world stage, blocking any attempts by Taiwan to re-enter the UN, and using its massive 
economic clout to prevent any international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state 
(29). It is for this reason that Taiwan’s diplomatic representatives and Olympic teams are 
recognized only as representatives of “Chinese Taipei”, and that visa-granting offices 
overseas are referred to not as embassies or consulates but as Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Offices (TECO). Only 17 countries (such as the Holy See and several small 
African and Caribbean countries) official recognize Taiwan’s government. Under the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), first passed by U.S. Congress in 1979, the U.S. considers 
Taiwan’s status undetermined, but any attempt by China to coerce Taiwan into 
unification is seen as a grave threat to American security (Horton 2019).  
1.5.4 Commonalities and Differences Between Taiwan and China 
In this section I will continue to examine some of the differences between Taiwan 
and China, but also describe how they have many shared cultural norms, given the history 
of emigration of Chinese to Taiwan starting from the 1600s as described above. While it 
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would be impossible to list all of these similarities, I will describe those that have the 
most salience for my study: Confucian norms and life for tongzhi today. 
1.5.4.1 Similarities and Differences in Cultural Ideas  
Confucian philosophy is central to the cultures of Taiwan and other East Asian 
nations, particularly when it comes to understandings of family and society. Embedded 
within Confucian values are five principal relationships through which each person 
defines a sense of duty, responsibility, and identity (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007). 
They are ruler and subject (or government and citizen), parent and child, husband and 
wife, older sibling and younger sibling, and friend and friend (Park and Chesla 2007, 
303). In familial relations, respect of parents and grandparents has supreme value, with 
near total obedience given to parents by the rest of the family (304). The value of duty 
and responsibility can also vary within these hierarchies. In the husband-wife 
relationship, if children are involved, the role of mother should take precedence over the 
role of wife, with the parent-child relationship being more important (304, 307). With 
regard to siblings, the oldest sibling usually acts as the surrogate of parents in their 
absence (304). Family is the base of society: among the five basic human relationships, 
three are family relationships (305). Within family relationships, filial piety is a central 
value (Chou 2000, 253). Being filial to one’s family members, particularly to one’s 
parents, includes the imperative to marry and continue the family line, as well as taking 
care of the elderly in the family (253). 
 For this reason, the social services safety net that exists in North America and 
much of Europe is largely absent in Taiwan. Instead, the government has long relied on 
families to provide a basic safety net, looking after their family members including those 
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who are elderly, disabled, and poor. This has even been written into law: Care for 
children, frail older people, and disabled people is defined as a family responsibility in 
Taiwan’s Civic Code, which places legal responsibility for care on lineal family members 
(Yeandle et al. 2013, 29). Under Taiwan’s Welfare of Older People Act 2009, adult 
children can be penalized for neglect, abuse, or leaving an elderly resident in a nursing 
home without paying the fees for their care (Wang et al. 2013, 90). The assumption that 
family care is available permeates all welfare practices in Taiwan (91). For this reason, 
Taiwan has been described in the literature as a familialist (or familistic) welfare state 
(Estévez-Abe and Kim 2013; Chou Y. et al. 2013). Familialist welfare states (which 
include most East Asian countries) are known for their high rates of multi-generational 
households, where household heads cohabit with their parents and children (Estévez-Abe 
and Kim 2013, 2). The three characteristics of these states are: 1) Underdevelopment of 
social services such as childcare and elderly care; 2) low levels of cash benefits to 
working-age citizens such as public insurance and unemployment benefits; and 3) 
comparatively low levels of social spending (1). Though social services such as home and 
day care, respite or residential care are available in Taiwan, relatively few families use 
them—not least because family members are expected to cover, or contribute to their cost 
(Yeandle et al. 2013, 29). Those needing care mostly live with their families. For 
example, a national survey in 2006 found that 93% of disabled people of all ages lived 
with their families, while only 7% used residential services (Chou Y. et al. 2013, 144). 
Almost all disabled children under 15 years of age lived with their families (98%), with 
their primary carers being their parents (80%) or other relatives (14%) (144). Confucian 
thinking—especially Confucian ideas of familial obligations—permeates Taiwan to this 
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day, and this can also be seen in how the government views welfare: as a family 
responsibility rather than a public matter. 
1.5.4.2 Similarities and Differences in Experiences for Tongzhi 
In terms of sexuality and same-sex love specifically, the Maoist era (1949-77) in 
China enforced a heterosexual, marital model in which sex was only legitimate for 
reproductive purposes (Zheng 2015, 41). Family was emphasized as the basic unit of 
society, and marriage was stressed as the fulfillment of a social responsibility to produce 
children for the Communist state (41). Sex for reasons other that reproduction—including 
same-sex acts—were regarded as deviant and were policed by the state (41). During the 
Cultural Revolution, same-sex attracted people were classified as “bad elements” under 
the “five black categories”, along with landlords, rich peasants, rightists, and 
counterrevolutionaries (42). The CCP replaced the Qing criminal code with a new system 
of criminal laws during the economic reform period (1978-present), and forced sodomy 
and sodomy with a minor continued to be treated as a crime (41) (also see section 2.3). 
Since there were no laws against consensual same-sex acts in China, these acts were 
often disciplined under the charge of “hooliganism”, a general term that encompassed a 
wide range of offenses (41-2). The Maoist era’s model of sex for reproduction was 
replaced by a new model in the post-socialist era in which sex for pleasure within 
marriage was regarded as important because it maintains marital harmony and thwarts 
extramarital affairs (42). These new ideas around sexuality and the state’s loosening 
control led to a growth in the number of self-identified gay men who gathered at parks, 
street corners, bathhouses, bars, and toilets (42). However, succumbing to the strong 
pressure to marry and have children, more than 90 percent of same-sex attracted people 
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in China are estimated to choose to marry opposite-sex partners and form heterosexual 
families with children (43). State censorship of movie contents has also impeded the 
dissemination of knowledge about same-sex attracted people (43). Today in China, 
tongzhi face harassment from authorities, social stigma, pressure from their families and 
society to ‘cure’ their same-sex attraction and marry heterosexually, and are vulnerable to 
contracting AIDS and other STIs because of negative misconceptions about condom use 
(Zheng 2015). In her ethnography of tongzhi men in contemporary Dalian, China, Zheng 
Tiantian describes how almost all of the men she encountered in her research had either a 
girlfriend or a wife, and that some used websites to match with lesbians who were willing 
to form fake marriages (Zheng 2015, 152). “To many tongzhi, establishing a heterosexual 
family and fathering a child represent not only a performance of masculinity but also a 
fulfillment of social and family responsibilities,” Zheng writes (2015, 153). China does 
not currently recognize same-sex marriage nor civil unions.  
In Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s the tongzhi community made strides in the 
recognition of their rights, and politicians began expressing their support for the 
community as well. Yet, tongzhi still faced harassment from authorities: in Taipei there 
were repeated police raids on the longstanding gay cruising ground in Taipei known as 
Changde Street, as well as a raid of the gay sauna AG in December 1998 (J.C. Ho 2010, 
552; Simon 2004, 81). In the early 2000s politicians started to publicly express support 
for the tongzhi community. Taipei’s then-mayor Ma Ying-jiou allocated funding for 
tongzhi groups to organize a civil rights forum in 2000, and both he and newly elected 
president Chen Shui-bian met with tongzhi activists during the event (J.C. Ho 2010, 539; 
Simon 2004, 71). The Taipei municipal government also published a “Getting to Know 
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Tongzhi Handbook,” with Major Ying-jiou (who would later become the president of 
Taiwan) writing the introduction, which apologized for past human rights violations 
against tongzhi, including the Changde Street and AG Incidents (which had occurred 
when Chen was still mayor) (Simon 2004, 84). Petrus Liu (2007) argues that the recent 
liberalism in Taiwan, which afforded the tongzhi community some rights and recognition 
in the early 2000s, was shaped by forces involving both the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China. He also argues it was born out of the creation of the multi-
party system in Taiwan, which first began after martial law was lifted in 1987. The 
Kuomingtang (KMT), which had ruled during the time of martial law, came to be 
associated with a ‘One China’ policy, while the newly formed opposition Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) represented increased independence from China. Liu argues that 
the DPP (whose first president was Chen Shui-bian) saw itself as the liberator of the 
‘native’ Taiwanese Han Chinese population (as opposed to the more recently arrived 
Mainland Han Chinese population, which fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
KMT government in 1949 (Liu 2007, 519). Liu argues that recognizing tongzhi rights is 
an important way for the DPP to distinguish Taiwan from China, and align it with the 
U.S., which provides the country with military support:  
DPP’s rhetoric of democracy and human rights (renquan liguo), which now under 
international pressure must include gay rights, permits Taiwan to create a 
desperately needed cultural distinction from the People’s Republic of China 
(where human rights continue to be a ‘sensitive’ issue) and its similarities to the 
United States (which sees itself as the guardian of democratic values), since DPP 
politicians recognize (correctly) that Taiwan will cease to exist without the 
popular support of the United States (519).  
 
It would be under the next DPP president—Tsai Ing-wen, who first became president in 
2016—that same-sex marriage in Taiwan became legal. Tsai, who has never married, is 
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currently serving her second term. In 2017 the Constitutional Court—the highest court in 
the country—ruled that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right, giving the 
Taiwanese government a two-year deadline to come up with a framework for 
legalization. In May 2019, same-sex marriage was made into law, making Taiwan the 
first country in Asia to legalize marriage between people of the same gender. 
1.5.5 Political Economy: Closing Thoughts 
 Despite their shared history and culture, Taiwan today is much more tongzhi-
friendly than China. In Taiwan tongzhi can serve in the military, there are tongzhi bars, 
tongzhi publications, the largest Pride parades in Asia (held in Taipei), and, as of 2019, 
same-sex marriage. Over the course of the latter half of the 20th Century, Taiwan went 
from an authoritarian regime to a thriving democracy. Tongzhi rights are very much a 
part of a larger call for equal rights for all in Taiwan. However, despite these gains, 
tongzhi experience is still impacted and mired by cultural traditions, especially those 
relating to family and filial piety. It is for this reason that, like in China, some tongzhi in 
Taiwan still marry heterosexually. In Queer Kinship and Family Change in Taiwan 
(2019), Amy Brainer describes various forms that these kinds of marriages may take, 
with combinations including tongzhi hiding their sexual identities, their heterosexual 
partner being aware of it, or couplings of men and women tongzhi. Scholars in this field 
have argued that the nature of the Chinese family is one of the major obstacles for 
tongzhi, rather than state oppression (Brainer 2019; Chou 2000; Simon 2004). In his 
chapter exploring the history of the tongzhi community in Taiwan, anthropologist Scott 
Simon concludes that even tongzhi-friendly laws “will have little impact on real lives of 
individual people if Taiwanese gays and lesbians do not successfully deal with the 
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problem of family pressure” (2004, 86). To return to the case of Evan, who I introduced 
at the beginning of this chapter: he told me that even though same-sex marriage has been 
legalized in Taiwan, his parents still do not fully accept him and are pressuring him to get 
married to a woman. I will explore this issue in depth in Chapter 3. First, however, I will 
turn to the history of same-sex love in the Chinese-speaking world.
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Chapter 2 
A Historical Overview of Tongzhi Identity: A Survey Through 
Terminology
I will examine the history of same-sex love and identity in China and Taiwan in 
this chapter. I will use the term “same-sex love” because, as I will explain in more detail 
below, the terms for homosexuality in Chinese (tongxinglian, or tongxing’ai) are a direct 
translation of the Western term that was typically used to pathologize those who were 
attracted to individuals of the same gender (Hinsch 1990, 169). These terms are rarely 
used today by same-sex attracted people in China and Taiwan because of the pathological 
and medical notions of homosexuality they convey (Zheng 2015, 4). Furthermore, when 
discussing the history of same-sex love in Chinese history, one cannot really speak of 
heterosexuals, bisexuals, or homosexuals, because “the concept of sexual orientation, i.e., 
dividing people by their erotic object choice, did not exist” (Chou 2000, 13).  
 In this chapter I will examine the history of same-sex love and identity in China 
and Taiwan through an overview of the terminology used to describe and label same-sex 
eroticism. I will begin by looking at the earliest historical records available describing 
same-sex love in China. For many centuries same-sex eroticism was widely accepted and 
enjoyed by many. Same-sex love was referred to by poetic metaphors, usually based on 
famous stories. I will then move to other periods of China’s imperial history, examining 
how new terminology as well as new laws may have indicated a shift in attitudes towards 
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same-sex love. When I turn to the early 20th century—a time of great change in which 
many intellectuals pushed for modernizing the nation—I devote time to exploring how 
Western sexology was imported and reinterpreted by writers in China. Finally, I look at 
the range of terminology used in present-day China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
2.1 Acceptance and tolerance: The poetic metaphors of cut-sleeves and half-eaten 
peaches 
 There was a long historical tradition of male same-sex love in China, dating back 
to the Zhou Dynasty (1122 to 256 BCE) and even as far back as the Bronze Age (Hinsch 
1990, Van Gulik 1961). In many periods of China’s history same-sex love was widely 
accepted and even respected, influencing Chinese political institutions, social 
conventions, and artistic creation (Hinsch 1990, 4). Historian Bret Hinsch, who wrote the 
pioneering Passions of the Cut Sleeve, explains that it is arguably more accurate to speak 
of this history as a “male homosexual tradition” because, unlike modern society, the 
Chinese viewed male homosexuality and lesbianism as completely different forms of 
sexuality (6-7). He also explains that very little documentation survives on lesbian life in 
China because Chinese literature was almost always written by men for men (7). He 
includes an appendix focusing on these scanty sources (173-8). Another reason why 
references to lesbianism in traditional sources are rare was because of the relative 
absence of personal freedom women were bestowed (173). If relationships did form, they 
would usually escape notice by men uninterested in the affairs of women, Hinsch writes 
(174). The scholars who have examined this history of same-sex love in China have 
drawn their arguments from records dating from the Zhou Dynasty (1122 to 256 BCE) 
through to the early Qing Dynasty (1644 to 1912 CE) (Hinsch 1990; Van Gulik 1961; 
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Vitiello 2011). These records include official histories and literature; the official histories 
from the ancient period deal with the sexual practices of the uppermost elite, and the 
literature from later periods provides insight into the lives of the literati as well as the 
lives of young male prostitutes and their patrons (Hinsch 1990, 5-6; Vitiello 2011, 1).  
 The social and sexual practices specific to China can be understood in terms of 
two basic sets of complementary roles: dominant/submissive and active/passive (Hinsch 
1990, 8-9). The dominant and submissive roles were derived from the social standing of 
each partner, determined mostly by gender, age, and status—factors that were important 
for assigning dominant and submissive roles in many social and sexual encounters (9). 
Women were generally regarded as socially inferior, which also affected the condition of 
men who became identified with the female gender (9). In terms of age, a younger male 
was inferior to an older male (9). As for status, family background, education, 
employment, wealth, talent, and multiple other factors contributed to a man’s overall 
social standing (9). In many cases, the set of dominant/submissive was related to the 
separate dichotomy of active/passive: the dominant male was often the active partner 
engaging in the penile penetration of the submissive partner (Chou 2000, 26, Hinsch 
1990, 10). The difference in social standing and power between the two was more 
important than the participants’ sex: “The idea that the (male) inserter and the 
subordinate insertee may share the same social-sexual category—homosexual or gay—
simply did not exist in the traditional Chinese mind,” Chou Hua-shan writes (2000, 27, 
emphasis in original). Hinsch notes that men often manifested sexuality differently, 
depending on their stage in life (1990, 10). He writes that Chinese literature shows a 
tendency for boys and adolescents to take the passive sexual role and for adult men to 
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take the active role (10). Therefore, a man’s sexual role may change as he grew older 
(10). “This acceptance of changing sexual roles gave a certain fluidity to the sexual 
development of an individual male while still allowing a sense of hierarchy within each 
relationship when hierarchy was desired,” Hinsch writes (10). In addition, Chinese 
records also describe many men who experienced both heterosexuality and same-sex love 
during their lives (11). Hinsch argues that some men had sexual intercourse with women 
not because they desired it, but because they were expected to do so (11). Society’s 
expectations often determined the ways in which Chinese men manifested their sexual 
desires (11).  
 This fluidity of male sexuality, and focus on the social and sexual standing of the 
active and passive participants in the same-sex act, can be further understood in relation 
to Michel Foucault’s The Use of Pleasure (1985). As Foucault writes in his second 
volume on The History of Sexuality, the Greeks did not see love for the other sex and for 
the same sex as two exclusive choices or radically different types of behavior (187). Men 
were expected to be married to “a single lawful wife”, with sexual relations being 
devoted to bearing children (144). While one’s husband was expected to be a woman’s 
exclusive partner, the husband could have multiple sexual relations outside of marriage: 
with boys, prostitutes, men or women slaves (144, 146). Instead of a division between 
heterosexuality and same-sex love, the “dividing lines” in sexual relations were that of 
activity versus passivity, as well as a lack of moderation versus self-control (enkrateia), 
Foucault argues (65, 85, 187-8). Adult free men were those who were the “active actors”, 
while as “passive actors” were women, boys, and slaves (47). Being a passive actor was 
looked upon negatively, as was not being in control of oneself (85-6). Similarly, there 
 36 
was a negative perception of passivity within same-sex relations in imperial China 
(Hinsch 1990, 10, 107). In later imperial history, passive sexuality came to be associated 
with certain types of cosmetics and feminizing clothing, and wearing them could weaken 
a man’s social status (10). Also, there were obscenities that would insult a person by 
referring to him as the dominated partner in a same-sex sexual act (Chou 2000, 27). 
Passivity was also viewed as feminizing in Greece; preferring other men did not make a 
man effeminate, Foucault notes, as long as the man was active in the sexual act and 
practiced self-control (Foucault 1985, 85). In contrast, being immoderate and 
overindulging in sexual relations with members of either the male or female sex would 
make one “feminine” (85). It was this concern over passivity and a lack of restraint that 
made the relationship between men and boys an anxious concern for some Greek thinkers 
and writers, Foucault argues (187). This was a “privileged” relationship, one that implied 
an age difference and a certain difference of status, as compared to relations between two 
older adult males or schoolboys that were given less attention (193). Foucault writes that 
the young boy had to behave in a way that would not bring him dishonor—something 
that would affect his eventual status and place in the city when he grew up—and that the 
older partner was expected to also act in a way that didn't bring the younger dishonor 
(206). Much attention was given to how the younger partner (who was being actively 
pursued and courted by the older suitor) had to be careful not to yield too easily or offer 
himself too easily out of weakness, lust, or self-interest (196, 211). Once he had yielded 
to his older suitor, then—beyond the customary gifts fitting his status—he could only 
accept “honorable” benefits such as training for manhood, social connections for the 
future, or a lasting friendship (224). Since the boy himself would one day be a man—
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exercising the powers and responsibilities of a male citizen—many philosophers were 
concerned with how one who was previously the object of pleasure could later become 
the active participant in the sexual relation (216, 220-1). As in imperial China, there was 
a fluidity of male sexuality in ancient Greece—relations other than heterosexuality were 
regarded as natural, and within same-sex love a man could perform both the feminizing 
passive role and the active role in his lifetime (Foucault 1985; Hinsch 1990). 
Heterosexual marriage, however, was still expected for men in both societies.  
 Foucault writes that for the Greeks, the purpose of sexual intercourse in marriage 
was regarded as being for reproduction, while the “domain of pleasures” was located 
outside the marital relationship (with boys, prostitutes, male and female slaves) (Foucault 
1985, 146-7). Likewise, Hinsch notes a sexual dichotomy between “duty and pleasure” in 
much of Chinese history (Hinsch 1990, 19).  “Even in the ancient period, we see men 
who maintained a heterosexual marriage and a homosexual romance without apparently 
seeing any contradiction between the two,” Hinsch writes (19). This was because 
traditionally marriage in China is regarded as a transaction between two households 
instead of a romantic union joining two individuals (Chou 2000, 23; Hinsch 1990, 19). 
Confucianism rejects passionate love between a husband and wife, because it would 
distract them from family obligations; however, producing heirs, especially boys, is an 
imperative (Chou 2000, 23). Having children was important for all in Chinese society 
(Hinsch 1990, 27). For the peasantry, children were needed to help in agricultural life, 
and for the elite, children had particular value in uniting families through marriage ties 
(26). Although a large emphasis was placed on the procreative purpose of marriage, sex 
with prostitutes, sex within the same gender, or a man having several wives and 
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concubines were usually tolerated because the male-dominate family system was not 
challenged (Chou 2000, 24).  
 The monographs and studies that have explored same-sex love in Chinese history 
have all problematized the notion of heterosexuality and homosexuality. Apart from the 
issue of reproduction, little separation was made between heterosexual and homosexual 
love in emotional and psychological terms (Wu 2004, 4). The vast majority of elite men 
who engaged in same-sex love performed the penetrant role, were married, and had 
family responsibilities (6). They were ‘bisexual’ in their sexual appetites, and this 
‘bisexuality’ prevailed over exclusive same-sex love in much of China’s history (Hinsch 
1990; Wu 2004, 6). However, trying to use words such as ‘heterosexual’, ‘bisexual’, and 
‘homosexual’ is problematic, as the concept of sexual orientation (dividing people by the 
gender of their erotic object choice) did not exist, and there is no evidence that men who 
engaged in same-sex love identified with a particular sexual identity (Chou 2000, 13; Wu 
2004, 6). For much of Chinese history, normative sexualities were set along a different 
set of criteria that had more to do with life stages than fixed identities. Men had the 
freedom to explore different sexual desires, however, they still had to fulfill the 
Confucian imperative to marry and continue the family line by having progeny. I will 
return to this obligation—of filial piety—in more depth in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Classical Chinese also did not have a medical or scientific term that could be 
compared to “homosexuality” or “homosexual” (7). Instead, male same-sex love was 
discussed using poetic metaphors referring to earlier men or incidents famed for their 
association with homosexuality (7). Same-sex love was also often described in terms of 
social roles: men who had sexual relationships with the emperors are described as 
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“favorites” in early records (7). “Chinese terminology therefore did not emphasize an 
innate sexual essence, but concentrated rather on actions, tendencies, and preferences,” 
Hinsch argues (7). 
 One of these poetic terms is yu tao or fen tao, meaning “half-eaten peach” or “part 
of a peach that is not eaten” (Hinsch 1990, 20; Vitiello 1992, 347; Zheng 2015, 4). This 
term appeared during the Zhou Dynasty in a story about the fickle love Duke Ling of Wei 
(534-493 BCE) had for his courtier Mizi Xia (Hinsch 1990, 20). This tale, recorded in the 
ancient philosophic work Han Fei Zi, tells of how Mizi Xia was one day strolling with 
the ruler in an orchard (20). After biting into a peach and finding it too sweet, he gave the 
remaining half to the ruler to enjoy. The ruler was impressed that Mizi Xia neglected his 
own appetite and gave him the delicious peach to eat, and thanked him for the sincerity of 
his love (20). Hinsch writes that the Mizi Xia and the duke are described according to 
social relationship in the story, with Mizi Xia being said to have won favor (chong) with 
the duke (21). Chong denotes a hierarchical relationship of regular patronage or favor 
bestowed by a superior—and is therefore not remotely equivalent to “homosexuality”; 
also gender is not factored into this term either (Hinsch 1990, 21; Vitiello 1992, 347).  
The story is significant not only for being the origin of the term yu tao, but also because 
Mizi Xia would became the most famous representative of same-sex love from this 
period in Chinese history (Hinsch 1990, 20). The name Mizi Xia also became a 
catchword for same-sex love in general (20).  
Another term is duan xiu, or “passion of the cut sleeve”, which originated during 
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 200 CE) (Hinsch 1990, 53; Vitiello 1992, 343). This term 
came from a famous story describing Emperor Ai and the tenderness he felt for his 
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favorite Dong Xian. It is recorded in The Cut Sleeve (Duanxiu Pian), a specialized erotic 
anthology consisting of 51 short stories and anecdotes dealing with homoeroticism, 
chronologically arranged from the 5th century BCE up to the 19th century CE (Vitiello 
1992, 343-4). The collection is named after the following story: 
Dong Xian used to sleep with the emperor. Once, he was taking a nap and was 
lying on a sleeve of the sovereign’s robe. The sovereign wanted to get up, but 
Xian was not yet awake. Thus, not wanting to shake him, the emperor cut off his 
own sleeve, and then got up: so great was his love! (quoted in Vitiello 1992, 344). 
 
The story continues to describe how all of Ai’s courtiers “imitated the cut sleeve, also 
calling it the chopped sleeve,” in tribute to the love shared between their emperor and 
Dong (Hinsch 1990, 53). Hinsch also writes that during the Han Dynasty, historical 
records openly discuss how Han emperors had sexual relations with both men and 
women—retaining large harems of wives and concubines while also enjoying regular 
trysts with their male favorites (35). Poetry, tales, folk songs, and art recounted stories of 
same-sex love in the imperial court and among scholars and officials in the Han and later 
dynasties. Both The Book of Poetry and the Spring-Autumn Annals—required readings by 
Confucius—had homoerotic themes (Zheng 2015, 35). The terms yu tao, fen tao, 
duanxiu, and longyang (referring to the male favorite of another famous Chinese ruler) 
were used throughout the centuries by the literati to refer to same-sex love (Vitiello 1992, 
348).  
2.2. Beginning of a shift in attitude: The introduction of ‘chicken lewdness’ 
 During the Tang Dynasty (618 to 907) a new term emerged to describe same-sex 
relations: jijian (“sodomy”) (Hinsch 1990, 88). Hinsch writes that this term is the first 
recorded derogatory term for a same-sex act in Chinese (88). Jijian literally means 
chicken lewdness”, a reference to a belief that domesticated fowls commonly engage in 
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intercourse with fowls of the same sex (89). However, Hinsch points out that according to 
Qing scholar and philologist Yuan Mei, the original first character of the term (also 
pronounced ji) depicted a field above a woman and denoted “a man being like a woman” 
(89). This definition, Hinsch writes, clearly implies one man assuming a receptive sexual 
role (89). Hinsch argues that the substitution of the “chicken” character in this compound 
seems to be more than a careless error, making the unfavorable association between 
animal sexuality and same-sex relations (89). It was this incorrect form of jijian that 
appears to have gained currency in the Tang and Song periods (618 – 1279). Hinsch, who 
writes that sources such as the Hebrew Bible also compared adulterers and prostitutes to 
various animals, writes that in Chinese jijian provides a bestial connotation that is 
negative enough to justify translating it into English as “sodomy” (89). It is jijian, rather 
than the more poetic and favorable terms “half-eaten peach” or “cut sleeve”, that appears 
in later Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) laws restricting certain forms of same-sex activity, 
which I will discuss below (89). Hinsch points out that jijian (with the ‘chicken’ 
character ji) came into use at a time when male favorites played a less prominent role in 
the official histories of the period (89). He suggests that this decline in political visibility, 
along with the rise of a derogatory term for same-sex relations, may indicate a change in 
public sentiment towards same-sex love. However, he writes that this is only speculation, 
because there is not enough data to be conclusive (89). 
 Moving into the Song Dynasty (960-1279), male favorites appear to have 
experienced a continued decline in their influence on court and government in the Song 
period, and the practice of patronage (in which a benevolent emperor showered his 
beloved with titles and official payments) was seen as inappropriate for the rising classes 
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of merchants and officials (90-1). With the rise in urbanization, the Song elite no longer 
had to maintain staffs of retainers to provide cultural and sensual amenities (91-2). Less 
wealthy individuals, who were unable to afford looking after a full-time favorite, would 
hire prostitutes instead. Evidence shows that male prostitution was widespread 
throughout the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and continued throughout the rest of China’s 
imperial history (92). However, in the early 12th century authorities created a law to 
prohibit male prostitution (93). Hinsch argues that, given the long history of tolerance for 
same-sex relations in China, there must have been “a change in the character of Chinese 
thought in general” to account for the Song law against male prostitution (95). He writes 
that the law may have represented a backlash against the rise in prostitution in this era 
(95). Furthermore, written records point to an increasing disapproval of the effeminacy 
associated with the passive role in prostitution (though significantly, Hinsch points out, 
this intolerance was not directed toward the active patrons of these prostitutes, but only 
toward the passive men) (94-5). Another possibility is that some of these changes were 
perhaps due to larger transformations taking place in Song intellectual life, including the 
revival and reinterpretation of Confucianism in the Neo-Confucian movement, which was 
concerned with strict sexual propriety and familial duty (95). Hinsch writes that since 
certain Buddhist ideas had a large influence on Neo-Confucian thought, the official 
intolerance towards same-sex love may have had its roots in popular Buddhist tracts that 
took the concept of sexual sin far more seriously than some clerical Buddhist traditions 
(96). However, Hinsch argues that the laws prohibiting prostitution did not seem to be 
regularly enforced (94, 97). Authorities were typically reticent to interfere in sexual 
 43 
matters, and the diversity among the intellectual and political establishment may have 
meant there was no consensus on sensitive issues such as same-sex love (97).  
2.3 Restrictions on same-sex love: The Qing laws and prosecution of ‘illicit sexual 
intercourse’  
The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) was a time of social and cultural openness, 
including in sexual matters, and the literati of this period explored individuality as well as 
carnal and worldly satisfaction in their writings (Wu 2004, 3). After Manchu bannermen 
defeated the Ming Dynasty, there was a marked reaction against the perceived libertinism 
of the Ming, partly as a result of imported Manchu concepts of sexuality and Neo-
Confucian rhethoric regarding the family order (Hinsch 1990, 162; Wu 2004, 3). Erotic 
literature was censored, and officials of the empire and literati were banned from the 
entertainment quarters (Wu 2004, 3). A number of laws targeting sodomy (jijian)—
though mostly focusing on rape—were also put into place during the Qing Dynasty (1644 
to 1912) (Hinsch 1990, 140-5; Sommer 2002, 68). These laws describe the various 
punishments for gangs or individuals who rape boys of certain ages, attempt rape, injure 
or murder their rape victims, and those who falsely claim they had been sodomized 
(Hinsch 1990, 143-4). Same-sex violence may indeed have been a concern to Qing 
officials, as well as the widespread prostitution and forced procurement of male children 
that was happening during that time (Dikötter 1995, 138; Hinsch 1990, 140). The Qing 
laws banned consensual anal intercourse as well—with a punishment of one month in the 
cangue and 100 heavy blows (Hinsch 1990, 144). However, China scholars argue that 
these laws, which were incorporated into the larger body of laws prohibiting heterosexual 
offenses (under the rubric of ‘illicit sexual intercourse’ or jian), were part of a general 
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effort by Qing officials to combat all forms of extramarital sexuality (Dikötter 1995, 139; 
Chou 2000, 25; Hinsch 1990, 144; Sommer 2002, 68). Hinsch argues that this explains 
why the punishment for consensual sodomy—though harsh from a modern viewpoint—
was among the lightest possible at the time under the Qing legal system (144). Hinsch 
also suggests that, given the openness of homosexuality through the Qing Dynasty, it is 
doubtful that this particular idealistic article of the law was ever systematically enforced 
(144).  
The prohibitions against rape also did not take gender into account, but focused 
instead on the age of the victim and the extent of violence inflicted (Dikötter 1995, 139; 
Sommer 2002). Historian Matthew Sommer, who examines legal cases from this era, 
argues that the principal target of these regulations was the marginal man who was seen 
as existing outside the mainstream configuration of settled households (2002, 68-70). 
These men, who in judicial discourse were described as Buddhist and Daoist clergy, local 
toughs, migrants, and single men without prospects, pursued both men and women in 
their role as an aggressive penetrator and threat to social order (69, 71-2). This pursuit of 
men and women—what would be described in English today as bisexuality—did not 
warrant special concern for jurists of the time, Sommer argues: “This bisexual targeting 
of lust in and of itself does not appear problematic; jurists employed no special 
explanation or commentary. Rather, it was the dangerous male’s utter lack of respect for 
all boundaries and rules that threatened social order” (72, emphasis in original). While 
same-sex love in China was widely accepted as an option for a man to satisfy his sexual 
desire, the practice had to stay within certain boundaries (Vitiello 1992, 361). It could not 
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be adopted as a total alternative to heterosexuality, as this would have clashed with the 
moral duty of reproduction, which is the first expression of filial piety (362).  
However, same-sex love was still widespread during the Qing, remaining a strong 
cultural and social force (Wu 2004, 3). By the end of the reign of the Qianlong emperor 
(1735-96), Beijing was home to several districts catering to male same-sex love, and boy-
actors were idealized as objects of exalted beauty (3). In terms of prevalence and social 
influence, the most important form of male same-sex love that can be identified during 
the Qing Dynasty was that between upper-class men (literati, officials, and merchants) 
and boy-actors (dan) (8). Dan also came to refer to these boy-actors’ offstage persona as 
catamites, a role which paralleled that of the female courtesan in earlier periods of 
Chinese history (8). In the 18th and 19th Centuries, upper-class men not only patronized 
dan as male prostitutes, but also developed long-term romantic relationships with them 
(8). Though the acting profession was associated negatively with passive sexuality and 
prostitution, actors’ active patrons included some of the most respected intellectual and 
political figures of the Qing Dynasty (Hinsch 1990, 153). Another form of male same-sex 
love that is widely recorded in records and stories from the Qing period is that between 
affluent men and their boy servants (Wu 2004, 8). This kind of relationship was very 
common throughout the whole of Chinese history (8). Finally, while relationships 
between men of equal status certainly existed within all levels of late imperial Chinese 




2.4 Modernization during the Republican period (1912-1949): ‘Homosexuality’ as 
pathological and deviant 
At the beginning of the 20th century various intellectuals and elites began taking 
steps to modernize China. These modernizing elites, who felt a deep sense of cultural and 
political humiliation following the Sino-Japanese War (1894), looked towards Western 
science to rescue China from what they perceived as the inferiority and backwardness of 
Chinese culture (Chou 2000, 43-4; Dikötter 1995). These elites shifted away from 
Confucian (and neo-Confucian) cosmological understandings of gender and sexuality, 
and turned instead to the authority of the natural sciences (Dikötter 1995, 8). Gender 
distinctions were no longer thought to be linked to the cosmological foundations of the 
universe, and were instead viewed as biologically determined (14). Some reformers 
urgently promoted eugenics, and wrote about the dangers that frequent sex, prostitution, 
and venereal diseases such as syphilis posed to men and women who were expected to 
bear healthy children that would strengthen the nation (114, 130, 133).  
2.4.1 Biological determinism and inversion 
It was during this time that Western sexology was also imported and reinterpreted 
by Chinese writers and reformers. The direct translation of the term “homosexuality” 
(tongxinglian or tongxing’ai) emerged in the Chinese language in the 1930s (Zheng 2015, 
39). In this section I will occasionally use the term “homosexuality”, because writers at 
the time were using the medical term tongxinglian or tongxing’ai (a direct translation of 
the English term “homosexuality”) in their writings, as they were focused on discussing 
same-sex love as a pathological behavior. Historian Frank Dikötter, who examines over 
350 publications produced in the early Republican period covering sexual matters, argues 
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that tongxinglian was widely regarded as a “temporary aberration, a mental disease, or an 
‘inversion’” (Dikötter 1995, 139). Dikötter argues that the concept of inversion—in 
which, for example, a same-sex attracted man was regarded as being a woman trapped in 
a male body—contributed to keep sexuality firmly linked to procreation, as this 
representation emphasized heterosexism as a natural need (141). “Insisting that all desire 
was by nature heterosexual, reducing masculinity and femininity to an expression of 
sexuality, most biologizing theories represented ‘the homosexual’ as the very opposite of 
‘manliness’,” Dikötter writes (141). The image of ‘the homosexual’ as a female mind in a 
male body was central to Cheng Hao’s The Sexual Life of Mankind (1934), which also 
included a list of the biological reversals that were thought to characterize same-sex 
attracted men and women (see Table 2.1 on next page).  
2.4.2 Same-sex love: An intermediate step for youth; abnormal for adults 
In the eyes of some writers and scholars in China, sodomy among young males 
was seen as a stage of development towards the ‘normal’ expression of sexual desire, and 
was an acceptable behavior specific to certain situations (140). For example, Gui 
Zhiliang, a famous gynecologist in the 1930s and 1940s, wrote that homosexuality was 
an inevitable intermediate or preparatory stage on the path towards heterosexuality 
(Dikötter 1995, 140; Chou 2000, 49). As Gui wrote in his 1936 book A Woman’s Life 
(Nüren zhi yisheng), “the ‘normally’ developed person would ‘transit’ (guodu) through 
homosexuality, but some would ‘get blocked’ (zu’ai) or ‘bogged down’ (tingzhi) in what 
was described as a form of ‘abnormal homosexuality’ (bu putong de tongxing lian’ai)” 
(Dikötter 1995,140). Only a small minority of youth was thought to have an innate 
tendency towards homosexual intercourse, and, as with people with genetic mental 
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Table 2.1 Cheng Hao’s list of the presumed biological reversals in male and female 
homosexuals: 
 (H. Cheng 1934, 133-4, adapted from Dikötter 1995, 142).  
disorders, it was believed to be impossible to correct them, according to Gui (140). Wang 
Chengpin, another writer from this period argued that if homosexual tendencies were  
allowed to develop into an addiction, then it would not even be possible for the ‘victim’ 
to be ‘rescued’ through marriage (140). Instead, the homosexual was thought to have 
strayed from the right path, having turned his back on ‘normal’ (zheng) intercourse, 
 Man Woman 
Skeleton Resembles mostly that of a 
girl, particularly the pelvis 
Similar in size and strength 
to that of a man; the pelvis 
is not very broad and has a 
small gradient, the spine is 
long and thin, the middle is 
not curve 
Skin Soft and warm  
Limbs Relatively small   
Pace The step is short and slow, 
like that of a girl 
Similar to men 
Voice High-pitched Gruff like men, structure 
of the larynx similar to 
men, weak laryngeal nodes 
Chest Developed to that of a girl, 
to the point of secreting 
milk in the mammary 
glands 
Flat, barely developed 
Facial hair None Can sometimes grow 
thickly like a man’s 
Character Likes girl’s games, 
activities and clothes 
Generally like a man, the 
exact opposite of the male 
homosexual 
Emotions  Used to saying sweet 
expressions of love, bashful 
in presence of other men 
 
Sex drive Very feeble in relation to 
women, to the point of 
impotence: can develop 
abnormal impulses when in 
presence of the same sex 
Cold towards men, 
sensitive to the same sex 
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‘inverted’ or ‘turned upside down’ (diandao) the natural order, and developed ‘abnormal’ 
desires (xingyu biantai) (140). “By calling homosexuality a ‘diseased state’ (bingtai) or a 
‘metamorphosis’ (biantai), it was implied that a ‘normal’ heterosexual instinct was  
originally present even in ‘abnormal’ bodies,” Dikötter writes (140). Much like 
masturbation, adolescent homosexuality was portrayed as a socially acquired vice that 
discipline had to overcome for the sake of the self, marriage, and the nation (140-1). 
 European scholars and reformers who were writing about both adolescent and 
adult same-sex love had an impact on Chinese scholars during the Republican period. 
The writings of British social reformers Edward Carpenter and Havelock Ellis helped 
inform prevalent attitudes toward sexuality in China. Ellis, in particular provided the 
groundwork that a good deal of Freudian psychology was based on (Carroll 2018, 107). 
Their key works—such as Carpenter’s “Affection in Education” (Carpenter 1899) and 
Ellis’s “The School-Friendships of Girls” (Ellis 1915)—shaped debates in China 
throughout the 1920s and in later years over single-sex schooling versus coeducation as 
well as the content and importance of sex education (Carroll 2018, 107). These essays 
were published initially in Chinese in 1923 and 1925 respectively (107). Ellis espoused a 
similar belief about same-sex love as Republican-era gynecologist Gui Zhiliang, 
describing school-aged same-sex relations as a “love-fiction” that prepared students to 
express affection in adult romantic and sexual relations with their spouses of the opposite 
sex (107). Ellis was tolerant of youthful same-sex relations, but saw its continuance into 
adulthood as a sign of developing mental disorders and asocial behavior (107). Ellis, and 
those he influenced, such as Republican-era sociologist Pan Guangdan, emphatically 
identified adult “inversion” as a psychological deficiency (107). Chou Wah-Shan writes 
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that Pan’s translation of Ellis’s Psychology of Sex (1947) as well as his own introduction, 
“Homosexual Examples in Chinese Literature,” are important because he represents the 
first generation of Chinese scholars who studied tongxinglian from the perspective of 
Western sexology (2000, 51). Pan was also one of many scholars during this period who 
weighed in on a high-profile murder case in 1932, in which a 22-year-old woman 
murdered her girlfriend, also 22 (Caroll 2018, 99). The two women had lived for a period 
as dormitory roommates while both attending the National Hangzhou Art Academy—
making the case a touchstone for discussions of the potential problems created by same-
sex dorms in educational institutions as well as women’s supposed propensity for jealous 
passions and even crime (100-1, 106-7, 116-9). While I noted at the beginning of this 
chapter that the records and writings about same-sex love throughout most of China’s 
history focused mostly on men and not women, same-sex relations between women did 
begin to gain notice and notoriety during the Republican era. Public discussions of same-
sex relations at this time focused more on those between women than between men, 
which reflected general social anxieties about the expansion of women’s presence and 
increased autonomy in civil society (Carroll 2018, 100). Pan believed the case 
demonstrated how problematic intractable same-sex love could be, and called on schools 
and society as a whole to provide better supervision of students (such as knowing how 
many times a week students masturbated) in order to identify and stop deviance before it 
became so extreme that it ended in murder (115-6). Pan, who was also influenced by 
Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (author of the twelve-edition 
Psychopathia Sexualis, a foundational study of sexual pathology), still judged same-sex 
love as abnormal (115).  
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It is significant to note that the early 20th century was the first time in Chinese 
history that someone could be spoken of as being ‘homosexual’ or doing something that 
was ‘homosexual’—with the term tongxinglian or tongxing’ai being used instead of 
metaphorical language (Hinsch 1990, 169). The discourse drew from what was 
happening in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, which Foucault describes as a 
“discursive explosion” (Foucault 1978, 37). In the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault argues that this era was an “age of multiplication” in which multiple, 
heterogeneous, “peripheral”, “unnatural” sexualities came to be the focus of attention 
(37-39). Those outside of heterosexual monogamy were scrutinized; and of the six types 
that Foucault draws attention to, one is the “homosexual” (38). He writes that there was a 
shift from the act—the forbidden acts of sodomy, with the perpetrator being “nothing 
more than the juridical subject of them”—to a person, a “species” (43). “The nineteenth-
century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in 
addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology with an indiscreet anatomy 
and possibly a mysterious physiology” (43). While care must be taken not to map the 
model of what was occurring in 18th and 19th-century Europe onto China in the early 
twentieth century, the new discourse around sexuality in China resulted in homosexuality 
being regarded as an essence rather than an act or tendency (one that was previously 
generally tolerated, though in certain forms was punishable under the Qing law code; see 
above) (Chou 2000, 51; Hinsch 1990, 169).  
2.4.3 The selective appropriation of Western science 
Dikötter writes that the modernizing discourses taking place in China during the 
Republican period did not only come from the introduction of new Western ideas, but 
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were also attributed to cultural reorientations taking place in China itself as long before as 
the 17th and 18th centuries (Dikötter 1995, 180-1). “Modernizing discourses of sex were 
not ‘hybrids’ of ‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ ideas, nor can they be interpreted as some sort 
of survival of ‘traditional’ cultural values underneath a veneer of ‘modern’ scientific 
ideas,” he writes, stating that he is critical of what he calls the “‘Western impact – 
Chinese response’ approach”  (11-12). Instead, Dikötter borrows anthropologist David 
Parkin’s term “latticed knowledge” to describe what emerged: a body of knowledge in 
flux, characterized by interactions, overlaps, constant change and endless combinations 
(12). Dikötter argues that sexual desire and procreation remained closely linked together 
throughout history and into the 20th century in China. He writes that during the first half 
of the 19th century in Europe, there emerged a new theoretical construction called 
‘sexuality,’ which, together with new categories like ‘homosexuality’ and 
‘heterosexuality’, closely connected the individual to the object of desire (63). One of the 
consequences of this gradual appearance of a notion of sexuality was that sexuality 
became detached from reproduction (63). Discourses no longer established strict 
distinctions between procreative and nonprocreative sex, and sexuality also become 
interpreted as an individual matter with the individual being the bearer of rights to self-
expression (64). However, he argues that no similar conception of ‘sexuality’ ever 
emerged in China—sexual desire in China was not dissociated from procreation, but 
remained firmly linked to it (64, 69). The Chinese discourse of desire demanded that 
social subjects subordinate their drives to the needs of a higher collectivity (111). He 
argues that for the reformers of this era, prostitution and sodomy represented the two 
extreme forms of non-procreative sex that needed to be eliminated for the sake of the 
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family and the nation (137). He writes that both forms of behavior were considered social 
evils that took place outside the legitimate domain of conjugal sexuality and domestic 
love (137). Dikötter argues that medical science was selectively appropriated by 
modernizing elites in Republican China to solidify the extensive distinction between 
procreative and nonprocreative sexual acts (139). 
While intellectuals and modernizing elites in China during the Republican era 
were reading and translating works by European writers—such as Havelock Ellis and 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing—they had their own goals in mind and structured their 
arguments accordingly. After being humiliated by Britain during the two Opium Wars 
(1839-1842 and 1856-1860) and Japan during the Sino-Japanese War (1894), Chinese 
intellectuals felt the need for the first time to completely transform traditional Chinese 
civilization (Chou 2000, 43-4). Several popular movements critiquing traditional Chinese 
culture were spawned during this time, such as the May Fourth Movement, and they 
advocated for changes with the goal in mind of building a modern, strong nation (Zheng 
2015, 39). Reformers such as Chen Duxiu (one of the founders of the Communist Party 
of China in 1921) criticized Confucianism for promoting superficial ceremonies, lax 
morality, feudalism, the caste system, and the oppression of women (Chou 2000, 44). He, 
and others, attacked Chinese men as being weak and sick; Chen specifically described 
Chinese men as lacking the strength to tie up a chicken and having bodies as delicate as 
women’s (Zheng 2014, 39-40). Many reformers attributed national weakness and 
backwardness to inadequacies among the population, including weak bodies and an 
inadequate knowledge of human sexuality and reproduction (Chou 2000, 44; Dikötter 
1995, 2). It was a time of strong anti-imperialist nationalism; many intellectuals did not 
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believe in complete Westernization, but put intense faith in tools such as Western science 
in order to achieve modernity and build a strong nation (Chou 2000, 44). Chou argues 
that the Chinese appropriation of Western ideas was very selective, as Christian ideas 
about sexuality as well as the duality of heterosexuality and homosexuality (which came 
into existence in Western sexology) had never been very popular (49). The Confucian 
marital system—which privileged reproduction and was not concerned if one practiced 
same-sex love as long as one married and had children—was fertile ground for Western 
sexology, Chou argues (47). Western sexology provided the discourses of biological 
determinism that “heterosexualize” the Confucian marital-reproductive institution and 
allowed for same-sex love to be pathologized “as a byproduct” (47, 49). “It was the 
sexologist's pathologization of homosexuality rather than the Christian homophobic 
attitude that was selectively and strategically adopted by Chinese intellectuals who had 
their own sociopolitical agenda in mind,” Chou writes (49). 
The Republican period in China was a major turning point in attitudes regarding 
same-sex love. What for centuries had been tolerated and even embraced came to be 
viewed as a deviant aberration that threatened heterosexual marriage and was the cause of 
a weak nation. While some scholars place the blame solely on the importation of Western 
sexology and medical knowledge, the situation is more complex, as described above. 
Some shared concepts can clearly be found in texts by both Western writers and Chinese 
reformers—such as the idea of same-sex love being a practice youth may temporarily 
experience, but one that is ultimately aberrant and a pathological inversion if allowed to 
continue into adulthood. Historian Frank Dikötter (1995) argues that it was the strong 
link between sexual desire and reproduction in China that caused any idea of same-sex 
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desire to be dismissed and viewed as a threat to the social responsibility of populating a 
healthy nation. Furthermore, the modernizing elites who were importing and translating 
Western sexology had their own goals in mind. In the course of their selective adoption 
of foreign concepts, biological determinism and the pathologization of homosexuality 
combined with traditional Chinese attitudes to heterosexualize the Confucian family and 
marital system.  
At least one of the people I interviewed was aware of the long history of how 
same-sex desire was tolerated and even celebrated in poetry and other literature for much 
of China’s history. In Chapter 3 I will introduce Master Lu, who has a temple dedicated 
to helping tongzhi in Taiwan. Master Lu said that before the Qing Dynasty, marriage 
between one man and one woman was not emphasized. A man could marry one woman, 
or multiple women, and also have desire for other men, he said. Same-sex desire was 
very normal, he added. He blames the change on influences from the Euro-American 
world beginning in the Qing dynasty, and said that Western religion (i.e. Christianity) 
emphasized that marriage should be between a husband and a wife. When I asked him if 
many people in Taiwan are aware of this history, he answered no, unless they do some 
research. Master Lu’s stories are indicative of how the long tradition of same-sex desire 
in Chinese history has been largely forgotten in the contemporary age. “The homosexual 
tradition is dead and virtually unknown, even among the educated,” Bret Hinsch writes 
(Hinsch 1990, 163). 
2.5 Tongzhi history from 1990s Taiwan until same-sex marriage 
 A politically engaged tongzhi community in Taiwan came into being in the 1990s 
(Chou 2000; Simon 2004). Anthropologist Scott Simon argues that the formation of the 
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tongzhi community in Taiwan took place in four progressive stages. First was the 
appropriation of public space. Parks (especially those near train stations) had been 
meeting spaces for tongzhi men, starting in the 1950s (75). Second was the establishment 
of gay and lesbian commercial venues, which coincided with Taiwan’s capitalistic 
growth (76). Third, entry into the political sphere was the next important step in identity 
and community formation. He describes three historical incidents as mobilizing activists 
and encouraging public discourse on same-sex love (79). This included then-Taipei 
mayor Chen Shui-bian’s decision in 1995 to convert New Park—a popular cruising 
ground for men—into a memorial for those who had died during a period of violent 
unrest in the martial law period (79-80). University students formed a group to educate 
the public about the tongzhi history of the park (Chou 2000, 164; Scott 2004, 80). Two 
other incidents also led to increased activism, which I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 in 
my section on Taiwan’s political economy. One was a police raid on Changde Street 
outside of New Park in 1997, in which 40-50 tongzhi men were rounded up by police 
who checked their identity cards (80-1). The other was a 1998 raid on AG Gym, one of 
the most popular gay establishments in Taipei, offering exercise equipment as well as a 
sauna and private rooms to allow for intimacy (81). In the AG raid, two men (a 
Taiwanese university student and a tourist from Macau who did not understand 
Mandarin) were coerced by police into removing their towels and posing for a 
photograph simulating anal sex (Simon 2004, 81). Over three hundred new and used 
condoms were used as evidence by the police that AG was a male tongzhi sex club. 
International human rights lawyers and gay activists fought against the charges and AG 
eventually won a court case against police harassment (Simon 2004; J. C. Ho 2010, 552). 
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Simon argues that these incidents contributed to a greater sense of tongzhi identity across 
the island (2004, 82). Fourth, Simon writes that there was a creation of a publicly 
recognized tongzhi community around the year 2000. He writes that major events 
involved in this creation were Taipei’s commercial “Rainbow Community” (which began 
with the opening of Taiwan’s first gay bookstore in 1999), Taipei City’s sponsorship of a 
Gay and Lesbian Pride Festival in 2000, and the birth of the marriage rights movement 
(82). 
 By the year 2000, same-sex marriage had become an item of pressing concern to 
Taiwan’s budding tongzhi community. On October 22, 2000, four Christian lesbian 
couples and one gay couple married publicly at Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian 
Church (Tongguang tongzhi zhanglao jiaohui, Taiwan’s first openly pro-tongzhi church) 
and demanded that the state recognize same-sex marriage rights (Simon 2004, 85). In 
2006, Democratic Political Party lawmaker Hsiao Bi-khim led an effort to legalize 
marriage and child adoption for same-sex couples; that same year the Taiwan Pride 
parade also focused on the marriage issue by staging wedding ceremonies for female 
tongzhi couples (M. Ho 2019, 487). However, the proposal failed to make it on the 
legislative agenda (487). The first advocacy organization for marriage equality, the 
Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights (TAPCPR, Taiwan banlu quanyi 
tuidong lianmeng) was formed in 2009, and they focused their efforts on promoting 
same-sex marriage, civil partnerships, and multi-person families (487). In 2013, equal 
right to marriage for same-sex couples (one of TAPCPR’s demands) gained sufficient 
endorsement from lawmakers and was ready for its first reading in the legislature (487). 
That same year, the countermovement opposing same-sex marriage began to grow. A 
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group of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Yiguandao leaders joined together and 
organized a large-scale rally in November (491). I will go into more details of the 
countermovement in Chapter 4, when I examine a Buddhist nun’s responses to those 
opposing same-sex marriage. In 2016, conservatives launched a new party, the Faith and 
Hope League (FHL, xinxin xiwang lianmeng), partly with the goal of defeating the 
attempt to legalize same-sex marriage (491). However, they failed to obtain a legislative 
seat.  
A third attempt to legalize same-sex marriage was launched in 2016, which was 
quickly followed by a mass rally by conservative groups (many of which were led by 
Christian churches and quasi-Christian ‘family values’ groups) (M. Ho 2019, 491). In 
February 2017, the case of same-sex marriage was taken out of the legislative arena and 
into the juridical, as the Constitutional Court made the decision to review the issue (492). 
The Court, which had a number of liberal judges recently nominated by the DPP (M. Ho 
2019, 496), ruled on May 24, 2017, that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right, 
giving the Taiwanese government a two-year deadline to come up with a framework for 
legalization. The quasi-Christian anti-same-sex marriage groups had enough influence to 
create demand for three referendums held on November 24, 2018 regarding the rights of 
tongzhi (M. Ho 2019, 499). All three ballot questions, which included the restriction of 
the legal definition of marriage to one husband and one wife in the Civil Code, the 
banning of same-sex education in junior high and elementary school, and a special law to 
protect the rights of same-sex couples, won the majority of support (499). Therefore in 
2019 the government did not change the Civil Code but instead proposed a special law 
that allowed for same-sex marriage, following both the courts as well as the referendum 
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result (Chin 2019, 2). Though the bill that was finally passed was the most progressive, 
some scholars and activists have pointed out its limitations. The new legislation does not 
offer full adoption rights, and same-sex marriages between Taiwanese and foreigners are 
only recognized if the partner is from a country where same-sex marriage is legal (2). 
2.6 Contemporary Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China: ‘Comrade’, 1s and 0s, T-Po, and 
TB/G  
The situation for same-sex attracted people in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in 
contemporary times differs because of each region’s different history in the 20th century. 
However, same-sex attracted people in Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong and other 
Chinese-speaking communities share some common terminology. The first term is 
tongzhi. 
2.6.1 ‘Comrade’ 
Tongzhi, which means “comrade”, is the most popular contemporary Chinese 
word used by same-sex attracted people, those who are transgender (kuaxingbie), and 
others who are sexually and gender nonconforming. The first character tong means 
‘same’, ‘alike’; and the second character zhi means ‘goal’, ‘spirit’, ‘occupation’ (Chou 
2000, 1). Before it was appropriated by same-sex attracted people, the term was first used 
in the Republican period, and adopted by both the Nationalist and Communist parties to 
refer to those who were struggling for the nationalist or communist revolutions (1). One 
of the most popular associations of the term is its use in a famous statement by Dr. Sun-
Yat Sen, leader of the 1911 Chinese Democratic Revolution to overthrow the last Chinese 
monarchy, in which he urges tongzhi to continue to fight (1). Linguistic anthropologists 
Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang (2001) translate the term in this usage as “followers” 
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(262). During the Communist Revolution (1920s to 1949) the term acquired its political 
and revolutionist connotations, Wong and Zhang argue (262). Initially it was an honorific 
address reserved only for Chinese Communist Party members, symbolizing recruitment 
into the Party (262-3). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
tongzhi became the politically correct, polite, and neutral term to address everyone , 
replacing the terms that signaled differences in social status and class (262). The term has 
largely fallen out of favor since the opening up of the market economy of China in 1978, 
and previous address terms that were replaced by tongzhi (such as Miss xiaojie and Mr. 
xiansheng) have since been revived (Chou 2000, 2; Wong and Zhang 2001, 263).  
The term tongzhi was initially used in the Chinese title of the ‘First Hong Kong 
Gay and Lesbian Film Festival’ in 1989 (xianggang diyi jie tongzhi dianying jie) (Chou 
2000, 2; Wong and Zhang 2001, 264). The organizers decided to use tongzhi as the 
Chinese translation of “gay and lesbian” because they wanted to use an indigenous term 
for same-sex love instead of Western, English terms such as “gay,” “lesbian,” and 
“queer” (Chou 2000, 2). The Chinese term for ‘homosexuality’ (tongxinglian) was 
dropped because of its usage as a medical term denoting pathology (2).1 Since then, the 
term tongzhi became widely adopted by same-sex attracted people and organizations in 
Hong Kong, and its usage later spread to Taiwan, China, and other Chinese-speaking 
parts of the world (Wong and Zhang 2001, 264). Hong Kong sociologist Chou Wah-shan, 
whose work on what he calls “tongzhi theory” has helped popularize the term in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, praises the fluidity of the term in his writings (264). In Tongzhi: 
Politics of Same-Sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies, he writes: 
																																								 																				
1	It should, however, be pointed out that the first character tong () is the same in both 
tongzhi () and tongxinglian (). 
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Unlike “homo” or “hetero,” tongzhi is not defined by the gender of one's erotic 
object choice but connotes an entire range of alternative sexual practices and 
sensitivities in a way that “lesbian,” “gay,” or “bisexual” does not. It rejects 
essentialism and behaviourism, and it does not require counting the incidence of 
same-sex sexual acts to qualify an individual tongzhi identity […] It achieves a 
political contribution similar to “queer politics,” but whereas queer politics 
confronts the mainstream by taking back a bigoted label, tongzhi harmonizes 
social relationships by taking the most sacred title from the mainstream culture. It 
is an indigenous strategy of proclaiming one’s sexual identity by appropriating 
rather than denying one’s familial-cultural identity (Chou 2000, 3). 
 
Chou also argues that the term helps to pluralize sexuality, as it refers to all forms of 
sexual practice that have been marginalized by hegemonic heterosexuality (3). He also 
writes that tongzhi represents a strong sentiment for integrating the sexual (legitimizing 
same-sex love), cultural (reappropriating Chinese identity), and the political (sharing the 
goals of combating heterosexism) (3). Wong and Zhang, who examine the use of the term 
in the bimonthly tongzhi magazine G&L, argue that the use of tongzhi constitutes a 
discourse of resistance (2001, 267). As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, same-
sex love was often associated with the elite over the course of Chinese history, and was 
therefore viewed as decadent in the communist discourse (268). “Hence the use of 
tóngzhì, a term so deeply rooted in the history of the Chinese communist revolution, as 
the name for the alternative identity of gay and lesbian, is in itself, a daring and rebellious 
act,” they write (268, tonal diacritics in original text).   
2.6.2 ‘1s and 0s’ 
 While tongzhi serves as an umbrella term for sexually and gender nonconforming 
people in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other Chinese-speaking communities, there are 
also other terms in use. Among same-sex attracted men, ‘1’ and ‘0’ are used (H.T. Huang 
2011; Zheng 2015). 1, symbolizing the penis, is associated with the male role, while as 0, 
symbolizing the vagina, is associated with the female role (Zheng 2015, 75). Newcomers 
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to the community either choose their role or are assigned it during their first sexual 
experience with someone who has already identified as a 0 or a 1 (75). Once this gender 
role has been determined, tongzhi are disciplined—through gossip and critique—to fit 
into it (75). Anthropologist Zheng Tiantian found that according to the men in her 
research conducted in Dalian, China, the gender division of 1 and 0 emulates the 
hegemonic gender roles in heterosexual relationships (78). 1 takes on the role of the 
inserter, while as 0 assumes the role of the inserted receiver (78). Same-sex attracted men 
usually call each other “wife” (laopo) or “husband” (laogong) in alignment with their 
gender roles (78). Zheng also found that the 1s and 0s in her research invoked the theory 
of yin and yang to describe their differences (78). Yin, or 0, signifies being negative, dark, 
passive, wet, cold, and feminine; Yang, or 1, denotes being positive, bright, active, dry, 
hot, and masculine (78). The same-sex attracted men in Zheng’s research believed it was 
natural to have a union of 1 and 0 in a relationship, just as it is understood to be natural to 
have a union of yin and yang in the universe (78). Zheng also found that it is the tongzhi 
community that defines male and female behaviors and roles and uses these rules to 
structure the identities of 1s and 0s (79-80). 0s may also adopt idealistic feminine 
behaviors in the way they speak, dress, and act (80, 84). Zheng, who conducted fieldwork 
in Dalian over the course of several months between 2005 and 2013, reports only finding 
two men who identified as “0.5” and questioned the 1/0 system (7, 78). In her analysis of 
the 1/0 system, Zheng argues that scholars must be careful not to make certain 
assumptions about non-Western queer communities. She writes that Dennis Altman 
(1996) has theorized that a global trend is taking place in which gender-based identities 
are giving way to egalitarian Western sexual identities that are not focused on gender 
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identities (76). However, the 1/0 system problematizes that argument, Zheng argues. For 
rather than sharing a sexual identity based on a common sexual orientation, 1s and 0s 
differ from each other as two different gender categories (77). “Gender difference is 
pivotal” to the identities of tongzhi, she writes (191). 
 Evan, a Daoist follower from Taipei, told me in an interview that he used to be a 0 
or a bottom, and then about five years ago changed to be a top or 1. Evan, 30, said he had 
been feeling some pain by being a bottom, so he tried being a top, and after having a few 
enjoyable experiences with it he then fully committed to this new role. However, he did 
say that he wants more of a sense of security in a relationship, hinting that this specific 
behavior is something that is not necessarily associated with being a top or a 1. As Zheng 
noted in her study of tongzhi in Dalian in the PRC, 1s may be less likely to commit to 
relationships and are expected to sleep around, whereas 0s are expected to be faithful, 
dedicated, and understanding of 1’s probable promiscuity (Zheng 2015, 80, 84). Zheng 
also discusses how many of the 0s she spoke to described the pain they felt in their sexual 
experiences, and how it took them a long time to finally become accustomed to the 
feeling of being a bottom and to eventually experience physical pleasure (79). Evan’s 
experience shows that these categories and the expectations attached to the roles of 1s 
and 0s are not always as fixed as Tiantian Zheng (2015) describes in the tongzhi 
community in the PRC. 
 Lloyd, a member of the same Daoist temple as Evan (and who facilitated my 
interview with Evan), said that the English words top, bottom, and vers (versatile) are 
also used in the male same-sex attracted community in Taiwan. Lloyd described a 
spectrum ranging from 100% bottom (always being a bottom), vers bottom (being a 
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bottom “70 percent” of the time, and at other times a top), vers (50% of the time a 
bottom, 50% being a top; bufen is also sometimes used), vers top, and 100% top. Lloyd 
added that these 100% tops sometimes have sex with women, and said that 0s/bottoms 
are the majority and tops are rare in the community. During this same interview, when I 
asked Evan if he uses tongzhi or another term to describe himself, he answered in 
English, with a chuckle: “I’m gay. I like boy[s]!” Wondering if he was translating the 
term, I asked—and got clarification—that he does in fact prefer to use the English word 
‘gay’ to describe himself. Lloyd too said he prefers to use the word ‘gay’ to describe 
himself. This may reflect transnational flows of information, with the tongzhi community 
in Taiwan being aware of LGBTQ discourses in Europe and North America, and 
sometimes appropriating and reinterpreting LGBTQ terminology and ideas. Lloyd and 
Evan have had different levels of exposure to the English language and to foreign 
countries (Lloyd has traveled to the United States and Europe and is fluent in English; 
Evan has limited English ability), but I would argue that their use of the English word 
‘gay’ is a display of cosmopolitanism. I explore cosmopolitanism in Taiwan further in 
Chapter 4, when I examine a Buddhist nun’s cosmopolitan display in a speech attacking 
those who are against same-sex marriage. 
2.6.3 T/Po, TB/G, and bufen or H 
 A similar binary exists among same-sex attracted women in Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and—in recent years—the PRC (Kam 2014). In Taiwan and the PRC, Female tongzhi 
inclined to masculine gender performances call themselves T, while those who represent 
themselves with normative femininity call themselves Po (Chou 2000; Y. Hu 2017; Kam 
2014). More recently, there is also bufen or H for those who are neither T nor Po; they 
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have no visible gender identification, and they may desire both T and Po or any other 
subjects (Y. Hu 2017, 91; Kam 2014, 253). One can imagine T and Po as being the two 
ends of a spectrum with bufen in the middle, with other hybridized subcategories and 
subdivisions. One can also be bufen pian (“inclined towards”) T or bufen pain Po (Y. Hu 
2017, 91). T masculinity can be subdivided further into “iron T” (tie T); “sissy T” (niang 
T); and “cute and submissive T” (zhengtai T; or sometimes the original Japanese term 
shouta is used) (Kam 2014, 253). For Po femininity, there is dominating Po (han Po), 
“big sister Po” (yujie Po; or the original Japanese term onee), and many other 
combinations (253). Among same-sex attracted women in Hong Kong, the masculine 
gender role is referred to as TB, short for tomboy (Chou 2000, 214). The feminine 
counterpart is called TBG, short for tomboy-girl (214). In these different Chinese 
societies, some also choose to use non-gendered words to denote themselves as same-sex 
attracted women, such as nütongzhi (literally “female” tongzhi), as well as lazi in Taiwan 
and lala in China (derived from the English word “lesbian”) (Y. Hu 2017; Kam 2014). 
  According to anthropologist Antonia Chao, who conducted ethnographic 
fieldwork on the Taiwanese lesbian community, the term T originated in Taiwan during 
the 1960s Vietnam War, when the first gay bars (along with American-style restaurants 
and bars) were opening in major cities (Chao 2000, 379). “During this time, lesbians 
either with Western connections or an educational background that enabled them to speak 
at least basic English, hung out with American GIs, while working-class lesbians came to 
gay bars,” Chao writes (379). It was from either or both of these social locations that the 
term T (short for the English word “tomboy”) came about (379). Po, its counterpart, is a 
Mandarin word that usually functions as a suffix in expressions like waipo (“outside 
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grandmother”, meaning grandmother on the mother’s side) or laopo (“old lady”, meaning 
wife) (379). However, T-Po identities only came more widely into formation when T bars 
began to open in Taiwan in the mid-1980s (380). The emergence and popularization of 
Westernized lesbian and feminist politics in Taiwan during the 1990s led to the T-Po 
binary being critiqued as replicating and reinforcing gender and sexual binaries (Y. Hu 
2017, 93). It was also regarded as being local and backward within the budding women’s 
and tongzhi movements of the time (93). It was in this atmosphere that the categories of 
lazi and nütongzhi were created to designate generic female same-sex desire (93). 
Nevertheless, as Yu-Ying Hu writes in her study of how same-sex attracted women in 
Taiwan choose to name their gender and sexual practices, T and Po continue to persist 
(90, 105-6). Hu argues, however, that though T and Po remain powerful concepts and 
identity labels, the meaning and categorical definition of T-Po continues to mutate in the 
face of the challenge of new non-binary identity categories such as bufen and nütongzhi 
(90).  
 One of the women I interviewed (Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian woman), told 
me that the divisions of masculine T, feminine Po, or ambiguous H are not an appropriate 
fit for her, because she is still interested in men, but hasn’t had the opportunity to explore 
that dimension of her sexuality. She is not content with using the English term “bi” 
either, because she doesn't feel like this term is quite enough to fully express who she is. 
She told me she uses the word tongzhi to decribe herself, and said that it is better than the 
word ‘queer’ (ku’er in Chinese) because it is so broad (kuan) and can include everyone 
from transgender people to even allies of the tongzhi community. “I feel, in my opinion, 
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tongzhi is a great word. It is a very broad one. It shows that many different sexual 
identities are possible,” she said. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 Today there are multiple terms in use by sexually and gender nonconforming 
people in Taiwan and China—starting with tongzhi as an umbrella term, and then with 
terminology differing and subdividing further within the male and female same-sex 
attracted communities. In this chapter I covered the history of tongzhi identity in the 
Chinese world, and in doing so provided a survey of the tolerance and intolerance 
expressed towards same-sex love over the course of Chinese history. I began by looking 
at some of the poetic metaphors used to describe same-sex eroticism in the early periods 
of China’s history, when same-sex love was tolerated and widely accepted. I discussed 
how attitudes may have begun to shift over time, with the introduction of the term jijian 
(lit. “chicken lewdness”) for sodomy in the Tang Dynasty, a term that would later be used 
in the Qing-era laws that punished nonconsensual sodomy as well as consensual sodomy. 
I then examined how the medical term for “homosexuality” (tongxinglian or tongxing’ai) 
came into being in the beginning of the 20th century in China, at a time when various 
elites and intellectuals in China had the goal of modernizing the nation. In this section I 
also examine the extent to which foreign sexology was to blame for same-sex love being 
viewed as deviant. I conclude that some ideas were undoubtedly imported; however they 
were also mapped onto existing concepts regarding sexuality and reproduction in China, 
as well as the reformers’ own specific goals in the project of modernization. Finally, I 
turned to the contemporary period and examine how same-sex love in China and Taiwan 
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is described both in terms of fluidity and nonessentialism (i.e. tongzhi) as well as 
gendered binaries (1s and 0s; T-Po).  
 It is evident that there is a long and rich history of same-sex love in China’s 
history. Modern, ‘Western’ concepts of bisexuality and homosexuality cannot be applied 
to this past. For, as long as a man got married and had progeny, he was free to explore his 
desires with others of the same gender. However, the dynamic of these same-sex relations 
often involved social differences—it was usually elite, older men that took the active role 
in the sexual relation, and the passive, penetrated role was stigmatized. At the turn of the 
20th century, as China was undergoing massive changes, Western sexology was imported. 
It merged with the traditional Chinese focus on heterosexual marriage and progeny, 
leading to a new stigmatization of same-sex love. Given this different history, it is also 
important not to use the term LGBTQ to describe the same-sex attracted community in 
Taiwan today, since the history of same-sex love in China and Taiwan through the ages 
and into contemporary times differs from that experienced in Europe and North America. 




Adopted by the Rabbit God: Filial Piety, Fictive Kinship, and Religious 
Practices Among Daoist Believers 
	 
“There are three ways to be unfilial; to not have posterity is the greatest of them all.” 
 Mencius (c. 372—289 B.C.E) 
 
In this chapter I will outline how the conception of the family in traditional 
Chinese thought—and the fundamental concept of filial piety—can make it challenging 
for parents and other relatives to accept a family member that has same-sex desires. I will 
also examine how some have reinterpreted the concept of filial piety and kinship in order 
to find support and acceptance. I link this reinterpretation of filial piety to the practices of 
celibate clergy in Taiwan. 
3.1 The family institution in Taiwan 
In his thorough examination of a wide range of issues affecting tongzhi, 
sociologist Chou Wah-shan makes some important points about the institution of the 
family in Chinese culture. Family, Chou writes in Tongzhi: Politics of Same-sex 
Eroticism in Chinese Societies, “is perceived as the most basic and profound social 
institution” (Chou 2000, 253). He argues that this derives from traditional Confucian 
concepts of the self and identity, which tend to be holistic and relational: No one is a 
discrete, isolated being; rather an individual exists through and is defined by their 
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relationship to others (20, 252). Confucianism defines five fundamental relationships, 
which lay down the central defining roles for an individual: sovereign and subject, father 
and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, and friend and friend (252). Chou argues 
that all human relationships are constructed in hierarchical patterns, but Confucianism 
also stresses harmony in those relationships (252-3). In this framework, guanxi (shared 
reciprocity) becomes a crucial reference, as it is the proper guanxi between self and 
others that defines and constitutes the sense of selfhood (253). This is why family is the 
central social institution, Chou writes. “It has salience for each individual in terms of 
emotional support, personal growth, economic bonds, and the entire sense of personal 
selfhood,” he argues (253). In their examination of how Confucianism is a conceptual 
framework for contemporary East Asian family life, Mijung Park and Catherine Chesla 
argue that the family is the irreducible unit, rather than the individual (2007). In the 
Confucian construct, both community and society are an extension of the family. A 
person who does not do well within family relationships cannot do well in society (Park 
and Chesla 2007, 305). This is why parents’ value as human beings is judged by how 
well they perform as parents (306).  
Within family relationships, filial piety is a central value (Chou 2000, 253). Being 
filial to one’s family members, particularly to one’s parents, includes the imperative to 
marry and continue the family line. Marriage in Chinese culture is traditionally regarded 
as a transaction between two households instead of two individuals (23). Historically, the 
basis of marriage and sex within marriage was not sexual desire or love, but the 
obligation to produce heirs, preferably boys (23). “Traditional Chinese focus their sexual 
concerns on marital procreation rather than different-sex pleasure,” Chou argues (23). 
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The nature of this strong Taiwanese family institution can make it challenging for parents 
to fully accept and support tongzhi. Chou argues that the traditional Chinese conception 
of the relational self—and the primacy of family as the most basic social institution—
generate a set of challenges for tongzhi that are very different from their LGBTQ 
counterparts in the Euro-American world (254). Though the tongzhi community in 
Taiwan has experienced its share of harassment by police and harmful stereotyping in the 
media, tongzhi have never been oppressed legally to the extent that they have in the 
United States and former British Colonies, which have had sodomy laws derived from the 
Judeo-Christian tradition (Simon 2004, 79). “The major problem for most tongzhi is not 
state oppression, religious fundamentalism, or job discrimination but the family, 
especially the parents,” Chou argues (254). This is because the problem for parents is not 
only accepting that their child is tongzhi, but the shame of losing face for having a child 
who does not get married (heterosexually) and have children to carry on the family name 
(23, 254). The parents may also feel a loss of face with relatives, neighbors, and ancestors 
(257). In a society where filial piety is of the utmost importance for being a person, 
hurting one’s parents “could be the most terrible thing for a tongzhi to do,” Chou argues 
(254). Chou explains that this is why almost every tongzhi he has encountered in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and the PRC agree that the most painful part of coming out is dealing with 
parents (254-5). He writes the concepts of ‘coming out’ and being ‘out and proud’ are 
Euro-American constructs and can be culturally problematic for the Chinese world, as 
being ‘out’ implies leaving one’s family, parents, and culture to become tongzhi (258-9).  
Evan told me that his parents expect him to marry a wife and have children, and 
this is why they have made several attempts to try and ‘cure’ him of his same-sex desire 
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(see Chapter 1). Evan said that he has known that he was attracted to people of the same 
gender ever since he was in the third grade. He said his parents found out about his 
sexuality when, around 19 years old, he brought his boyfriend to his parents’ house (Evan 
still currently lives with his parents). Evan told his father that his boyfriend was just a 
friend, but his father spotted a hicky on Evan’s neck and figured it out. Evan said his 
father was furious, and slapped him. After that, his family began trying to attempt to cure 
him of his sexual orientation. They first brought him to a temple to the goddess Mazu in 
Banqiao District of New Taipei City—the temple he had grown up going to with his 
family. He saw a spirit medium (jitong) who said that Evan’s true soul was away from his 
body, and that something dark and terrible had stuck to him instead. The medium 
performed a ritual to try and recover Evan’s lost spirit. That did not change his sexuality, 
so that was when they decided to take him to see a psychiatrist, as described in the 
introduction of this thesis. He told me the doctor prescribed a psychotropic drug 
(jingshenyao), and when I asked why, Evan answered that his parents needed the 
psychiatrist to do something; otherwise they wouldn’t leave the hospital. This medication 
of course did not change Evan, and so later his family took him back to the temple, still 
attempting to cure him. He told me he felt utterly helpless throughout this whole process. 
 Anthropologist Scott Simon writes that the expectation on men in Taiwan to 
marry and bear grandchildren for their parents is very intense, and can create a lot of guilt 
for tongzhi men, partly because they don’t want their parents to lose face (2004, 72). 
Drawing on his own ethnographic work in Taiwan, Simon writes that the cultural 
expectations are so powerful that some gay men often feel the most pressure to marry 
after they’ve come out to their parents (72). Evan said he would suffer if he had to marry 
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a woman, because he only likes men. Though tongzhi men may feel pressure to have 
children, Evan and Lloyd (who facilitated my two interviews with Evan) pointed out that 
some would like to adopt children. These two members, as well as Master Lu, argued that 
the current laws make the process of adoption very challenging for tongzhi. Evan said 
that this was the next step (after the legalization of same-sex marriage) that needed to be 
done to advance tongzhi rights in Taiwan. 
 Not all tongzhi have such negative experiences with their families, however. 
Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian woman I introduced at the end of Chapter 2, told me that 
both her mother and father are very accepting of her.1 Xiao’en does an extensive amount 
of advocacy work, trying to bridge relations between Taiwan’s Christian community and 
the tongzhi community. Xiao’en’s mother now joins her at some events (including 
speaking on a panel with other Christian mothers of tongzhi), as shown in the 2016 
documentary The Shepherds, which features Xiao’en and other members of the pro-
tongzhi Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian Church. Lloyd, a 32-year-old project 
manager in software development who lives in Taoyuan, told me in our interview that he 
came out to his mother three years ago.2 He said that she had already guessed his sexual 
identity and that she was accepting of it. He added that, while he was traveling in Japan 
and same-sex marriage was passed into law, his mother shared the news with him and 
sent him some related articles. “As a mother she intended to see her children got 
company for the rest of their life…no matter the gender,” he said. Lloyd said he thinks 
his father can probably guess that he is tongzhi, but he hasn’t talked to him about it. 
Nevertheless, Lloyd admitted that having a parent who is accepting of their child being 
																																								 																				
1 Interview on August 13, 2020.	
2	Interview on January 16, 2021.	
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tongzhi is “not typical actually, because Taiwanese family [is] mostly very traditional.” 
So, he said, even having just one supportive parent is very fortunate.  
3.2 Brilliant Light Temple and the Rabbit God 
In this section I will introduce Brilliant Light Temple, the Daoist temple where 
Evan and Lloyd are members.3 I will also introduce one of the primary gods of the 
temple: a Rabbit God who is a deification of a same-sex attracted man, and who serves 
the needs of tongzhi worshippers. I will then introduce the head priest of the temple. He 
chose to focus his work on supporting tongzhi because he saw that few other religious 
traditions were putting any effort into working with this community. In later sections I 
will discuss the kinship ties that have been created at this temple, as well as how both 
priest and lay members are reinterpreting the cultural idea of filial piety. 
Several members sought out and discovered the temple because they were 
experiencing relationship difficulties. None of those I interviewed were Daoists before 
coming to the temple, and when they sought out a temple for their needs they didn't have 
any specific religious tradition in mind. This highlights the highly syncretic nature of 
religious faith in Taiwan. People may visit Daoist and Buddhist temples for a range of 
reasons, or may follow certain practices at different times. In 2010, while Evan was still 
experiencing a lot of conflict with his family, he also experienced heartbreak that led him 
to turn more to religion. After his boyfriend at the time had cheated on him and then left 
him for the other person, Evan did some research to find a deity that could help him 
through this time. Though Evan had previously gone to folk and Buddhist temples with 
his family, he did not have any religious tradition in mind. This was the same with Lloyd, 
																																								 																				
3 Brilliant Light is my own translation of the Chinese name of the temple, Weimingtang.	
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who also did not grow up in a religious family, and sought out temples and religious 
specialists to help him with his relationship woes. Lloyd found that some of the religious 
options that he tried felt too business-like: he’d pay the religious specialist a fee and 
provide a photograph of his partner, and then the specialist would give him information 
about his partner that Lloyd did not find very useful. While religion in Taiwan is highly 
syncretic, and people search out temples and specialists for their personal needs, religion 
has also become a marketplace where priests, mediums, and other religious specialists 
have seen ways to profit off demand (Moskowitz 1999, 166-170; Pas 2003). Through 
their research, Lloyd and Evan came across a temple for the Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen). 
This was Brilliant Light Temple (Weimingtang). 
	
Figure 3.1: Daoist priest Master Lu, founder and head priest of Brilliant Light Temple in 
New Taipei City, Taiwan. Photo courtesy Lu Weiming. 
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This temple, which is currently located in a commercial building in Zhonghe 
District in New Taipei City, is named after Daoist priest Lu Weiming, who first founded 
the temple in 2007. Master Lu, 35, told me in an interview that Daoist priests tend to 
choose a specific community or type of support they will offer, and depending on what 
they choose to specialize in, they will accordingly select gods for their temples.4 He said 
he decided to cater to the needs of tongzhi because few other religious leaders in any of 
Taiwan’s religious traditions were concentrating their efforts on supporting this 
community. A few months after founding Brilliant Light Temple, Lu summoned the 
Rabbit God to the temple because he said this deity specifically supports tongzhi. This 
was done by taking a plaque in which the full name of the deity was carved (Uncle 
Rabbit God Hu Tianbao, Tu’er Shen Hu Tianbao Daye) and performing a ritual so that 
the god would be summoned to the plaque.  
 The Rabbit God is the deification of a man named Hu Tianbao, who is featured in 
a collection of supernatural stories titled What the Master Did Not Discuss (Zibuyu), 
compiled by Qing Dynasty poet Yuan Mei (1716-1798) (Szonyi 1998, Vitiello 1992). 
According to this story, the young Hu Tianbao admired the appearance of an official that 
had just arrived in Fujian province on the Southeast coast of China (Szonyi 1998, 6; 
Vitiello 1992, 362). After Hu spied on the official while he was on the toilet to see him 
naked, the official had Hu killed (Szonyi 1998, 6). After a month Hu appeared in a dream 
to a local man, explaining that though he had violated propriety and deserved to die, the 
officials of the spirit world were not angry with him because he had not caused harm to 
someone. Instead they made him into the Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen), charged with 
																																								 																				
4 Interview on September 17, 2020. 
 77 
supervising the affairs of men who appreciate other men. Hu asked the man to erect a 
temple for him (6-7). Szonyi argues that the cult of Hu Tianbao, largely centered in the 
Fujian city of Fuzhou in the eighteenth century, was focused around the deity’s power to 
grant the wishes of men who desired to have sexual intercourse with young men (1).  
The word ‘rabbit’ (tuzi) or ‘little rabbit’ (tu’er) was another of the many terms 
used to denote same-sex love in periods of China’s history, and has also been used as an 
insult in contemporary times in the PRC (Szonyi 1998, 7; Vitiello 1992, 349-350). In the 
first half of the twentieth century in the PRC, ‘rabbit’ could also refer to male prostitutes 
(Kang 2009, 37). China scholars Michael Szonyi (1998) and Giovanni Vitiello (1992) 
both note that, interestingly, the identical symbolic association between rabbits and same-
sex love also existed in ancient Rome, as described in scholarship by John Boswell 
(1980). In Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, Boswell argues that early 
Christian theologians also drew on this symbolism of the rabbit in their prohibitions 
against same-sex desire (Boswell 1980). He writes that these theologians drew on 
erroneous ideas about the animal—that the rabbit is a hermaphrodite, and that it could 
grow a new anal opening each year (this is quoted by Moses in the apocryphal Epistle of 
Barnabas, likely composed in the first century CE) (137-8, 306). Though the symbol of 
rabbits has sometimes been used to disparage same-sex love in China and elsewhere, the 
gods in Yuan Mei’s story do not disapprove of same-sex love and willingly make Hu 
Tianbao the Rabbit God to serve the needs of same-sex attracted men. 
 Master Lu did not point to any Daoists being disapproving of what his temple is 
doing. In fact, it appears that the Daoist tradition he is a part of has publicly embraced his 
work in promoting Daoism. According to Brilliant Light Temple’s website, Master Lu 
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has received praise from the 64th leader (Celestial Master) of the Way of Orthodox Unity 
tradition, even joining him on trips to the PRC to promote Daoism there. He believes it is 
his mission to care for tongzhi, and he carries out that concern regardless of shifting 
political winds or other wordly affairs such as harassment from anyone who opposes his 
work. Master Lu told me, 
As a priest, I hope that I can solve some of the problems that have been caused in 
society, to reduce discrimination. To help more people live in the light with 
themselves, because some tongzhi are not comfortable with themselves. They 
should be encouraged, because they are unique. They are unique because god 
made them for a special purpose. 
 
However, Master Lu primarily does this through his work at the temple and spreading 
Daoist teachings. To my knowledge, Master Lu did not publicly advocate for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, unlike Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, who I focus on 
in the next chapter, He did however indicate his support for it in an interview with the 
Taipei Times, in which he said Daoism recognizes the union of two people of the same 
gender, and that there is no reason why the state should not do the same (Yi 2007). When 
I asked Master Lu what his reaction was to same-sex marriage being legalized in May 
2019, he said that this was a matter of politics and not religion. He said that while 
Taiwan’s government has made this step forward in tongzhi rights, it is something that 
could always change: it is legalized now, but may become illegal later depending on what 
a different political climate decides. No matter what the government does or doesn't do, 
Master Lu said, “the care we provide for tongzhi remains the same.” This idea of 
religious separation from the spheres of politics and society is also why he does not 
comment on his own sexuality (see also Gold 2015), which is a theme I return to in the 
final section of this chapter.  
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The temple has received a significant amount of media attention, both in the 
Chinese language and in the English language (for example, in the Taipei Times and 
internationally in Reuters). Lloyd couldn’t remember exactly when he first heard of the 
temple, but he said it was when he saw news about the Rabbit God either on TV or on 
YouTube. For Evan, after his heartbreak, he specifically looked for a god that helps 
tongzhi, and through a Google search he found Brilliant Light Temple. Even visited the 
temple and felt warmly received. He found that Master Lu was able to give helpful advice 
and guidance with the problems he was experiencing, and felt that he was being well 
educated in the Daoist religion. For him, and other members, Brilliant Light Temple has 
become another home.  
3.3. Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple 
 Though it was heartbreak that first brought Evan, Lloyd, and others to Brilliant 
Light Temple, it was the community they found there that made them stay and become 
members and disciples of Master Lu. This section explores how members of the temple 
have used religious frameworks and beliefs such as reincarnation to form fictive kin 
bonds that provide them with emotional support. I argue they are also reinterpreting filial 
piety through their rituals and devotion to deities they consider to be their adoptive 
parents.   
 Though Chou (2000) argues that it is the nature of family that can make it 
challenging for tongzhi to be accepted by their relatives, he emphasizes that family-kin 
relations can also be used to accept tongzhi. Chou describes several ethnographic 
examples in which a tongzhi son or daughter maintains a strong relationship with their 
parents, and then introduces their partner into the family as a good friend (263). This 
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relationship is then deepened through mundane practices such as shopping or playing 
mahjong together (263). Finally, the tongzhi may use quasi-kin categories such as half-
sister/brother to integrate the partner into the family (263). Chou describes this process as 
“coming home,” and argues that it is more effective than trying to make a conceptual 
argument about same-sex eroticism and having that discussion understood by family 
members (263). Though there is a strong insider-outsider distinction based on family-
kinship categories, Chou argues, the boundary and composition of the Chinese familial 
group are also fluid and elastic, potentially including those who are not biologically 
related (265-7). “In all the successful cases of coming home, the partner is perceived by 
the tongzhi’s parents through quasi-kin categories, which is a crucial indication that the 
insider-outsider distinction has been broken,” Chou writes (267). Though the nature of 
the family institution in Taiwan makes it challenging for parents to accept tongzhi, it is 
arguably the very same family-kinship structure that could possibly be used—rather than 
conceptual arguments and discussions—to accept tongzhi relationships as part of the 
family. 
 Furthermore, tongzhi can turn to other people and communities outside of their 
family to create a fictive kinship group. Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang (2001) examine 
the use of Chinese kinship terms in their analysis of how readers and producers of the 
tongzhi magazine G&L draw on linguistic resources to construct a collective tongzhi 
identity. The authors discuss an advice column in which letters are addressed to “Auntie 
Bear” (Xiong Dama)—portrayed as an old lady who has been through the ups and downs 
of life and can provide advice, sympathy, and even ridicule; “expressing intimacy that 
one typically experiences from an old, loving and caring auntie” (Wong and Zhang 2001, 
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270). Dama literally means “elder mother”, and is a kinship term referring to the wife of 
the father’s elder brother (i.e. “aunt”) (269). Wong and Zhang write that G&L Magazine 
readers actively participate in the construction of the symbolic family through the use of 
pen names that portray themselves as junior members of the family (270). More than half 
the pen names they examined used either the structure of [adjective +] Xiao (little) + first 
name (i.e. Xiao Ru, Little Ru), or [adjective +] reduplication of a single-character first 
name—a structure usually used in nicknames for babies or young children (i.e. Haoqi 
Baobao, Curious Precious) (41). The authors argue that through the use of this linguistic 
resource, the magazine provides readers with an emotional shelter (41-2). “Members of 
this symbolic family can count on each other when faced with relationship problems, 
painful experiences in the process of coming out, and rejection of their blood family 
when they acknowledge their same-sex desire” (42). 
3.3.1 Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple: Symbolic Fathers 
 These kinds of fictive kin relations have been formed at Brilliant Light Temple, 
between members, disciples and Master Lu, and between members and deities. Evan told 
me that he has gone through the ritual process of becoming an “adopted son” (yizi) of the 
Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen). Evan, who had been bringing many offerings of chocolate and 
flowers to the Rabbit God, was one day asked by Master Lu if he wanted to become an 
adopted son of the deity. Evan felt that the Rabbit God had been looking after him very 
well, and felt that the temple could become another home for him. So he agreed, and, 
with Master Lu’s guidance, Evan tossed divination blocks (jiaobei) to ask if the Rabbit 
God would accept him as an adopted son. Evan received three successive positive 
answers, which meant that the god agreed to accept him. Evan said that his dating life has 
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improved since he became an adopted son of the deity. Previously, he told me, he usually 
met ‘players’ and other men who weren’t very good to him. He says that since becoming 
an adopted son of the Rabbit God, he has met men who treat him better, and that rather 
than chasing after other men, they are attracted to him and are coming to him. He said 
that even though it has not worked out with some of these men, who he felt strongly for, 
Evan could tell that the Rabbit God had a hand in his relationships and was helping to 
control those who came into his life.  
 Through the means of religious ritual, Evan has obtained a new, symbolic father 
(the Rabbit God), following rejection from his own parents. Evan is devoted to his 
adoptive father. He proudly displays his status on social media with the words ‘adopted 
son of the Rabbit God’ (Tuye yizi; ‘Uncle Rabbit God’s adopted son) on his Facebook 
page. In both our initial and follow-up interview he wore an amulet around his neck that 
represents the Rabbit God, and said he has been wearing it for over 10 years. With this 
amulet, his adoptive father is always with him, guiding his relationships. He said that to 
him, the relationship he has with the Rabbit God is just like one between a biological 
father and son. He feels protected and cared for by the Rabbit God. While his own father 
may not regard him as being filial, Evan is being filial to his spiritual father. 
People of all genders can be adopted by the Rabbit God: Lloyd said that the 
Rabbit God currently has two adopted daughters who are female tongzhi; one is in 
Kaohsiung and the other lives in Australia. Some at the temple are disciples of Master 
Lu, but not adopted sons and daughters of the Rabbit God. Lloyd explained that if one 
becomes a disciple of Master Lu first, then—since they are given protection and 
assistance through that relationship—they cannot become adopted children of gods. 
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Others, like Evan, become an ‘adopted child’ of a god, and then later choose to also 
become a disciple. So it appears that the process only goes one way (if one is an adopted 
child of a god, they can also be a disciple, but if one is already a disciple one cannot 
become an adopted child). Through their devotion and worship, these adopted children 
are being filial to their symbolic, spiritual parents.  
Disciples also demonstrate obedience and reverence to Master Lu, who they 
address as shifu, or “apprenticeship father”. Lloyd said that shifu implies a father-child 
relationship. In Adeline Herrou’s ethnography of a small Daoist temple in Shaanxi, 
China, she notes that the monastics used a range of kinship terms to refer to each other, 
including “apprenticeship father” (for disciples to address their master) and terms like 
elder brother, younger brother, uncle, father’s younger brother, and so forth (2013, 214-
5). All of these terms have the prefix “master” or “apprenticeship” before the defining 
kinship term (215). Herrou writes that the monastics adopt the forms of reverential 
behavior denoted by these kinship terms: “The duties of the disciple toward his master 
resemble those of the son toward his father. The monastics say that they behave with 
filial piety, and treat their master with due reverence and obedience” (217). Master Lu 
has also become a symbolic father for the disciples of his temple. Evan, for example, 
credits Master Lu’s advice and teaching for helping him through a difficult period in his 
life when he was feeling suicidal. Like the temple in Herrou’s ethnography, members of 
Brilliant Light Temple also address each other as “apprenticeship brothers/siblings” 
(shixiong). Members of the temple have also practiced filial piety by participating in 
rituals to improve the merit of their fellow disciples’ fathers and grandfathers who have 
passed away. By improving their merit (i.e. adding to the merit they earned themselves 
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through their own individual actions), the temple members hoped that these deceased 
men could have a more favorable rebirth. In rituals such as these, Lloyd explained, they 
have a ceremony every day of the week for seven weeks (a total of 49 days). 
3.3.2 Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple: A Predestined, Symbolic Family 
 In addition to the creation of symbolic, adoptive parents for members, those at the 
temple also have formed kinship bonds with each other, which they interpret through the 
belief of reincarnation. As Evan continued to face challenges with his family, he began 
spending even more time at Brilliant Light Temple. He calls the temple and its members 
his family (jiaren), and told me he comes to the temple to be with his ‘family’ and to feel 
comforted. This symbolic family also includes some who are heterosexual, like Olivia, a 
22-year-old administrative assistant who also acts as a secretary for the temple. Though 
not tongzhi herself, Olivia’s reason for first coming to Brilliant Light Temple was the 
same as Evan and Lloyd: heartbreak. In an interview, Olivia said a male tongzhi friend 
brought her to the temple after she broke up with her boyfriend, who had returned to his 
home country of France.5 She said she was feeling anxious and insecure, but quickly felt 
a sense of peace during her first experience in the temple. Visiting a temple because of 
relationship troubles—or for almost any personal matter—is common practice in Taiwan. 
Those seeking a good relationship pray to the matchmaking Daoist god ‘The Old Man 
Under the Moon’ (Yue Xia Lao Ren). Evan, the tongzhi Daoist, had tried to seek help 
from The Old Man Under the Moon before coming to Brilliant Light Temple. However, 
as Lloyd explained during my interview with Evan, the Rabbit God is more suitable for 
																																								 																				
5	Interview over Skype on October 31, 2020. Since Olivia was roughly as proficient in 
English as I am in Chinese, the interview was done in a combination of English and 
Mandarin.	
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helping with tongzhi relationships because the Rabbit God was tongzhi himself when he 
was the human man Hu Tianbao. Master Lu told the Taipei Times that he advises tongzhi 
not to go to The Old Man Under the Moon because that deity may be confused by the 
request and match the supplicant with someone from the opposite gender instead (Ho 
2007). Likewise, this is why Olivia does not pray to the Rabbit God for her relationship 
woes, but will instead pray to Mr. Sanshan Jiuhou, the other primary god at Brilliant 
Light Temple. 
Like Evan, Olivia said she experienced “miracles” in various aspects of her 
personal life after visiting Brilliant Light Temple and praying to the gods in the temple. 
Olivia told me the value of her stock investments increased, and also her ex-boyfriend 
came back to Taiwan and they rekindled their relationship (and a few months after our 
interview they got engaged). Lloyd, who said that he was more skeptical than Evan and 
Olivia and took longer (a full year) before fully committing to being a disciple, also said 
that miraculous happenings in both his professional and personal life finally convinced 
him to become a Daoist. For example, he was going to be very late on delivering on a 
project because a device he had ordered from overseas still had to be manufactured and it 
was going to take a month or two to arrive. Suddenly, another client cancelled the order 
on the same part and, since that device had already been made, it was sent to Lloyd 
instead and he got it only one day late. In his personal life, his dating options have 
expanded: the partner who had initially caused him trouble came back into his life and 
has since been very good to him, and another tongzhi friend and he have become close. 
Furthermore, the (heterosexual) wedding of one of his former army colleagues has been 
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delayed, and to Lloyd even that person now seems to be a potential future partner (“I 
have three choices now,” he told me, laughing).  
The members of Brilliant Light Temple also feel a deep connection with each 
other. Their kinship ties extend beyond just those that they have formed in this life—they 
interpret the bonds as having existing in previous lives before their current reincarnated 
state. The Chinese term used to refer to this kind of predestined relationship is yinyuan 
(chains of cause and effect, or principal and secondary causes), and, more casually, 
yuanfen. Yuanfen can be translated as “predestined affinity”, “fate”, or “pre-fated bond” 
(see for example Moskowitz 2001; G. Fisher, From Comrades to Bodhisattvas, 2014). 
The character (yuan) in both terms refers to “karmic destiny”: causes and conditions 
make up the world as we experience it, and these are often determined by actions in 
previous lifetimes (Farrer 2002, 197; G. Fisher, Comrades, 2014, 85). Though the term 
has religious origins, it is frequently used by both religious and non-religious people in 
Taiwan and China to refer to a wide range of relationships and feelings, not just between 
two people, but also between a person and a thing or place, or between a person and a 
deity (G. Fisher, Comrades, 2014, 85). The monastics in Herrou’s ethnography of a 
Daoist temple in Shaanxi also cited pre-fated bonds as the reason they became clergy 
(saying, for example, that they felt yuanfen with their master or with the temple, or that 
they did not feel yuanfen with their parents) (2013, 121). Lloyd told me the concept of 
pre-fated bonds explains why some—like Evan—felt a sense of familiarity when they 
first came to the temple, while others may visit once or twice and never return again (that 
is, they do not have a pre-fated bond with Master Lu and others at the temple). Lloyd 
even suggested in our interview that perhaps he and others at the temple have participated 
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in my research project and helped me so much because they owe a debt to me from a 
previous life. 
Pre-fated bonds also explain why Olivia, a straight woman, has become so 
involved in a temple where the majority of disciples and members are tongzhi. When I 
asked Olivia what made her become a Daoist and a disciple of Master Lu, she laughed at 
first. Lloyd, who was facilitating the interview, broke into the conversation and said that, 
because Olivia is heterosexual, he and others at the temple did not expect that Olivia 
would go on to become a disciple and play such an important role at Brilliant Light 
Temple (temple secretary). “Even she doesn’t really understand how this happened,” 
Lloyd said. Olivia agreed, and said the process happened “just suddenly,” and expressed 
that it felt like she had found “another home.” Lloyd offered an explanation based on the 
Daoist belief in reincarnation, explaining that Olivia and the rest of the temple’s staff and 
members were brought together because they had already forged connections in a 
previous life: 
It might be a past existence, and we were together in a certain group, many 
centuries ago. We now get together again because we were together already. So 
the connections and the relations keep us going to be together. This is from 
religious view. So when Olivia come to here, no matter, it doesn’t matter which 
instances urged Olivia to come to [Brilliant Light Temple], but when she saw this 
place, she felt warmth, felt familiar, but no sudden reason why, how this 
happened. And the people, and the Master Lu, and the friends in this temple, she 
just found another home, because her past memory urged her, encourage her to be 
here. 
 
Olivia said she agreed with Lloyd’s explanation. She told me she specifically decided to 
become a disciple after hearing a lesson that Master Lu gave about Laozi, the ancient 
Chinese philosopher regarded as the founder of Daoism. Olivia said that the lesson 
emphasized the importance of having a teacher, and this resonated with her. Master Lu’s 
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teaching—and the feeling of peace and ‘home’ that she felt at Brilliant Light Temple—
led Olivia to become a disciple and member.  
 This non-biological family also supports each other, even performing rituals to 
help members after death. My interview with Lloyd got pushed back from winter break 
until mid-January 2021, and when we connected over Skype he told me the tragic reason 
why: he and the other disciples had been busy performing rituals for a disciple who had 
killed herself at the end of 2020. Lloyd explained that the 25-year-old woman, who was 
also tongzhi, had long battled with depression. He said they were performing rituals (for 
49 days) to help her merit, because, from the Daoist point of view, a disciple who takes 
their own life has violated the first of the five precepts (no killing, no stealing, no sexual 
misconduct, no false speech, and no taking of intoxicants). Lloyd explained that making a 
vow to follow the five precepts is one of the first acts one does after becoming a disciple. 
Breaking the precepts means losing the blessings and good fortune provided by the gods. 
Lloyd said that those who kill themselves may become a ghost or go to a hell until they 
pay off their debt, adding that Buddhism and Daoism have similar cosmologies of 
multiple heavens and hells. However, Lloyd told me, the disciples had all been 
performing rituals to help this woman’s future birth. These rituals included reading 
scriptures, as well as buying 150 fish from a fish market and setting them free in the 
river, dedicating the accumulated merit to her. “We have done our best for her. So we 
will meet again in the future, in the very, very long future. We believe so. She got an 
advantage from us. So when people owe each other, so people meet,” Lloyd said. The 
kinship bonds between members of the temple transcend this world and this life, when 
viewed through the lens of reincarnation and pre-fated bonds.  
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 In Europe and North America, those who are gay, lesbian, and gender 
nonconforming have also formed these kinds of familial relationships. Kath Weston’s 
pioneering ethnography Families We Choose (1991) examined how gay men and lesbians 
in the San Francisco Bay Area have “chosen families”, with whom they apply kinship 
terminology. In this work, and in another book chapter (Weston 1995), Weston critiques 
the emphasis that society and scholars have put on blood and procreation for defining a 
‘real’ family. She writes that the politics of defining kinship was especially relevant in 
the United States in the 1980s, when sweeping cuts in government spending of social 
services resulted in the categories of “blood” and “marriage” being increasingly used to 
mediate how assistance was provided (Weston 1995, 105). It also had tangible effects for 
the lives of gay and lesbian people in whether or not they could take time off for a 
partner’s funeral, access a partner’s health-insurance plan, have hospital visitation 
privileges, as well as joint adoption and property rights (99). However, Weston also notes 
that some gay men and lesbians she spoke to agreed with the view held by some that 
blood ties represent the only authentic form of kinship (1991, 35-6). One Latinx woman, 
for example, told Weston, “my friends can be more important than my family, but that 
doesn't mean they are my family. . . . ’Cause no matter what, they are just friends—they 
don’t have your blood” (36, emphasis in original). Weston writes that those who disputed 
the validity of chosen families were often people “whose notions of kinship were bound 
up with their own sense of racial or ethnic identity” (36).  
In a more recent study of kinship practices of LGBTQ people in Poland, the 
authors note that, given the particular emphasis on the heteronormative concept of family 
in that country, the need to use the term ‘family’ for fictive or chosen families may be 
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politically driven (Mizielińska and Stasińska, 2018). Mizielińska and Stasińska write that 
Poland is a family-centered nation in which marriage is regarded as a union reserved for 
heterosexual couples and legitimized by the consitution and Catholic Church (2018, 984). 
Similar to the Confucian societies of China and Taiwan, in Poland society is seen as 
being composed of families or family-like groups, rather than individuals (984). The 
authors write that participants in their multi-methods (quantitative and qualitative) study 
emphasized that their non-heterosexual unions counted as being a family, which, they 
argue, may be a political strategy to gain recongition and disrupt the heteronormative 
notion prevalent in the public discourse (997). The authors also argue that the participants 
in their study did not build families of choice seperately from their families of origin, but 
instead tried to integrate them—actively creating a space for themselves and their 
partners within familial settings (990, 998). LGBTQ Poles depended on their families of 
origin for material support, and were also psychologically and emotionally attached to 
them (998). The authors note that some families of origin cannot cut their LGBTQ 
children off because they are dependent on their support (991). Central and Eastern 
Europe have familialist social policies, in which elderly or ill parents are dependent on 
the care of relatives (991) (this is very similar to the situation in Taiwan, as I described in 
Chapter 1). The authors note that this situation can, paradoxically, become an opportunity 
for the inclusion of non-heterosexual couples among the conservative family (991). They 
note as well that there is not a clear division between chosen families and families of 
origin, as described by Weston (1991), for example (991).   
Similarly, the division between fictive kin and families of origin is not always 
distinct in Taiwan either—one ‘family’ does not necessarily trump the other. Religious 
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clergy who renounce family life and form fictive kin bonds still stress that their actions 
are filial and ultimately benefit their parents and other blood relatives. I will explore this 
further in the following section, as well as in Chapter 4. Furthermore, given the 
Confucian emphasis on family, it is a challenge for tongzhi to embrace their sexual 
identity if it means leaving their families of origin (Chou 2000, 258-9). It is also why 
quasi-kin categories are sometimes used to integrate a tongzhi partner into one’s family. 
Despite the pressure from Evan’s parents leading him to become suicidal, he remains 
dedicated to them. He said that regardless of whether or not his parents accept his 
sexuality, he will still be obedient to them. “I love my parents,” he told me. When I asked 
him if he thought he would get married one day (now that same-sex marriage is legal), he 
said yes, but then quickly added: “But I want my family to accept and support me.” If one 
can still be filial to one’s biological parents, and be accepted by them, that is desirable.  
3.4 Celibate Clergy and Their Characterization as ‘Rootless Rascals’ 
 As evident in Evan’s story described in the opening of this thesis, filial piety can 
create a lot of hardship for tongzhi, who are accused of disobedience if they do not marry 
heterosexually and bear children to continue the family line. I have described how 
tongzhi (and non-tongzhi) members of Brilliant Light Temple have reinterpreted filial 
piety through devotion and reverence to Master Lu and the Rabbit God. Master Lu 
however, may have something in common with the tongzhi that visit his temple—they are 
both unfilial in the traditional Confucian sense. Master Lu, unlike some Daoist priests in 
Taiwan, is celibate. He told me he could not discuss anything further than that, because a 
Daoist priest should personally be above worldly matters such as sexuality. By being 
celibate, Master Lu is not marrying and having children of his own. As I discussed in 
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Chapter 2, religious celibacy, and being outside of the Confucian norm, has at some 
historical moments led to Daoist priests and Buddhists monks being depicted as deviant. 
Historian Matthew Sommer, who examines legal cases focused on regulating sexuality 
during the Qing dynasty, notes that male Buddhist and Daoist clergy—along with local 
toughs, migrants, and single men without prospects—were regarded as “rootless rascals” 
that stood outside the family-based social and moral order (2002, 68-9). In fact, Sommer 
notes, the clergy were seen as the very personification of the rootless rascal and all the 
dangers he represented, with both Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911) 
making repeated efforts to regulate the way clergy behaved (71). “By taking vows of 
celibacy, abstaining from marriage, and living apart from their natal families, these men 
stood outside the mainstream family order in the most basic ways,” Sommer writes (71).  
 This tension continues to the present day. In Herrou’s ethnography of a Shaanxi 
Daoist temple (which is part of a monastic Daoist tradition), those who left their families 
to become clerics found it to be a painful decision (2013, 137). Herrou writes that the 
men in her research struggled because they were viewed as betraying their patrilineage: 
Although they think of Daoist monastics as wise and respectable and of the Daoist 
way as admirable, few Chinese actually wish such a destiny for their son or 
daughter. They prefer that their children take up a profession that may be less 
honorable but provides better comfort in life, leaves the family organization 
intact, and helps with the continuation of the group (2013, 138).  
 
However, Herrou notes that the Daoist monastics in Shaanxi have found ways to 
reinterpret filial piety. Though the clerics assert that their original parents are of no 
concern to them anymore, they nevertheless suggest that the “virtuous and meritorious 
acts” they perform in the course of their monastic life will benefit their parents (2013, 
227). It is believed that if they can excel enough in their practice to attain immortality, 
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then they will give their parents a great advantage as well (227). Therefore, the filial piety 
of monastics is often called “great filial piety” (daxiao) as it connects to celestial powers 
(227). It is unlike the “little filial piety” (xiaoxiao) that is limited to one’s parents (227).  
Being unfilial is a major tension that tongzhi in Taiwan experience, as I discussed 
above in the case of Evan, who faces pressure from his parents to get married (to a 
woman) and bear children. Master Lu has taken a nontraditional life path for a young 
man in Taiwan, and this may give him more understanding of the tongzhi (especially 
male tongzhi, which appear to make up the majority of tongzhi devotees) who come to his 
temple. He too is partaking in the fictive kin network at Brilliant Light Temple. This 
tension is potentially also felt by Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, and may relate to her 
vocal support for tongzhi and same-sex marriage; an issue I explore in the next chapter 
(Chapter 4).  
3.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have examined how the nature of the family institution in Taiwan 
makes it challenging for some tongzhi to be accepted and supported by their families. 
This has been the experience of Evan, one of the members of Brilliant Light Temple. I 
have argued that he and other members of the temple have formed kinship bonds, which 
they interpret through the lens of reincarnation—members and the temple priest may 
have all met in a previous life. Members of the temple have also become adopted sons 
and daughters of deities at the temple. Since they are not filial to their biological families 
in the traditional sense, I argued that they are being filial through their religious practices 
and devotion. This mirrors the practices of celibate clergy in Taiwan, who have long been 
considered unfilial in the Confucian sense, and have been chastised by society because of 
it. In the following chapter I will continue this discussion, focusing on a Buddhist nun 
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The ‘God of War’ and her Fierce Words: Buddhist Nun Shih Chao 
Hwei’s Support of Tongzhi Rights
“In this spring of my life, despite the tears shed by my parents, I shaved my head, put on 
robes, renounced my home, and became a homeless monk” 
Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (Majjhima-nikāya, I, 163) 
On November 24, 2016, roughly two and a half years before same-sex marriage 
was legalized in Taiwan, Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei spoke at a public hearing on the 
issue. In this hearing, organized by Taiwan’s legislature, Shih gave an impassioned 
speech in support of same-sex marriage, and in the following days media reported her 
statements and other Taiwanese religious leaders gathered to refute her statements (UP 
Media 2016a, 2016b). One Buddhist leader stated that Shih does “not represent the 
Buddhist community” (UP Media 2016b). This was not the first time that Shih was 
outspoken on social issues, and neither was it the first time her statements proved to be 
controversial with the Buddhist establishment. Independent, feminist scholar-nun Shih 
has taken an activist approach to a wide range of social issues, arguing against nuclear 
energy and hunting, and arguing for increased animal rights and improved measures for 
environmental protection. She received worldwide media attention when she officiated a 
wedding for a Buddhist lesbian couple in Taiwan in 2012. Her activism and candor on 
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these issues differs from the approach taken by other monastics in Taiwan, such as Cheng 
Yen, the famed leader of the Tzu Chi Foundation (W. Cheng 2017; DeVido 2010).1  
	
Figure 4.1 Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei.  
Photo courtesy Shih Chao Hwei. 
 
This chapter will examine the argumentative strategies Shih deployed to support 
same-sex marriage in the speech she gave to the Taiwanese legislature, by focusing on 
four statements that were quoted by media outlets and discussed online by people in 
Taiwan and in Hong Kong. In these excerpts, Shih questions the nature of family, as well 
																																								 																				
1 Both Cheng Yen and Shih Chao Hwei were influenced by the teachings of Buddhist 
modernizer Yinshun, and both belong to the tradition of Humanistic or socially engaged 
Buddhism. Lee and Han (2016) argue that Cheng Yen embodies the compassionate 
mother ideal, whereas Shih embodies the moral activist. 
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as the core concept of filial piety, which expects people to marry and bear children. Shih 
poses questions to her opponents to force them to address the illogical reasoning they are 
using, portrays her opponents negatively, and also deploys repetition and rapid pacing to 
emphasize her points. In the final section of this chapter I will explore how Shih’s 
critiques of family are connected to how Buddhist monks and nuns have themselves been 
criticized by society for being unfilial. I argue that Buddhists like Shih have negotiated 
and reinterpreted family expectations to be more inclusive and cosmopolitan, and that 
this is something tongzhi have done as well. In this last section, I draw from a semi-
structured interview I did with Shih. Shih has earned significant fame because of her 
support for issues like same-sex marriage, as well as attracted controversy, when, for 
example, at an academic conference in 2001 she publicly ripped up a copy of the “Eight 
Special Rules” that uphold the subordination of nuns to monks (for example that even a 
very senior nun has to bow to a novice monk) (DeVido 2010, 107; Lee and Han 2016, 
67-9). She has a large following on Facebook, with hundreds of people commenting 
every time she posts. Since she also works as a professor and is a prolific writer, she is 
busy and in high demand—which is perhaps why it was only after several months of 
reaching out to her that we were eventually able to set up an interview. Since this was my 
final interview, and I had already written Chapter 3, many of my questions were focused 
on the connections between tongzhi experiences and family expectations. I also indicate 
below when I directly asked about some of these issues.  
4.1 Shih Chao Hwei and her Humanistic Buddhist Activism  
Shih, 64, is the founder of the Hongshi Buddhist Institute (a Buddhist monastery 
and college in Taoyuan), as well as a professor in the Department of Religious Studies 
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and Cultural Studies at Hsuan Chuang University. Shih’s family is from Guangdong 
province, and they fled to Burma during the rise of communism in China (Lieblich 2020). 
Shih was born in Yangon, Myanmar in 1957, and then moved to Taiwan with her family 
in 1965. While studying Chinese literature at National Taiwan Normal University, she 
attended a summer camp designed to attract students to Mahāyāna Buddhism, and 
decided to become a nun (Lieblich 2020).2 She studied Buddhism under the mentorship 
of famous Chinese monk Yinshun (1906-2005), who, along with other monks, came to 
Taiwan after the defeat of the Nationalist government in China in 1949 (DeVido 2010, 
14-5, 102). Yinshun and his mentor Taixu are considered to be the major reformers of 
20th-century Chinese Buddhism, arguing that one taking the bodhisattva path (see 
footnote) should undertake efforts to benefit humanity, and advocating for serving society 
in order to create a Pure Land on earth (99). Shih was influenced by these ideas, and 
became a tireless worker for a number of social causes. She and her colleagues at the 
Hongshi Buddhist Institute (which she founded in 1998) have published many works on 
Buddhist ethics with regard to issues such as abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, 
suicide, the death penalty, organ transplants, animal and environmental rights, and 
indigenous Taiwanese hunting practices (102-3). However, Elise Anne DeVido points out 
that, unlike some of the other monastics in the tradition of ‘Engaged’ or ‘Humanistic 
Buddhism’ (renjian fojiao), Shih is a radical activist and feminist and one of the only 
																																								 																				
2	Mahāyāna Buddhism is the dominant form of Buddhism in Taiwan (and East Asia 
generally). Mahāyāna, which means ‘Great Vehicle’, is one of two main branches of 
Buddhism, the other being Theravāda (the oldest existing school, which is practiced in 
Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia). Unlike the Theravāda tradition, Mahāyāna 
generally holds that pursuing only individual release from suffering (i.e. nirvana) is an 
inferior aspiration; instead the superior path is that of the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva 
could reach nirvana, but chooses to remain in the cycle of death and rebirth to liberate all 
sentient beings from this same cycle (Mitchell 2008).	
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monastics who is willing to engage in issues that are political (103). Shih claims her 
views cannot be categorized as either “left” or “right” (Chen and Chen 2018). She 
believes that Buddhists should be concerned with politics—and work to raise the public’s 
consciousness on issues and lobby to change laws if necessary—but they should not 
become directly involved with the political administration or run for office (DeVido 
2010, 105). Shih has long supported tongzhi rights, including through writing about 
tongzhi rights and the issue of same-sex marriage over the years in her Institute’s 
bimonthly magazine Hongshi Newsletter (Hongshi Tongxun)—with issues fully or 
partially devoted to the subject in 2019, 2018, 2016, 2012 and 2006. Shih’s support for 
tongzhi rights comes from her view of Buddhist compassion. She argues that the central 
theme of Buddhist doctrine is that all beings should be able to abandon suffering and 
obtain happiness (Shih 2016). Therefore, it is wrong for society to discriminate against 
tongzhi people, and equal marriage rights can grant happiness and less suffering.  
Hsiao-Lan Hu (2016) and Chengpang Lee and Ling Han (2016) have discussed 
Shih’s support for tongzhi rights, through some of her writings as well as her officiating a 
Buddhist lesbian wedding in 2012, but neither work has examined her more recent 
support for equal marriage rights. None of these sources focuses closely on Shih’s verbal 
discourses, nor employs a pragmatic analysis. It is important to examine her speech at the 
legislature hearing because this event represents one of Shih’s most prominent and 
political acts of support for equal marriage rights, and because it was an event that was 
extensively covered in the media. Since Shih often speaks out publicly on a range of 
social issues, it is important that attention is given to her verbal discourse—specifically 
how she constructs her arguments.  
 100 
4.2. Background and Methods 
 I will be looking at the speech Shih Chao Hwei gave on November 24, 2016, at a 
public hearing to discuss same-sex marriage, organized by the Legislative Yuan 
(Taiwan’s legislature). I have selected four points that she makes over the course of her 
speech, which was just over 8 minutes in length. I have chosen these four examples 
because they were quoted in media in Taiwan (UP Media 2016a) and Hong Kong (Chen 
and Chen 2018; Stand News 2017). Two of these articles—in UP Media and Stand 
News—published parts of all four examples I am using. The article that appeared in Stand 
News (a Hong Kong independent, not-for-profit online news website), was about Shih’s 
attendance at an event in Hong Kong on January 22, 2017 in which she spoke to local 
tongzhi organizations. To give the reader background on Shih, this feature article 
discussed Shih’s speech at the legislative hearing (which would have been just a few 
months prior) and described the words of her speech as powerful and impressive 
(kengqiang) (Stand News 2017). It was at this point in the article that parts of each of the 
four examples I have using were highlighted in the article in a grey text box that stood 
out from the rest of the text (see figure 4.2 on next page).3 The four excerpts I have 
chosen touch on a range of themes. One of the excerpts downplays the supposed 
differences between heterosexual and non-heterosexual (tongzhi) individuals. Two of the 
excerpts call into question hegemonic, heteronormative ideas of what constitutes a 
family. The remaining excerpt relates to the fear of the prevalence of homosexuality 
increasing once same-sex marriage is allowed.  
																																								 																				
3 My examples are longer than the ones used in the Stand News article, because they 
include some of the sentences spoken by Shih before the ones reproduced in the article. 
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Figure 4.2: Screenshot of Stand News article, with grey text box  
between main text of article and YouTube video of Shih's speech. 
 
I have produced a line-by-line transcription based on video of Shih’s speech 
(Yvon Lin 2016), which I also compared with a transcription that was made by a student 
organization and published in Hongshi Institute’s magazine (Shih 2016). The 
organization’s transcriptions edited out some repetitive words and phrases in Shih’s 
speech, but I included those in my transcription. My transcription also captures Shih’s 
pauses as well as other elements of her delivery.4 The translation is my own, with some 
reference to an English translation in the Taiwan Gazette (Chen and Chen 2018). The left 
side is the English translation, and the right side is the Chinese written out using pinyin 
(the traditional characters can be found in Appendix B). I have followed sociolinguistic 
																																								 																				
4 The four examples are spread out over the course of Shih’s speech (of 8 minutes and 14 
seconds). Because I did not transcribe the entire speech the line numbers continue from 
one example into the other, but this is not to suggest that these separate examples were 
spoken right after each other, as they were not. They were however spoken temporally in 
this order.	
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conventions (see Chun 2001 for example) in my transcription, as well as taken the liberty 
of underlining words to indicate which parts of Shih’s speech were quoted in media. 
These are the conventions I use:  
((comment)) transcriber’s description of speech quality 
bold   emphasis signaled by increased pitch or amplitude 
 (number) seconds of silence, for a pause 
CAPITALS increased volume 
underline parts of excerpts quoted in other media  
4.3 Analysis 
This first example occurs in Shih’s speech after she had been speaking at some 
length about her interpretation of Buddhism as it relates to non-heterosexual relationships 
and ethics. She also specifically mentions how Christian leaders and organizations that 
are against same-sex marriage have used the concept of family values to try and sway 
public opinion, because, as Shih argues, if they had used Christian reasoning it would not 
have resonated with the larger (predominantly non-Christian) public. Ke-hsien Huang 
(2017) argues that the organizations and NGOs that publicly rallied against same-sex 
marriage in Taiwan learned to downplay their Christian identity and instead use the 
secular rhetoric deployed by the global Christian Right campaign against gay rights 
movements. Specifically, he writes, these groups focused on “advocating the positive 
values of protecting family institutions and caring first for children, rather than the 
negative approach of opposing gay rights, which may be condemned as discriminatory” 
(122). Huang also argues that Christian leaders were behind the formation of a group 
called the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family (Taiwan zongjiao 
tuanti aihu jiating dalianmeng), which consisted of leaders representing Buddhism, the 
Unity/Yiguandao sect and the Chinese Confucian-Mencius Association (123-4). The 
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spokesperson from this group said in a press conference in 2014 that same-sex marriage 
would destroy Chinese traditional culture, eliminate filial piety, as well as collapse the 
order of human relations (124). It is this notion of family values that Shih is arguing 
against in the first excerpt. 































To say it honestly and bluntly  
the value of family has never been 
absolute 
the value of family has never been 
absolute 
I must say it again 
in other words 




from an early time there have been 
many of what are called homeless 
people  
and they have created the most 
glorious civilizations in human society 
And 
These individuals did not necessarily 
have a position in a family 
including the Buddha among them 
and including many wandering 
monks.  
Therefore 
for you to continuously require that 
everyone enter the family  
 
based on this single value that is also 
defined by you 
this is actually 
































Na laoshi bu keqi de shuo 
jia de jiazhi xianglai jiu bushi 
wuxian shang gang  
jia de jiazhí xianglai jiu bushi 
wuxian shang gang  
wo bixu yao zai zheyang shuo 
ye jiushi shuo 
zai ouzhou ye hao, 
zai 
zai  
yindu ye hao 
zao jiu yijing you xuduo suowei de 
homeless ((Shih uses the English 
word here))  
erqie tamen chuangzaole renlei 
shehui zui canlan de wenming,  
Name  
zhexie ren bujian deyi jia wei 
gangwei baokuole fotuo zai nei 
 
baokuole xuduo de you fang seng 
 
Name yinci ne 
Yi danyi de jiazhi zai yaoqiu suoyou 
de ren dou shi yao jinru dao zhege 
jia  
erqie zhege jia haishi yao you ni lai 
dingyi de 
na zhege qishi shi 




In this example Shih uses Buddhism to critique a widespread conception of family. She 
argues that the idea of what constitutes a family has never been absolute, and repeats this 
statement twice (lines 2-3), stating she must “say it again” (4), describing what she is 
doing to emphasis her point. She increases her pitch in lines 15-16, to address and mock a 
distal ‘you’ of the ‘family values’ groups mentioned above. Her increased pitch also 
signifies her displeasure at those who “continuously” promote a narrow view of the 
family—a perspective she describes as “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19). This is one 
construal of a pathological and parochial personhood limited to thinking only of a narrow 
notion of family, which she immediately contrasts with individuals from around the globe 
who chose alternative paths to the benefit of entire societies and not just a single family. 
Specifically, she uses the example of the Buddha as well as wandering monks to illustrate 
how people who have renounced family life have made great achievements. In many 
ways Buddhism is seemingly incompatible with Confucian notions of filial piety, which 
dominate Taiwan to this day. However, filial piety can be reinterpreted, argues Simon 
Scott, an anthropologist who researches Taiwan (2004). In his discussion of gay men and 
filial piety, Scott argues that many celibate Buddhist monks and nuns emphasize that 
their Buddhist practices (such as chanting and other rituals to help their dead ancestors 
enter the Pure Land) are filial, even when they reject marriage and rearing children (73). I 
will explore this Buddhist interpretation of filial piety in more detail in the last section of 
this chapter. Finally, the Stand News and UP Media only quoted the last part of this 
excerpt (see underlined); arguably because this is where Shih accuses her opponents of 
being “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19). The use of this description is another example of 
how Shih sets up contrasting and dueling figures of personhood: one may be filial in the 
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narrow traditional sense, but adhering to such a limited view borders on the pathological, 
she argues. Instead, the alternate path Shih constructs for her audience is that of 
admirable “homeless” individuals (line 10). 
 Shih’s code-switch into English with the word “homeless” may also be a socio-
indexical rhetorical device to display a sense of cosmopolitanism and to appeal to a wider 
audience who might align in mocking the parochial narrow-minded figure disparaged 
above. Cosmopolitanism can be understood as the appreciation of ideas, things, and 
beings “from many places”, as well as the casting off of a parochial mindset (Tsing 2005, 
121, 126). In Taiwan, English words and phrases are frequently seen in print and 
television advertisements, interspersed in Mandarin pop songs, and also appear (often 
with spelling and/or grammatical errors) on items such as t-shirts, sweaters, and students’ 
stationary cases. This use of English is often cosmopolitan.5 According to a study by Jia-
Ling Hsu (2008), copywriters who mix English words into larger Mandarin text generally 
agree that the use of English conveys the following socio-psychological effects to the 
audience about the advertised product: internationalism, metropolitan orientation, 
authenticity, urban experience, the trendy taste of the younger generation, and is 
attention-grabbing (159). Drawing on surveys of both English-literate and illiterate 
readers, Hsu argues that the use of English in advertisements is “overwhelmingly 
popular” in Taiwan, even among monolingual Chinese speakers (180). For them, the use 
of English words and phrases alongside Chinese words indexed themes such as 
‘internationalism and standardization’ and ‘American and English culture’ (173-7). One 
																																								 																				
5 Cosmopolitanism may also explain why Evan and Lloyd of Brilliant Light Temple (see 
Chapter 3) told me they like to use the English word ‘gay’ to describe their sexual 
identity. They were showing themselves to be globally minded.  
 106 
copywriter Hsu interviewed (who wrote ad copy that was fragmentary, ungrammatical, 
and filled with misspellings) said that it is the English form rather than the English 
context that communicates to the target audience, and therefore English accuracy is 
outside the concern of copywriters (161). Shih’s use of English in this speech may been 
attention-grabbing—similar to how she used “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19) to 
describe her opponents, and goes on to discuss combining sperm and eggs (see example 
3, line 31), something her audience may not have expected a Buddhist nun to discuss. 
Shih designed her speech to be quoted and disseminated in the media, which it was (as 
evident in the articles I mention above). As I describe later, her speech resonated with the 
media and public. 
 Shih’s cosmopolitan display may also have been intended to contest the global 
leanings of her opponents. Scholars and observers in Taiwan have pointed out how the 
conservative organizations and NGOs that fought against the legalization of same-sex 
marriage were affiliated with global Christian organizations (Cole 2017; K. Huang 2017; 
J. Ho 2010). As I described above, Ke-hsien Huang (2017) described how the groups 
campaigning against the legalization of same-sex marriage adopted the rhetoric deployed 
by the global Christian right campaign against gay rights movements. Huang argues that, 
in the face of criticism, the Christian-led League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring 
for Family “appealed to the West” to confirm they were on the right path (130). He writes 
that they translated, edited, and spread foreign news stories that were not favorable to 
LGBTQ rights, in an attempt to convince their supporters that they are truly on the side of 
global progress (131). Some of the churches that campaigned against same-sex marriage 
also received tactical support from anti-LGBTQ Christian organizations in the United 
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States, as well as from the extreme-right group MassResistance (Cole 2017). Therefore, 
in using an English word, Shih is also combatting the cosmopolitan influences of her 
opponents: these quasi-Christian organizations may have global connections, but Shih 
and her tradition of Taiwanese Humanistic Buddhism are also globally minded. She is 
casting off any charge of parochialism (Tsing 2005, 121). Also, by not choosing a 
referent for denoting homelessness in the Chinese language, she avoids the social-
indexical chain of assumptions that would be connected to that referent. It is interesting 
to note that Shih may not have realized the negative connotation that the word ‘homeless’ 
could have for native English speakers. However, like the copywriter in the study by Hsu 
(2008), Shih is not concerned with English accuracy, but with being cosmopolitan—one 
aspect of her multi-pronged strategy to combat her opponents, which I will expand on in 
section 4.4 of this chapter. 
After this excerpt, Shih continues discussing ideas of family and tradition, 
responding to some of the main themes that her opponents have used (see K. Huang 
2017).  











In all of Taiwan 
because of alarmist talk many people 
have been swept up as a consequence  
 
for example saying that if you have 
same-sex marriage then heterosexual 
people will become homosexual 
so WILL YOU? 












Quan taiwan  
bian de yinwei weiyansongting 
henduo ren bei juan jin dao zhege 
gong ye (2) 
Piru shuo ni ruguo youle tongzhi 
hunyin yixing lian zhe jiu hui 
biancheng tongxinglian 
na NI HUI MA? 




Here Shih dismisses the fear that same-sex marriage will lead to more people becoming 
homosexual. This dismissal is pragmatically packaged in the metalanguage of “alarmist 
talk” (line 21), which is construed as illogical and irrational, yet nonetheless powerful as 
it draws other people into that mindset. In line 23, she raises her voice to emphatically 
ask, “Will you (turn gay)?” This is a response to groups like the one mentioned above 
(the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family), which stated that same-
sex marriage would collapse the order of human relations (K. Huang 2017, 124).  
 Here too Shih addresses her opponents who say society will collapse (through the 
legalization of same-sex marriage), by arguing that throughout time marriage hasn’t 
always consisted of one man and woman. In previous eras, men in China could have 
many wives, she said in her speech just prior to this excerpt, adding that the concept of 
family is not a fixed, stable construct (and in previous times in Chinese history, same-sex 
love was also widely accepted; a topic I explored in Chapter 2). Attitudes to same-sex 
love have long been linked to fears of imperial decline, as Jeffrey Weeks writes in his 
examination of sexual life in Britain from the 1800s to the present (Weeks 2012, 133). In 
this framework, the family is seen as being vitally important to the security of the nation. 
This is not unlike much of the scholarly discourse in China on sexuality and same-sex 
love in particular at the dawn of the 20th century, in which same-sex love came to be 
viewed as a threat to heterosexual marriage and the cause of a weak nation (see Chapter 
2). Shih’s opponents draw on a heteronormative notion of family as the base of society, 
while same-sex love is seen as threatening the structure of society itself. 
This, again, is all framed by Shih as ‘alarmist talk.’ Her emphatic question in line 
23 provides a pragmatic bookend to contain its further spread while also pointing out the 
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flawed thinking in her opponents. Shih quickly moves on to ask her detractors why they 
are worrying. “Crazy” (line 25) is her evaluation of the typified persona responsible for 
the alarmist talk, and is quickly spoken (before Shih moves on in her speech, without 
missing a beat). Once again, it is the last part of this excerpt (see underlined) that Stand 
News and UP Media quoted. Both these lines involve the construction of a 
characterological personhood that is illogical and parochial, in contrast to the logical and 
cosmopolitan Shih. I will revisit Shih’s use of figure producing language in section 4.4. 
 Shih continues in her speech and quotes someone else who discusses how 
children leave their parents when they grow up, and start families of their own. 

















if it is said that family must ((rapid 
speech)) 
be regulated so that its existence is to 
serve the purpose of producing the 
next generation 
((rapid speech))  
in that case may I ask, are people 
who are infertile also swept aside by 
you? ((rapid speech)) 
The family has many, many 
functions, please everyone, don't 
think it’s all just for ((rapid speech)) 
 

















ruguo shuo yiding yao ba jia ((rapid 
speech)) 
guifan wei zhishi weile yunyu xia 
yidai er cunzai ((rapid speech)) 
 
 
name wo qingwen, bu yun zheng de 
ren shi bushi ye bei ni sao daole? 
((rapid speech)) 
jiating de gongneng feichang 
feichang de duo, qing gewei buyao 
renwei dou shi weile ((rapid 
speech)) 
jingzi gen luanzi de jiehe hao ma? 
 
Here Shih, who spoke fairly rapidly throughout her speech, spoke at an even faster rate, a 
verbal crescendo to signal that she was nearing the end of her speech and was making her 
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final concluding points.6 As in example 1, she critiques her opponents’ narrow views of 
‘family’; in this instance, discussing the purpose of family. The underlined section (lines 
30-1) are those quoted by Stand News, UP Media and the Taiwan Gazette. Shih contests 
the assumption that procreation (and having progeny, another important Confucian 
belief) is the only function of family. In the Taiwan Gazette (Chen and Chen 2018), the 
writers highlight this quote as an example of how Shih shocked the audience at the public 
hearing.7 As seen in excerpts 1 and 3, Shih may be personally acute to the stigma about 
nonconformity to hegemonic ideas of family because, as a celibate monastic, she has not 
married and is going against (or, reinterpreting) Confucian notions of filial piety. I will 
explore this further in the final section of this chapter. 
Next, as Shih reaches the conclusion of her speech, she discusses stereotypes of 
tongzhi.  














Just now I once again heard the 
absurd statement that said ((rapid fire 
speech)) 
you tongzhi often change sexual 
partners ((rapid speech)) 
Hello ((rapid speech)) 
Isn’t it that because he doesn't want 
to change sexual partners often that 


















Gangcai wo you tingdao yige hen 
huangmiu de xiaoxi shuo ((rapid fire 
speech)) 
nimen tongzhi jingchang huan xing 
banlü ((rapid speech)) 
wei ((rapid speech)) 
ta bu jiushi yin wei buxiang yao 





jiehun ma? ((softer voice)) 
																																								 																				
6 After having interviewed Shih myself, and I can say that she was speaking particularly 
fast during her speech (compared to her normal speed of conversing); she was clearly 
impassioned.	
7 The video I was using was only focused on Shih the whole time, so I was unable to see 
















Why should one not help them 
achieve this?  
Furthermore 
there are also many people of the 
opposite sex who often change sexual 
partners you know? 
therefore should we order that 
heterosexuals not be permitted to 
marry?  
I think before we speak of these 
things  















na weishenme bu you chengrenzhimei 
ne? 
erqie 
yixing yeyou henduo ren jingchang 
huan xing banlü ma 
 
yinci you jiao yixinglianzhe bu zhun 
jiehun ma?  
 
wo juede women shi bushi zai jiang 
zhexie shiqing yiqian 
women de luojj sikao shi bushi keyi 
zai chongxin zhengli yixia? 
 
In this excerpt Shih again speaks very quickly, but then slows down as she seemingly 
stutters over the word yao (to want, to wish/desire), getting quiet when she asks the 
question about getting married (line 38). Here she questions the logic of her opponents 
(and the underlined portion is that which was quoted in Stand Times and UP Media), and 
calls for their logical reasoning to be rearranged (line 44). The logic Shih uses both points 
out the flawed thinking of her opponents, but also possibly indicates some of her own 
moral values. Her argument presupposes the following: 1) Changing sexual partners often 
is immoral; and 2) Marriage encourages moral behavior (because it means committing to 
one partner and not frequently changing partners). Therefore her implicatures are that 1) 
Tongzhi are not immoral, for they want to marry, and because they are not the only ones 
frequently changing partners—some heterosexual people do this as well. 2) Those who 
want to prevent tongzhi from marrying are being illogical, because they are accusing 
tongzhi of immortality while not supporting tongzhi’s desired moral lifestyle.  
 When interviewing Shih, she did not seem concerned with the morality of 
marriage, so I believe she was instead trying to get her opponents to question their own 
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assumptions and logic (and perhaps even trying to find common ground with them).8 
Shih told me that Buddhism does not make any moral judgments on same-sex love. Like 
she stated at the beginning of the speech examined in this chapter, Shih told me as well 
that Buddhism sees desire as being instinctual and not wrong as long as it doesn’t hurt 
others. Also, there is no difference between heterosexual or homosexual desire. However, 
Shih said, excessive desire can lead to suffering (this is the second of the four noble 
truths taught by the Buddha). She said that Buddhism believes desire can eventually 
make one numb to what one experiences, and lead one to seek out more stimulation or 
variety—and that this can happen for both straight and tongzhi couples. Therefore, 
marriage can be a way to control desire, but it is not the only way, Shih said. However, 
she added, “if we have marriage for heterosexual people, why not have it for tongzhi as 
well?” Shih’s promotion of marriage is not based on moral principle, but on the Buddhist 
idea of compassion—compassion to ease the suffering (caused by excessive desire) that 
others experience. I will explore this notion of compassion later in this chapter. 
Shih told me that while the anti-tongzhi groups argued that tongzhi are more 
promiscuous than those who are straight, she sees no evidence to support that. She said 
that tongzhi who are not committed in their relationships are acting this way because of 
larger systemic discrimination and lack of societal support. Anthropologist Tiantian 
Zheng’s ethnography of tongzhi men in Dalian, China, describes how social stigma, the 
threat of police raids, and the secretive nature of same-sex relationships has led many 
men to engage in risky sexual practices (Zheng 2015). Zheng writes that in order to 
survive in society many of these tongzhi lead a double life, having wives or girlfriends 
																																								 																				
8 Interview on February 12, 2021.	
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while also seeking out random sexual encounters to temporarily satisfy their needs (2015, 
167). While some did form romantic relationships, social and cultural pressures usually 
made these unions hard to sustain (167). As a result, tongzhi men engaged in 
underground, risky behaviors in places such as bathhouses, or public parks and toilets—
where they were so frightened by possible police patrols that they were in too much of a 
hurry to put on condoms (167). Shih told me that the anti-tongzhi groups (which she also 
said were mostly Christian organizations) were being hypocritical, because if they think 
tongzhi are promiscuous then they should allow them to get married (the same argument 
she made above in example 4). She said that the opinion that some Christian churches 
have that tongzhi should stop their desire for people of the same gender does not make 
sense (from the perspective of Buddhism in which desire is instinctual) because these 
Christians wouldn’t be able to switch off their heterosexual desires either. For Shih, 
Christians’ lack of support for same-sex marriage is completely illogical. Shih believes 
that having support from society and government—namely in terms of same-sex 
marriage—can cause less suffering for tongzhi, which is why she has made active efforts 
to support it.  
4.4 Argumentative Strategies to Question ‘Family’ 
 In the excerpts I examined, Shih questions heteronormative ideas of what 
constitutes a family, and what the function of the family is. She does this in part by 
portraying her opponents as illogical through metapragmatic display. In his ethnography 
of Navajo poetry, linguistic anthropologist Anthony K. Webster examines the reportive 
metapragmatic devices used in a short story about boarding school experiences by Navajo 
poet Laura Tohe (Webster 2015). Webster argues that Tohe creates a contrast in the story 
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“So I Blow Smoke in Her Face” between the metapragmatic terms ‘tell’ on one hand, and 
‘tease’ and ‘joke’ on the other (2015, 44). He writes that her use of the verb ‘tell’ 
functions as a directive or monologic critique: for example, the narrator (a Navajo girl) 
‘tells’ two Chicano boys to drop her and her cousin off, stating that they are government 
property (45, 48). The use of the verbs ‘tease’ and ‘joke’ however, create a mark of social 
intimacy between Navajos, Webster argues (45). He writes that metapragmatic forms can 
aid in the construction of characterological images—one recognizes characters as playful 
or serious by the metapragmatic terms used for them (for example, ‘jokes’ versus 
‘explains’) (41). Through her use of metapragmatic forms, “Tohe constructs an image of 
the boarding school as a place where Navajos are silenced and humiliated, but also a 
place where at times they assert their own voices and challenge the boarding-school 
regimes,” Webster argues (44). Similarly, Shih also uses terms to create patterns of 
affective social relations—specifically describing her opponents negatively through the 
use of meta-cognitive construals. Those who obsess over family are being “obsessive-
compulsive” (line 19); those who worry about increased rates of homosexuality are 
“crazy” (line 25). She is responding to those who are contributing to the “alarmist talk” 
(line 21) spreading around Taiwan, from people who make “absurd statement[s]” (line 
32) such as the claim that tongzhi frequently change sexual partners. In this speech Shih 
is directly addressing the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family and 
others who subscribe to a heterosexual, Confucian idea of ‘family’—that family is 
between a man and a woman, and involves giving birth biologically to a child. Shih uses 
metapragmatic strategies to place all those who agree with this narrow conception of 
family into a faction and personhood she decries as illogical. Included in this faction—
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holding the same views about family—are potentially some of the legislators listening to 
her speech, as well as some members of the public (either attending the speech in-person 
or hearing/reading it through media transmission). This ‘illogical’ faction is referred to 
with the second-person pronoun “you” (lines 16, 17, 24, 29). However, if members of 
this faction were to think before speaking (line 43) and rearrange their logical reasoning 
(line 44), they could become part of the collective “we” that, like Shih, is logical and 
ethical.  
Furthermore, by paraphrasing some of the things her opponents have said (rates of 
homosexuality will increase; family’s purpose is producing the next generation; tongzhi 
rapidly change partners) and then stepping into direct address (i.e. line 23 “So will 
you?”), Shih puts their logic on display and invites those who hear or read her speech to 
decide their next step—more specifically, their footing vis-à-vis these discursively 
figured political positions (Goffman 1981). In the essay “Footing,” Erving Goffman 
(1981) introduces his concept of the same name by examining a newspaper article 
describing an interaction between Nixon (the U.S. president at the time) and female 
White House journalist Helen Thomas in which the president comments on Thomas’ 
wearing of slacks (124-5). Goffman writes that through the president’s comments, 
Thomas was forced from her occupational capacity into a “sexual, domestic one,” and 
argues that underlying this incident is the assumption that a woman must always be ready 
to change ground, or have the ground changed for her (125). For Goffman, this is an 
example of a change in footing, “the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present 
as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (128). In 
his essay Goffman also defines three different aspects of the speaker: the author (who has 
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selected the sentiments and words expressing them), the principal (person responsible for 
the message), and the animator—the “individual active in the role of utterance 
production” (144). Shih animates the words of her opponents, and then characterizes 
them as illogical both through metapragmatic display and through her use of direct 
address, asking questions to point out her opponents’ illogical thinking. By doing so, she 
also invites her audience (legislators and the general public) to decide whether they want 
to be irrational like her opponents or follow her footing and take her rational, progressive, 
globally minded path that recognizes tongzhi rights.   
 Shih also uses other strategies. She appears to question the rigidity of her 
opponent’s heterosexuality (lines 23-4). Her use of questioning (lines 23, 31, 38, 42, 44) 
forces her opponents to confront themselves and the arguments and assumptions they are 
making. In line 31, her question to her opponents to consider the role of families going 
beyond just combining eggs and sperm ends with “okay?” (ma). In the final excerpt she 
uses wei (a question word akin to “hello”) with emphasis when bringing up (and 
subsequently dismissing) the argument that tongzhi are promiscuous. These phatic forms 
(Jakobson 1960, 355-6) are part of her strategy of questioning; they serve to direct and 
focus attention as well as underline her points. Another poetic technique she uses to 
emphasize her argument is repetition. As stated previously, she deliberately repeats her 
claim that “the value of family has never been absolute” (lines 3-4). In the other excerpt 
(example 3) dealing with family, she states that the family has “many, many functions” 
(line 30). Shih draws on a variety of ideas and issues—Buddhas and traveling monks, 
sexual partners and marriage, egg and sperm, infertility—to argue for a broader definition 
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of family and to downplay the differences between heterosexual and non-heterosexual 
people. I will return to this rethinking of the family in the final section of this chapter.  
 Ultimately, these pragmatic-poetic strategies, often exploited in political speech, 
seem to have resonated with the media and the public. The excerpts I have chosen were 
quoted in both Taiwanese and Hong Kong media, and, according to Stand News, were 
widely discussed by netizens in the Chinese-speaking world (Stand News 2017). These 
same netizens nicknamed Shih “the god of war” (zhanshen). UP Media (2016a) described 
Shih as “fierce” in the headline and body of their article, evoking military imagery. It is 
possible that the rapid-fire delivery of her speech—as she neared her conclusion—
contributed to this characterization. It is important to examine Shih’s methodology of 
verbal discourse, because it is a part of her radical activism on ongoing social issues in 
Taiwan. Shih takes the arguments used in anti-tongzhi discourse and exposes their logical 
fallacies and limiting, hegemonic perspectives. This approach is informed by Buddhist 
doctrine—both the Buddhist perspective on family and ethics, as well as the Buddhist call 
to be compassionate and support all who are suffering. For Shih, this includes tongzhi. 
4.5 Shih Chao Hwei, Celibate Monks and Nuns, and Filial Piety 
  In this section I will explain how Buddhist monks and nuns have long had to 
defend their decision to leave their families, not marry, and not have children. I will 
examine how Shih herself has negotiated family responsibilities. Shih also questions the 
very nature of family—especially Confucian ideas and heteronormative expectations of 
family—and in doing so defends both tongzhi as well as her own chosen path as a 
monastic. 
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 Questioning her opponents’ idea of family—in which marriage serves the purpose 
of bearing offspring—was a major theme in Shih’s speech. Shih may be especially acute 
to the stigma attached to those who do not conform to this view of family because monks 
and nuns are unfilial from a Confucian perspective. When Buddhism spread to China 
from India around the first century C.E., it encountered resistance and was attacked by 
the Chinese (especially by Confucian scholars) for being antithetical to filial piety, the 
fundamental organizing principle of Chinese society (Chandler 2004; Hinsch 2002; 
Mitchell 2008). The word used to describe becoming a monk or a nun is chujia, which 
literally means to “leave home”. Buddhism stressed individual salvation and encouraged 
the devout to leave their homes and become celibate, devoting their energy to religious 
practice instead. Shaving one’s head was also regarded as unfilial because Confucius 
believed hair was a gift from one’s parents (Hinsch 2002, 53). Monks were accused of 
failing in their responsibility to care for parents, and—even worse—to produce sons to 
continue the patriline (Chandler 2004, 238). Historian Bret Hinsch writes that women 
were also on the front lines of this battle between native family values and imported 
Buddhist ideals:  
When a woman became a nun, from the traditional filial viewpoint she committed 
a terrible wrong. By removing herself from family life, she would no longer be in 
a position to take care of parents who became ill or destitute. She would not 
provide children to carry on a prospective husband’s family line…she had 
violated the fundamental principle of filial piety that held together China’s 
patrilineal kinship system—a principle that Confucian rhetoric canonized as 
supreme virtue. She might easily be seen as an ungrateful failure by refusing to 
adhere to the expected roles of daughter, wife, and mother (Hinsch 2002, 53).  
Shih Chao Hwei is very much aware of the longstanding criticism of monks and nuns for 
being unfilial. She mentioned that this hostility was expressed in literary work by Han 
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Yu, a Tang dynasty writer and government official, who wrote that monks and nuns are 
not fully human because they do not bear children.  
Stuart Chandler (2004) writes that contentious feelings towards monks and nuns 
continue to this day. In his book on Buddha’s Light Mountain (Foguangshan), one of the 
major Humanistic Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, Chandler writes that monastics find 
Chinese New Year to be an especially difficult holiday for them, because this is normally 
a time when people return home to reaffirm familial affection (Chandler 2004, 238). 
Also, Chandler writes, some of the public who visit these temples during this time “either 
unintentionally or sometimes even maliciously remind the clerics of their failure to fulfill 
this minimal act of filial respect” (238). Chandler also writes that there is an ongoing 
suspicion that Buddhist masters scheme to lure young people away from their parents. 
This impression was confirmed when a monk from another major Taiwanese monastic 
order tonsured 158 new disciples without their parents’ consent in September 1996, after 
they had initially gone to the monastery to join a short-term retreat (238). News coverage 
showed images of shocked and grieving parents flocking to the monastery to try and 
retrieve their sons and daughters, and editorials condemned the pressure techniques used 
to “brainwash” the young people and expressed concerns over the rising popularity of 
youth in Taiwan entering monastic life (239). Chandler writes that because of incidents 
such as these, the founding master of Buddha’s Light Mountain has taken pains to 
emphasize that Buddhist monasticism is not contrary to filial piety (239).  
 Through Shih’s questioning of the hegemonic Confucian concept of family, she is 
defending both Buddhist clergy like herself as well as tongzhi. In my interview with Shih 
she challenged the assumptions, values, and expectations placed around ‘family’ (as she 
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did in her speech), as well as the Confucian emphasis on filial piety in Taiwan’s culture. 
As I described in the previous chapter, Confucian ideas have shaped the view in Chinese 
culture that family (and not the individual) is the irreducible unit and the most basic 
social institution (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007). Buddhism is generally 
individualistic. It stresses individual liberation: through meditation and other practices 
one aims to break out of the cycle of rebirth and become a buddha or bodhisattva 
(Mitchell 2008). Therefore when Shih questions the notion of family to defend tongzhi 
against those who oppose same-sex marriage, she also defends the individualistic path of 
becoming a cleric and the individualistic nature of Buddhism in general. She does this by 
using the examples of Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (who she also referred to in her 
speech; see example 1) and Jesus of Nazareth. Siddhartha Gautama Buddha left his wife 
and son to undertake his spiritual quest, and Jesus of Nazareth did not marry or have any 
children. Both wandered in their spiritual journeys and also traveled and spread their 
teachings, hence Shih’s use of the English word “homeless” in her speech (line 10). 
Jesus’ and the Buddha’s lives offend Confucian sensibilities, yet they are the founders of 
major world religions and have positively impacted many people’s lives. Shih defends 
the individualism of monks and nuns by referring to those like the Buddha and other 
wandering monks who have “created the most glorious civilizations on earth” (line 11 in 
excerpt 1 above). She said she specifically criticized the concept of family put forth by 
groups like the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family because she 
said they influenced a lot of Buddhist monks and nuns into thinking that same-sex 
marriage was wrong. “If monks and nuns are saying that family is the only value in this 
life, then aren’t you contradicting yourself?” Shih asked rhetorically during our 
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interview. Since clerics also do not marry and bear children, they are also not following 
traditional Chinese familial obligations—so criticizing tongzhi for failing to do so is 
illogical and contradictory in Shih’s view. 
The pressure of filial piety not only negatively impacts tongzhi, as I described in 
Chapter 3, but also affects others who cannot fulfill the filial responsibility to bear 
progeny—such as monks, nuns, and those who cannot have children because of certain 
health conditions. Infertile women in both China and Taiwan describe the shame they feel 
because of not being able to bear children (particularly for their in-laws), and the pressure 
they experience to try infertility treatments that may not always be successful (Cheng et 
al. 2018; Yao et al. 2018). In her speech, Shih questioned why her opponents also want to 
“sweep aside” (line 29) these people. In our interview, Shih also mentioned heterosexual 
couples and individuals who are unable to bear children as an example of those who 
experience significant stress because of the expectations of filial piety. Shih spoke of 
this—drawing links between infertile people, clergy, and tongzhi—when I asked if she 
saw parallels between Buddhist clergy and tongzhi. I asked, given that monks, nuns, and 
tongzhi are not filial in the sense of marrying (or marrying heterosexually) and bearing 
children, if they face some of the same pressures and whether or not this has given her 
some insight into the experiences of tongzhi. She said there are some “subtle similarities” 
between them:  
When a Buddhist nun announces that she does not marry, that means she does not 
want to have offspring. She does not want to share the burden of continuing the 
family with her partner. That is his business, not hers. As for tongzhi, without 
artificial reproduction or adopting children that are not blood relatives, they also 
need to cope with their parents’ demand, which is to continue the family lineage. 
[…] I think we need to be reflective about why we put such emphasis on having 
offspring, in Confucian ideology. 
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Shih said that it is her compassion for the suffering of others that leads to her support for 
tongzhi. However, her chosen path as a nun has also given her insight into the struggles 
tongzhi have when they cannot be filial in the Confucian sense by providing offspring 
(Chou 2000). She and other clergy have also had to fight back against Confucian 
ideology. 
 Buddhists have long had to defend themselves against the charge that they are 
unfilial, and Shih too has taken up the strategy of stating that her practice of Buddhism is 
not inimical to filial piety. Some of the earliest Buddhist works in Chinese, such as the 
Treatise on the Disposing of Error (Mouzi lihuo lun) of late 2nd century CE, made efforts 
to refute the charge that Buddhist doctrine was unfilial (Hinsch 2002, 50). In 
contemporary times, monks and nuns of Taiwan’s Buddha Light Mountain have 
emphasized how they revere their parents by guiding them to appreciate and learn from 
Buddhist teachings, and the monastery allows clergy to take extended leave if their 
parents fall ill (Chandler 2004, 240-2). Shih also uses Buddhist framing to explain why 
she would still prioritize her family. She does this through her understanding of 
compassion (cibei). Compassion is a core component of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which 
regards the ‘bodhisattva path’ as superior to the path in which one who becomes an arhat 
(one who achieves nirvana and disappears from the cycle of rebirth at the end of their 
lifetime) (Mitchell 2008). In the ‘bodhisattva path’, one perfects oneself over many eons 
in order to become a Buddha, and during this time compassionately helps others gain 
enlightenment (Mitchell 2008, 103-6). Humanistic Buddhism (renjian fojiao)—the 
tradition to which Shih and her mentor Yinshun belong—sees the compassionate action 
of the bodhisattva as providing a role model for how to solve worldly problems and 
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reduce suffering (Pacey 2005). Compassion for others, which is one of the reasons Shih 
supports tongzhi rights, also affects her negotiation of her familial responsibilities while 
being a monastic. During the time she was still a novice nun at a small monastery in New 
Taipei City, Shih’s younger sister was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and their mother 
needed help finding medical care for her (Lieblich 2020). Her Buddhist master told her 
she had to choose between the monastery and her family, arguing that her first 
responsibility was to attain personal enlightenment. After struggling over whether to 
leave her master, she decided to go (Lieblich 2020). She moved with her family to a lay 
Buddhist community in southern Taiwan, and it was here that she found Master Yinshun 
and continued her learning. “If you want to develop compassion for everyone, then you 
start with the people that are closest with you. So, whenever my family is suffering, I will 
choose my family over what I’m doing right now,” Shih told me. Shih interprets 
obligations to her family through the bodhisattva notion of compassion. 
 Tongzhi can also reinterpret their filial obligations. As I explored in the previous 
chapter, members of the Daoist Brilliant Light Temple have become adopted children of 
Daoist gods, and they show filial piety through their devotion to their spiritual parents. 
Temple members have also been filial through ritual action in which they’ve improved 
the merit of disciples’ fathers and grandfathers who have passed away. From my 
interviews, it also seemed like having a family that includes children is important to 
tongzhi. Almost all the tongzhi I interviewed, as well as Daoist priest Master Lu and 
Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei said that the next step in tongzhi rights in Taiwan (given 




 In this chapter I examined Shih Chao Hwei’s support for tongzhi and how she 
critiques and reinterprets the concept of family and filial piety. I first made a pragmatic-
poetic analysis—drawing upon techniques used in ethnographical approaches to political 
speech events—of excerpts of a speech Shih gave at a public hearing in support of same-
sex marriage in 2016. I examined how Shih critiqued her opponents’ ideas of what 
constitutes a family, and how she also questioned the Confucian notion which views 
marriage as being primarily for the purpose of bearing children. I also argued that Shih 
challenges and dismisses her opponents and their logic through the use of strategies such 
as phatic poetic forms including repetition and rapid pacing, rhetorical questions using 
constructed dialogue, and negative characterizations via metapramatic construal. I then 
continue the discussion of Shih’s critique of family and filial piety, drawing from my 
interview with her. I argue that, like many Buddhists have had to do, Shih has had to 
defend herself against those who criticize monks and nuns for being unfilial. I argue that 
this is not unlike the challenge tongzhi encounter, in which they also have to face 
criticism from family members who will only fully accept them if they bear children. I 
conclude by arguing that both tongzhi and Buddhist clerics like Shih find ways to 
negotiate and reinterpret their family responsibilities. For Shih, it is choosing to not fully 
isolate herself from her family, as some Buddhist clergy would. For the tongzhi I have 
interviewed for my project, they enact filial piety through devotion to gods, rituals to help 





Daoist Master Weiming Lu and Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei come from 
different religious traditions, but they have both made serving the needs of tongzhi in 
Taiwan a core part of their work. While they do that in part through religious guidance 
and advocating for equal rights, many of the tongzhi that seek their counsel on an 
individual basis complain not of political or legal discrimination, but instead lament the 
struggles that they experience with their families of origin. Shih has facilitated 
conversations between some of her tongzhi students and their families who were 
“shocked and angry” when they learned of their children’s sexual orientation.  
Taiwan’s Confucian-inspired culture means that the family is strictly defined, 
with expected roles for each member. Given the nature of the family institution, and the 
belief that children need to marry and bear children to fulfill the expectation of filial 
piety, it can be challenging for some parents to accept tongzhi family members. In the 
previous pages, I drew on scholarship describing the familial pressure that tongzhi face, 
as well as fictive kin studies, in order to argue that tongzhi at the Daoist Brilliant Light 
Temple in Taiwan have created their own fictive kin network through the use of religious 
frameworks. These relations—with deities, Master Lu, and peers—provide members with 
emotional and social support. I argue that, through their negotiation of familial 
obligations and filial piety, religious tongzhi are not unlike celibate clergy such as Master 
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Lu and Shih Chao Hwei, who are also outside of the Confucian norm by not marrying 
and bearing children. Celibate monks, nuns, and priests have long had to defend their 
chosen path and argue that their religious work is in fact filial. The same Confucian 
pressure to marry and bear children acts on clergy as well as tongzhi, and this may 
motivate at least some of the support that Shih and Master Lu give to tongzhi.  
In my thesis I examined how Shih challenged the anti-same-sex marriage groups’ 
heteronormative view of family by portraying these groups as illogical, narrow-minded, 
and parochial—in contrast to progressives like herself who she argues are enlightened 
and cosmopolitan. Through this argument in support of tongzhi, Shih was also justifying 
her own chosen path as a monastic. Both tongzhi and clergy in Taiwan have found ways 
to negotiate and reinterpret their family responsibilities. To my knowledge, this 
connection between tongzhi and religious clergy in Taiwan has not been made before. 
This thesis also addressed a gap in the literature, as little scholarship has been done on the 
intersection of tongzhi with Daoism and Buddhism. 
Buddhism, Daoism, and a variety of folk religious beliefs and practices were 
brought to Taiwan with the immigrants who crossed the Taiwan Strait to come to the 
island from China starting in the 1600s, as well as introduced by Daoist and Buddhist 
missionaries. While these religious traditions were repressed in China during the Maoist 
era, for much of Taiwan’s history they were given the freedom to thrive and innovate. It 
is for this reason that Taiwan has become a source of information on Chinese religious 
practices: when some communities in China began to revive their religious practices 
starting in the 1980s, they could look to temples of the same gods in Taiwan as well as 
other connections across the Strait to restore and reinvent their traditions (Overmyer 
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2003). Therefore, Taiwan is arguably not on the periphery of Chinese religious practices, 
but is the very center. It is the complete religious freedom that Taiwan has today, as well 
as its democratic rights, which have made it possible for Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei to 
speak in front of the Taiwanese legislature to passionately call for same-sex marriage. It 
is also why Brilliant Light Temple—a Daoist temple focused on openly supporting 
tongzhi—can exist as well as be featured in both Taiwanese and international media 
reports. I believe it would be very difficult for this temple to exist in China, and that if it 
did, it would be underground and not publicized (given the stigma facing tongzhi in the 
PRC; see Zheng 2015). This thesis resituates Taiwan as the center of Chinese religion. 
 While I have chosen to focus on the topic of how tongzhi and religious clergy 
navigate and reinterpret family bonds and familial obligations, there are other themes that 
are apparent in my research. One is the role of patriarchy for both the tongzhi community 
in Taiwan and LGBTQ communities in the Euro-North American world. In Chapters 1 
and 2 I stated that I was choosing to use the term tongzhi throughout my thesis because 
the tongzhi community in Taiwan has its own unique facets and historical trajectory that 
differ from that of the LGBTQ communities in Europe and North America. Therefore, I 
argued, tongzhi is a more appropriate umbrella term than LGBTQ for this community. 
However, despite their different histories, the LGBTQ community in North America and 
the tongzhi community are both affected by patriarchy. The pressure that tongzhi face is 
patriarchal. They are to expected to marry heterosexually, and heterosexual marriage is 
for the purpose of producing heirs, preferably boys through whom the family name is 
continued. Stigma against LGBTQ in North America often has a basis in patriarchy as 
well: some men use homophobic jokes and slurs to assert their heterosexual masculinity 
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and adherence to patriarchal gender norms (which reflects a preference for male 
dominance, female submission, and hetero-cis-normativity) (Cameron 1997; Worthen 
2020). The social pressure that tongzhi in Taiwan and LGBTQ people in North America 
experience is often connected to a desire to preserve the patriarchy. 
 As I described in Chapter 2, there are a range of terms used in Taiwan by people 
who are same-sex attracted: there is tongzhi, the English terms ‘LGBTQ’ and ‘gay’, as 
well as gendered binary terms such as 1 and 0 and T and Po. One may use one term over 
another for a strategic political purpose. For example, one may use LGBTQ to align 
themselves with the global queer community. Or, for the organizers of the ‘First Hong 
Kong Gay and Lesbian Film Festival’ in 1989, using tongzhi as the Chinese language 
translation of ‘gay and lesbian’ was a conscious effort to use an indigenous term for 
same-sex love instead of a Western term (and using the Chinese term for ‘homosexuality’ 
was not feasible because of its negative connotations as a medical term connoting a 
pathology). Linguistic anthropologists Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang argue that the use 
of the term tongzhi by bimonthly tongzhi magazine G&L constitutes a discourse of 
resistance—namely reappropriating a term deeply rooted in the history of the Chinese 
communist revolution to describe a non-heteronormative sexual identity is an act of 
rebellion (2001, 267-8). Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian tongzhi woman (see Chapters 2 
and 4), chooses to use the term tongzhi because she said it is so broad—it can describe 
someone like her who is not sure if she is only attracted to women—and inclusive of a 
range of sexual identities. This is not unlike the description of the term by pioneering 
‘tongzhi theorist’ Chou Wah-shan, who argues that the term “rejects essentialism” and 
can refer to all forms of sexual practice that have been marginalized by hegemonic 
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heterosexism (2000, 3). The term tongzhi evokes the fluid conception of sexuality that 
prevailed for much of China’s history. 
 There are other terms in use that are more gendered, such as 1 and 0 among same-
sex attracted men (with 1s being associated with masculinity and 0s with femininity) and 
the masculine T and feminine Po identities among same-sex attracted women. These 
terms indicate an essentialism that didn’t previously exist in the imperial Chinese view of 
sexuality. While scholarship by anthropologist Zheng Tiantian (2015) suggests these 
gendered binaries are fairly rigid (one becomes a 1 or 0 and then is disciplined to stay in 
that role, for example), my research suggests these categories aren’t as fixed, as least not 
in Taiwan. Lloyd of Brilliant Light Temple described a whole spectrum that exists 
between tops and bottoms. His fellow temple member Evan said he decided to go from 
being a 0 to a 1 several years ago, and said that though he now enjoys being a 1, he also 
displays some behavior that is more associated with being a 0. For Evan, using 1 and 0 
may be more for the purpose of specifically describing the sexual role he takes in his 
relationships, for both he and Lloyd told me that they prefer to use the English word 
‘gay’ to describe themselves. This appears to be a cosmopolitan display. Like Buddhist 
nun Shih Chao Hwei’s use of English in her speech to the Taiwanese legislature, Evan 
and Lloyd’s use of the English term ‘gay’ may be a strategy to show themselves as 
globally minded in contrast to those who oppose tongzhi rights (who are portrayed as 
parochial and illogical by Shih, as I described in Chapter 4).  
The various terms for sexual orientation in use in Taiwan—some of which are in 
English, some of which are in Chinese; ranging from a fluid conception of sexuality to 
one that is more essential and gendered—can sometimes be used simultaneously by the 
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same person. Though there are reasons to see these terms as having their own unique 
histories and demarcated meanings, there is sometimes overlap: patriarchy often plays a 
role in the lives of both those who identify as LGBTQ and tongzhi. As I explored in this 
thesis, regardless of the term one may use, in Taiwan the main source of conflict for those 
who are same-sex attracted comes from the family—because of heteronormative 
expectations to marry, bear children, and continue the family line.  
 Finally, while I examine how the symbolic family formed among worshippers at 
Brilliant Light Temple provides emotional support and allows members to navigate 
familial responsibilities, it should be acknowledged that being a family also involves 
quotidian forms of support. Parents feed, clothe, and shelter their children, and family 
members take care of each other when someone is sick and help out with tasks and 
errands. Research on fictive kin networks has shown that these communities do often 
fulfill the same tasks. In Eric Shaw’s (2008) study of three different kinship groups 
(Haitian immigrants, Christian fundamentalists, and gang members), he notes that 
nonrelated members of these communities helped each other with everyday tasks and 
problems. Shaw writes that new immigrants to a Haitian community in New England 
relied on fictive kin for help with the immigration process and with food, shelter, and 
transportation when they first arrived (2008). In a different fictive kin community—that 
of gang members—individuals helped each other with small tasks such as providing 
transportation as well as larger concerns (such as bringing someone with a broken arm to 
a hospital) (2008). Shaw writes that helping members with “trivial” needs is often 
commonplace and expected—and that this same type of help is evident in the fictive kin 
communities he studied.  
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 Ultimately, I argued that members of Brilliant Light Temple are receiving 
substantial emotional support and care (an equally important function of family) through 
the fictive kin network they have created. I have made the new argument that clergy in 
Taiwan like Master Lu and Shih Chao Hwei are not unlike the tongzhi they serve—for as 
celibate priests, monks, and nuns, they are also outside of the heteronormative Confucian 
social order. I have demonstrated that through religious frameworks, both celibate clergy 
and tongzhi reinterpet family obligations and can therefore see themselves as being filial. 
Evan, who has had many struggles with his family, hopes that they too will see him as 
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Table A.1 Glossary of Chinese Terms 
Pinyin Characters (Traditional) English meaning 
baoshou 0 Conservative 
 
binghuan aB Illness, disease 
 
bufen  Term used among same-sex 
attracted women in Taiwan 
and PRC denoting neither 
masculine T or feminine Po; 
no visible gender 
identification 
 




Famous nun in Taiwan who 
leads the Tzu Chi 
Foundation  
 
chong 4 To favor, term used in 
homoerotic writing to refer 
to how emperors had male 
‘favorites’ 
 
chujia 2 To renounce and become a 
monk or nun (literally 
“leave home”) 
 
cibei FC Benevolence 
 
Ciji jijin hui FY"P

Tzu Chi Foundation; 
international NGO based in 
Taiwan  
 
Daodejing =l A fundamental text for both 
philosophical and religious 
Daoism, traditionally 
attributed to Laozi 
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dan M Type of female role in 
traditional opera that came 
to be associated with boy 
actors; term also 
synonymous with catamite 
 
Dong Xian s~ Male favorite of Emperor Ai 
  
duanxiu Lw ‘(Passion of the) cut sleeve’; 
a term denoting same-sex 
love in early Chinese history 
 
Duanxiu pian Lwj The Cut Sleeve; anthology 
of homoerotic short stories 
and anecdotes with stories 
chronologically arranged 
from 5th century up to 19th 
century 
 
fentao U ‘Divided peach’, metaphor 
referring to same-sex love 
 
Foguangshan 6 Buddha’s Light Mountain; 
one of the major Humanistic 
Buddhist organizations in 
Taiwan 
 
H  Term used among same-sex 
attracted women in Taiwan 
and PRC denoting neither 
masculine T or feminine Po; 
no visible gender 
identification; see also bufen 
 
Hongshi Tongxun <yx Hongshi Newsletter 
 
Hu Tianbao q% Name of a person who 
became deified into a god in 
Qing Dynasty China 
 
Hongshi Tongxun <yx Hongshi Newsletter 
(newsletter of the Hongshi 
Institute) 
 
jiaobei iS ‘Moon blocks’—a pair of 
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mussel-shaped objects used 
for divination 
 
jiaren 2 One’s family, or a family 
member  
 
jijian ( Literally ‘chicken 
lewdness’; connotation in 
English is ‘sodomy’ 
 
jingshenyao    kft Psychotropic drugs 
 
jitong h Spirit medium 
 
kengqiang  Impressive, resounding 
 
kuan 3 Broad 
 
lala II Term for ‘lesbian’ used in 
PRC 
 






credited with writing the 
Daodejing 
 
lazi I. Term for ‘lesbian’ used in 
Taiwan 
 
Lu Weiming d*N Name of Daoist priest in 
New Taipei City who runs a 
temple dedicated to Tu’er 
Shen 
 
Mazu e Mazu—the name of a sea 
goddess widely worshipped 
in Taiwan and SE China 
coast 
 
Mouzi lihuo lun 
 
^-_D{ Treatise on the Disposing of 
Error; one of the earliest 
Buddhist works in Chinese, 
dating to the late 2nd 
Century CE 
 
nütongzhi   '? Term used among same-sex 
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 attracted women in Chinese 
societies; literally ‘female’ 
tongzhi 
 
Po + Female tongzhi inclined to 
feminine gender 
performances; ‘femme’  
 
Quanguo zongjiao da 
lianmeng fan hunyin 
pinggqan 
 
 1K$pc,)9W National Religious Alliance 
Against Marriage Equality 
renjian fojiao K Buddhism for the human 







Mr. Sanshan Jiuhou; Daoist 
deity (other main god at 
Weimingtang temple, in 
addition to the Rabbit God) 
 
shifu 8\ Apprenticeship father; term 
used by Daoist disciples to 
address their master. Also 
used as a term of respect for 
a monk or nun. See also 
shixiong 
 
Shih Chao Hwei (in 
pinyin: Shi Zhao Hui)  







brother/sibling. Term used 
among Daoist disciples 
and/or temple members to 
address each other 
 




Taiwan banlu quanyi 
tuidong lianmeng 
Z
WbJpc Taiwan Alliance to Promote 




Taiwan zongjiao tuanti 




Alliance of Taiwanese 
Religious Groups Caring for 
Family 
 
Taixu &u Name of a modernist 
Buddhist monk (1890-1947 
who reformed Chinese 
Buddhism. Mentor to 
Yinshun 
 
Tong fanjing she hVkr ‘Child-Brahman Abode’, the 
first tongzhi Buddhist group 




?oKP Tong-Kwang Lighthouse 
Presbyterian Church; first 
openly pro-tongzhi church 
in Taiwan; opened in Taipei 
in 1996 
 
tongzhi ? Most popular contemporary 
word used in Taiwan, 
China, and Hong Kong by 
same-sex attracted people, 
those who are transgender, 
and others who are sexually 
and gender nonconforming. 
Literally ‘comrade’; roughly 
equivalent to LGBTQ 
 
tongxing’ai @E Translation of English word 
‘homosexuality’ 
 
tongxinglian @H Translation of English word 
‘homosexuality’ 
 
tongzhi ? LGBTQ (lit: comrade) 
 
tu’er  ‘Little' rabbit’ 
 
Tu’er Shen f Name of a Chinese rabbit 
god 
 
Tuye yizi   ]n- Uncle Rabbit God’s adopted 
son 





Weimingtang *N# Name of Daoist temple 
devoted to the Rabbit God; 
named after head priest 
Master Lu (see entries for 
Tu’er Shen and Lu 
Weiming); I have translated 
it as ‘Brilliant Light 
Temple’ 
 
Xia yidai xingfu lianmeng 	:gpc Alliance For The Next 
Generation's Happiness  
 
xiao / Filial piety; some monastics 
divide this into “great filial 
piety” (daxiao $/), 
connected to celestial 
powers and the state, and 
“little filial piety” (xiaoxiao 
5/) that is limited to one’s 
parents   
 
xiao 5 Little/small; can be used 
with a first name to mean 
“Little so-and-so”  
 
Xiao’en   5A Name of Christian tongzhi 
woman interviewed for this 
thesis 
 
Xinxin xiwang lianmeng 
 
>7Rpc Faith and Hope League 
(FHL) 
Xiong Dama [$ “Auntie Bear”, a person to 
whom letters to tongzhi 
magazine G&L could be 
addressed. Dama literally 
means “elder mother”, and 
is a kinship term referring to 
the wife of the father’s elder 




Name of a Chinese monk 
(1906-2005) who, along 
with his mentor Taixu, 
reformed Chinese 
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Buddhism. Was a mentor to 
Shih Chao Hwei. 
 
yizi n- Adopted son 
 
yuanfen m Term used to refer to a 
predestined relationship; can 
also be translated as “fateful 
coincidences”, “predestined 
affinity”, or “pre-fated 
bond”. 
 
Yuan Mei vT Qing Dynasty poet and 
scholar (1716-1798) 
 
Yue Xia Lao Ren Qo ‘The Old Man Under the 
Moon’; Name of a Chinese 
matchmaking god 
responsible for love and 
marriage 
 
yutao U Half-eaten peach/part of a 
peach that is not eaten; 
metaphor for same-sex love 
 
Zhengyi Dao  X Way of Orthodox Unity 
(Daoist movement)  
 
Zibuyu -z What the Master Would Not 
Discuss, a collection of 
supernatural stories by Qing 
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